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
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
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
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
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
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HAS GEN. GRANT GENIUS?

BY

PRIVATE JONES.

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HAS GENERAL GRANT GENIUS ?

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

It has been said that all have genius—that each one of us can do something better than any one else in the world. The results of our labor may not be so apparent to the world's eye as that of some, but we will be none the less happy in doing it. And when all are angels, it will doubtless be found that our work—the present company's excepted, of course—was as important and necessary a part of the Great Plan as that of any.

“Act well your part, there all the honor lies.”

Various definitions have been and will be given of the qualifications that constitute genius ; but with special reference to the matter in hand I would say, a genius is one whose thought cannot be anticipated. In war, when the average commander is confronted by such an one, he is all at sea : the usual plans to checkmate an ordinary antagonist are of no avail ; he cannot imagine how or where he will be struck ; and in this condition—he is already whipped.

One of the essentials of genius, then, is the capacity to originate plans that are too deep, too boldly conceived for the ordinary or even the able man to anticipate or prepare for.

And, as a beautiful voice is always accompanied by the capacity to learn music easily, so the ability to originate is accompanied by the courage to execute, the courage of your convictions. For the ability to make superior combinations goes for nothing if the person is too timid to test them.

The creative instinct is also accompanied by such an intense and unselfish love for the work for which it is best adapted, that life

itself is held cheap in comparison. This quality is known as enthusiasm, magnetism, etc., and is contagious.

In art it elevates and ennobles all who come in contact with it, and in a commander it inspires his men with a fire that is irresistible. The perfect commander is also a real artist, and not a mere butcher, as an incident in the late war goes to show.

During Sheridan's raid on Lynchburg, Custer was ordered in pursuit of Early. General Early was found at Waynesboro, in a well-chosen position, behind intrenchments, and Custer disposed his men for attack at once, sending three regiments around Early's left flank, while the balance of his troops deployed in front. Then charging impetuously at the head of his command he carried the Confederate works, and two regiments, without stopping, dashed through the town and secured the bridge in the Confederate rear, where they formed in line with drawn sabres. Early's entire command, on seeing this, "threw down their arms and surrendered, absolutely cheering at the suddenness with which they had been captured."

It was a work of art, and that was their tribute to the artist. General Sherman shows the artist's eye in the smallest matters. Speaking of a soldier roasting ears of corn, he says : "The fire was built artistically." Water-color painting, the general says, was his weakness when a young officer.

Military genius means, then, the capacity to conceive, the courage to execute, and the enthusiasm to inspire an army. General Badeau says : "It takes a hero to command an army." And so it does—to command it properly.

When the war broke out I thought it would take at least two years to subdue the South. Some thought then that it would be merely a matter of a few months ; but I felt assured that the Southern people would make a determined struggle, once they got into it.

When, however, Horace Greeley gave the order, "On to Richmond !" and I had read the vivid descriptions of the long lines of baggage-wagons that were advancing in that direction, I thought that I might be mistaken and that the baggage-wagons would do it.

After the first Bull Run I joined the Army of the Potomac, and knowing how much depended on the capacity of the leaders, I naturally "took stock" of all the generals and officers I saw.

Genius—military genius—did not appear to me to be rampant there, and, so far as I could see, an intelligent corporal could have handled the army as well as it was done on most occasions. In light

artillery (to which I belonged) phraseology, Forward into line ! Commence firing ! May the best men win ! would have covered most of the strategy.

To me a brigadier-general meant a man who could absorb a large amount of whiskey and assimilate a good deal of flattery from his subordinates.

About the most intellectual officer I saw was General Meade. The first time I saw him I thought, "There is the man that should have command of the army," and in about a year from that time he got it. General Hooker and he were riding together, and the contrast between the two was great. Meade's eyes were bent on the ground in an attitude of intense thought, while Hooker's head was thrown back as in those who have the approbative faculty largely developed, and would have been the last man in the army that I would have thought of in connection with the command of it ; but he got it, and the result is known.

When Halleck was digging in front of Corinth, Miss., May, 1862, one of the newspapers published a map of the theatre of war. Seeing by the map the great distance down to New Orleans or Mobile—to which points I supposed we would eventually press the enemy—I concluded that my two years' estimate to end the war would be more likely to run into fifty, more or less, at the rate we were then going. Next, I saw that it would be impossible to keep the railroad open such a distance through the midst of an enemy's country, for by the time our army got half way down it would require all the supplies that the road could haul to feed the army required to guard it, leaving nothing to feed an army fighting in front. "That won't do." I then swept my finger across the map from Corinth, keeping south of the mountains—Kenesaw Mountains, I believe—to the Atlantic, or near it, and up to the rear of Richmond.

"There's the way they should go," I said to myself. "Will they go ?" I hesitated for a moment, and then said, "Well, they'll be forced to go." I suppose I was therefore about the first to conceive the idea—crude as it was—of "the march to the sea," or of the capture of Richmond by the Western army, as it was a year and a half after that, before the "march to the sea" was attempted. In the newspaper map I think the Atlantic looked to be nearer and Mobile farther away than it appears on a proper map, otherwise the idea might not have occurred to me. And it is entirely unnecessary to my happiness that any one should believe what I say, nor do I wish

to detract a feather's weight from the laurels that the author of the march to the sea is justly entitled to.

The reason I hesitated at "Will they go?" was because I knew it required some little originality and courage to make such a movement. And so far I had not seen much of those qualities exhibited in the army leaders.

Sherman showed his comprehension of the struggle when he said it would take 200,000 men to go through the South-West, and I felt that so long as he was there the West would be taken care of. He was in a subordinate position then, but I knew he would make himself felt. He had also been called crazy by a politician, and that alone would be almost a sure sign of unusual ability in a soldier.

With General Grant, on the contrary, I had my doubts. When the news of the fall of Fort Henry came, and he was talked of as the rising man, I saw that he had been behind with his legions, as Commodore Foote feared he would be. And it appeared to me that a man of genius, after providing for every contingency, would move heaven and earth to be on time. "It is the half-hours," said Napoleon, "that decide battles." Even that time, halved, would be nearer to it.

Two different opinions have been given by men friendly to General Grant at two different periods—one immediately after the war, the other of late years. Of the latter, General Badeau, in his military history of U. S. Grant, noting how the general would turn from things of "great pith and moment" to matters of ordinary interest, says: "And marvel of all, he was not unwilling to turn from these momentous themes to descant on the making of a fire or the qualities of a horse." The natural inference is that in Badeau's opinion the general is a marvellous man. Colonel Ingersoll calls the general "the greatest man of the Saxon blood," while others are equally complimentary.

Greeley, writing immediately after the war, in speaking of the general's appointment to the command of all the armies, says:

"General Grant's qualifications for this most momentous trust were not universally conceded. There were many military men who esteemed General Meade, General Buell, General McClellan, and some other of our commanders his superior as a strategist, and several of his battles, especially those of Belmont and Shiloh, had not escaped the unfavorable judgment of military critics."

Swinton—war correspondent of the *New York Times*, and there-

fore friendly to the general—says of the Army of the Potomac, in his history of that army : “ And one must think—seeing it never had a, great, and generally had mediocre commanders—whatever it won, it owed not to genius, but bought with its blood.”

I give these opinions to show that there might be some foundation for my doubts. Swinton’s opinion confirms my own, that there was not much military genius running wild in the Army of the Potomac.

Soon after General Grant joined the Army of the Potomac, and before starting on the campaign, I saw him at a review of the artillery reserve.

“ Ah, he’s a fighter”—that is, if he got whipped he would try again. I was glad to see it, for I had long given up any hope of our being able to accomplish anything by superior generalship—Meade being constrained by the people at Washington—and therefore I only desired that the men should get a chance to fight it out themselves, for I hoped to see the war ended some time.

Otherwise, there was nothing marvellous about the general that I could see. In mental calibre he did not appear to outrank the group of generals who sat on horseback a few yards in his rear. The lines of the face looked too hard for genius—for genius requires imagination to conceive, and imagination is incompatible with hard lines. The eye, as Badeau admits, was neither piercing nor penetrating—an ordinary eye, in fact—and the ordinary eye does not conceal extraordinary ability as a rule. He sat his horse well, and looked as if he did not expect any disagreeable surprises—looked as if he intended matters to go differently in the future from what they had been in the past with the Army of the Potomac.

It was the custom of the press in those days to criticise the Union generals severely if they did not vanquish the enemy every time they met him. So, after the Wilderness affair I trembled for the general. But when I saw the headings in the newspapers in great capitals, “ Fight it out on this line,” etc., “ Oh, that’s the way he got over it,” thought I, and I was glad to see him escape (from the press) so easily.

The patriotic press realized the situation ; they knew that the government tried to do the best they could, and now they must be supported through thick and thin or the effect might be disastrous. Badeau says, “ It electrified the North.” It did not appear to affect the army that way, that I could see ; they took it mild.

After Early’s raid on Washington our battery served under Sheridan in the “ Valley.” While on the march one day I heard the

clatter of a squad of mounted troops going in the same direction, marching a few yards to our right flank. I paid no attention to them, as troops were continually passing and repassing to the front and rear ; but feeling the magnetism of a pair of eyes directed on my face I glanced up and saw the leader looking back at me. As our eyes met we measured each other instantly. My estimate was, "Genius in repose." I knew that the eyes that were now regarding me for an instant with a clear and penetrating glance—eyes such as a woman or an artist might have—could assume the real hell-fire aspect when necessary.

" In peace there's nothing so becomes a man
As modest stillness and humility ;
But when the blast of war blows in our ears,
Then imitate the action of the tiger :
Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,
Disguise fair nature with hard-favored rage ;
Then lend to the eye a terrible aspect."

—Henry V.

Becoming interested in the leader, I asked one of the men who he was. "General Sheridan," he replied. This was before he had crossed swords with Early ; but in less than six weeks from that day Sheridan had exhibited a capacity to conceive, a courage to execute, and a magnetism and energy to direct and inspire his soldiers never surpassed, seldom equalled.

After the war was over I was willing, like the majority, to give General Grant full credit for all that had been accomplished by the Union armies. He had been the chief, and was entitled to the credit. I was even willing that he should be called "United States Grant," as his initials were sometimes interpreted in those days, with all which that implied, although I saw in the news of Lee's surrender that it was through Sheridan's suggestion that he was enabled to accomplish that feat.

When he was nominated for the Presidency I doubted his capacity to fill that position, but the cry of Cæsarism, third term, etc., I regarded as nonsense for a long time.

But when the intention became manifest, I felt—like the majority, again—strongly in the matter. All the rest of the soldiers had settled down quietly to their usual avocations, but he, who had been loaded down with every favor which the country could bestow on him with honor, sought to break through a custom established by our first

President and respected by all his successors, and thus establish a dangerous precedent.

Was this what the soldiers fought for? Not if I understood their feelings. They fought for the Republic, not for any one man in the Republic, and would regard the attitude of General Grant, or any man in the same position, as a menace to our institutions. I respect the opinions of those who honestly thought it would be for the welfare of the country to elect General Grant President for a third term, assuming them to be at least as patriotic as myself, and I always desire to have my neighbor vote if opposed to my opinion, for he may be right, I may be wrong, and the country would have the benefit of his vote.

It was not what the general would do, but what would the next "greatest man of the Saxon blood" do, after the lines had been broken once? And the next? And the next? For they will keep coming.

The same circumstances affect different people in different ways. I began to strike back. Would not a really great man respect the fears, even if groundless fears, of a large number of his most intelligent fellow-citizens? "The good alone are great."

My original estimate of the man was confirmed, and despite the fact that his attitude implied the absurdity of one so great as he being bound by a custom inaugurated by Washington, yet, my belief in the principles on which intellects are constructed was so assured that before I had read any history of the war I asked myself in my pride as an American citizen, "Who is General Grant?"

So when the "Hon. Roscoe" referred to the general's "record"—meaning his military record—as a test of his capacity to fill a most important civil position, I resolved to look his "record" up, and if I saw indications of his being a candidate again I would publish the results of my examination.

I assumed that he would give a hint of his intention in his speeches or otherwise during the last Presidential campaign, and I was not mistaken. But he held out very well, and it was only the night before Garfield's election that he said to a phalanx of young citizens, who were marching into a meeting in martial array, "It should be four years from now, boys." And some of them replied, "It will be for yourself then" (New York *Herald*).

In the mean time General Badeau has published his military history of the general, and it is from that source, and from other writers friendly to the general, that I looked for his "record."

It is not complimentary to the discrimination of those who think—or pretend to think—that because a man is superior in one direction that he must be superior in every direction. On the contrary, it will be found that genius is generally limited to a specialty. Outside of that they do not rise above, and in many directions sink below, the average. It would not be giving every one a fair chance. “Every man you meet is your superior in some direction.”

It is true that Michael Angelo was sculptor, painter, architect, etc., but these may be properly considered as in one line, requiring the same faculties. Had he been put in charge of a scrap-iron yard—which requires no imagination to run—he would have failed. Patrick Henry, orator, failed as a grocer. Sherman marched around from Tennessee to North Carolina—nor could he be stopped—but there a few lawyers from his own army and a few lawyers from the Confederate army “talked him blind” about civil matters. Patti, when trying to “manage” herself for even one night, was a dead failure. Mr. Beecher’s principal crop from his farm has the (to him) extraordinary peculiarity of blossoming out in one unvarying color, no matter what he may plant—black and white—bills payable.

Before proceeding farther, let us get our weights and measures adjusted.

I have stated that it requires at least three essentials to constitute a military genius, also that I took Sheridan to be a man of genius at the first glance.

Then if he fulfilled these conditions, I will consider the assertion proved.

As to his capacity to conceive, Swinton, speaking of the battle of Five Forks, says : “He devised a beautiful tactical manœuvre. He ordered General Merritt, while holding the enemy in front with the cavalry, to demonstrate as though he aimed to turn the Confederate right, and directed Warren to form his infantry so that its full pressure would fall directly on the enemy’s left flank and rear.

“The Confederates were now completely entrapped. Held as in a vise by the cavalry, which enveloped their whole front and right, stung with a biting fire and charged at the signal of the musketry of the infantry, they now found a line of battle sweeping down in their rear. Thus placed, they did all that men may. But it was in vain.” Colonel Taylor, of General Lee’s staff, says the Confederates were almost annihilated.

His capacity to conceive and courage to execute were shown when

he first got an independent command in the late war. When with 2000 troopers he was nearly surrounded by 6000 of the enemy, he turned the tables on them, and drove them in great confusion and loss for twenty miles.

He first sent 90 men by a long detour to come in on the enemy's rear, and on the signal being given—their firing on the enemy—he charged in front on the surprised and confused enemy, who, not knowing what force had struck them in the rear, fled in great rout and disorder.

Evidently his thought was not anticipated. Brains count fast in war.

The secret of his power over his men was owing to his own example of terrible earnestness and activity in battle, besides their confidence in his plans, filling every one with an eagerness and desire to take their part in his combinations.

Nor would he allow any consideration to balk his plans. "Fly, or I will dismount you," he shouts to an aide, after giving him an order to execute at Winchester, while he himself "flew" along the line of battle as if mounted on a winged steed. And when the men saw every factor in the fight move like clock-work, without hitch or blunder, and at the proper moment everything on foot, on wheels, or on horseback that could strike, crush, or destroy was hurled upon the enemy like a thunderbolt, and he was sent "whirling," why, then, "Phil" was their man, and they were "Phil's" men, and the combination meant success.

To keep the men upon their mettle continually, in camp as in battle, he took woman's persistent methods. An infantry soldier told me that Sheridan visited their camp one day, and as the men, who were standing around in groups, saluted him as he was passing he said, "No saluting, boys, no saluting. When it comes to a fight, show what you are made of. If you have no stomach for a fight, go home to your mothers and get a suck."

In his "Ride from Winchester" the apparition of the flying horseman proclaimed victory to the retreating stragglers, and "Face the other way, boys, face the other way," was instantly and enthusiastically taken up and obeyed.

"And victory crowned the day."

I might add to these examples to show that there were no "doubters" under Sheridan.

It is unnecessary to say that Sheridan never attacked an enemy just as an enemy wanted to be attacked. He was not afraid to get around on the enemy's flank and rear, for fear of being "isolated"—gobbled up. Starting his enemy first on the flank, he generally moved in his whole force in a half-wheel, as the enemy gave way, forcing him out of his intrenchments as the spoke of a gigantic wheel would do, if turned horizontally. This prevented the flying host from recovering or getting any chance to re-form for a stand.

Then, if possible, he struck them from the other flank with his cavalry, and thus made large hauls of prisoners and guns.

His appreciation of time and energy in battle is evinced by an incident at the battle of Cedar Creek.

While putting the disorganized troops into position he despatched an aide for the Sixth Corps, but despite the fact that his aides "flew" at his command—when in battle—yet he would not trust to them, but "flew" after the Sixth Corps himself.

I might multiply evidences of Sheridan's capacity to meet every emergency by instantaneous and superior methods, which were executed without doubt or hesitation, and will therefore consider my scales correct.

CHAPTER II.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

THE march to the sea was a thorough test of military genius. No cast-iron commander would ever have thought of such a movement ; or if the idea had been suggested to him, would he have had the courage to attempt it under the conditions in which it was made ? If General Grant was the first to conceive this project, then I will admit that he is a man of genius by this one test.

Badeau, vol. iii., p. 66, says : " As to the original idea of the march the germ was undoubtedly Grant's."

That should settle it, as the germ—the rough diamond, the indistinct glimmer—when discovered can be easily polished up by ordinary minds and hands.

" The germ was undoubtedly Grant's ; but—"

This reminds me of what Mr. Beecher said of Dr. Chapin. Said he : " There were no buts in his character." With the general, however, it is, " undoubtedly," " but—"

As this assertion is made in the third volume, and as Badeau says in his first volume that General Grant often spoke about these movements to his staff in January, 1864, before Sherman got command of the army, we will examine that statement first.

Speaking of the movement against Atlanta and Mobile, Badeau, vol. i., p. 571, says : " This operation had now been frequently explained by him to his staff. It was his plan, at this time, to fight his way to Atlanta, and then holding that place and the line between it and Chattanooga, to cut loose with his army either for Mobile or Savannah, whichever events should designate as the most practicable objective point." Now this testimony should also settle the question at once ; but, unfortunately, the statement that General Grant " frequently explained " his idea of cutting loose either for Mobile or Savannah is contradicted by General Grant's own letter to Halleck of October 4, 1864, when Sherman was pressing Grant for his consent to make the march. Grant says : " When this campaign was commenced nothing else was in contemplation but that Sherman, after

capturing Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile" (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 54).

Now surely if Grant had "frequently explained" to his staff his plan of cutting loose for "Mobile or Savannah," he would have remembered something about it; but "nothing else was in contemplation," he says, except moving toward Mobile—an idea that required no genius to conceive, for every schoolboy must have understood the main idea—to press the enemy as far South as he could, and drown him in the Gulf of Mexico if he did not surrender. And surely if General Grant had "frequently explained" this idea of moving either to Savannah or Mobile to his staff, he would also have "explained" it to General Sherman, and that would have settled the matter as to who first conceived the idea of the march, for I count myself out in this discussion. Again, he would have informed Halleck of it at this time; but instead (Badeau, vol. i., p. 554) "Grant announced his plan to Halleck at this time" (January 15, 1864): "I look upon the next line for me to secure to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile; Montgomery and Mobile being the important intermediate points." Notice what he says next. "I do not look upon any points except Mobile in the south and the Tennessee River in the north as presenting practicable starting-points from which to operate against Atlanta and Montgomery." . . . "A copy of this letter was sent to Sherman, and on the 19th Thomas also was informed."

No word here about Savannah, and for the best of reasons: first, because Savannah lay in the line of operations of the eastern armies (Grant was not then lieutenant-general), and it was probable would be captured by those armies, as they would endeavor to press the enemy toward the last ditch—the Gulf of Mexico. Consequently there would be no occasion to start the western army to the east. And again, the contingency which suggested that march (the failure to capture Mobile) was not anticipated at that time. My own notion of transferring the western army to the east was on account of the impossibility of supplying that army from the north while it was forcing the enemy toward the Gulf; but by capturing Mobile, with a separate force from the south, and opening up the Alabama River to Montgomery, 200 miles north of Mobile, supplies could be sent to meet Sherman at that point, as he cut loose from Atlanta. Consequently there appeared no more necessity for going to Savannah at that time than of going to Chicago, nor was there a word said or a

suggestion made to Halleck about capturing Savannah, to meet Sherman with supplies from the east, much less that Sherman should start on a march of over 300 miles through an enemy's country, uncertain of where he should strike the coast.

Further, Badeau, vol. iii., p. 46, says of Grant and Sherman : " Neither as yet " (September 12, 1864) " dreamed of cutting loose from Atlanta except to find another base already opened." Then how could Grant explain this movement frequently to his staff eight months before ? Or why did he not explain it to Halleck, Sherman, and Thomas ? To this may be added Badeau's opinion that Grant himself would probably never have made the march under the conditions in which it was made.

The inevitable conclusion is that Grant never spoke a word to his staff officers about going to Savannah at that time, instead of explaining this movement to them " frequently ;" but that, on the contrary, his plans as then communicated to his superiors and subordinates, by telegram, by letter, or in conversation, contemplated nothing else, as he himself says, " but that Sherman after capturing Atlanta should connect with Canby at Mobile." And the assertion that Grant had now frequently explained his plan of cutting loose with his army, " either for Mobile or Savannah, whichever events should designate as the most practicable objective point," is entirely without foundation.

And as General Badeau did not join General Grant's staff until about a month after these supposed conversations, the affair has a bad look.

But why does Badeau smuggle in these imaginary conversations into his " history " ?—I say smuggle, because it is a plain English word. But what was his idea ? Surely he did not think it necessary to stuff so great a man as General Grant with imaginary brains ! For he describes the general as " announcing judgments, made apparently at the moment, which he never reversed, and which the world has never seen reason to reverse ; enunciating opinions or declaring plans of the most important character in the plainest words and commonest manner, as if great things and small were to him of equal moment ; as if it cost him no more to command armies than to direct a farm, to capture cities than to drive a horse."

It would certainly be descending from the sublime and approaching dangerously near to the ridiculous to suppose that such a man would require imaginary incidents and conversations to be introduced into

his "military history" to make it appear "as if great things and small were to him of equal moment"—as if heroic and original ideas, like the march to the sea, or the very obvious plan of pushing the enemy straight before him, were alike to him.

But facts are stubborn things, and when we read Sherman's letter to Grant at the time he was commissioned lieutenant-general the descent seems possible. Sherman says: "My only point of doubt was in your knowledge of grand strategy" (Badeau, vol. i., p. 574).

In plain words he doubted Grant's capacity in the prime necessity of generalship—brains, the capacity to conceive—and Badeau's assumption that it cost the general "no more to command armies than to direct a farm, to capture cities than to drive a horse," would certainly affect Sherman's risibles.

So it would those who in the army took him, Badeau says, for a "good, plain man, who blundered on one or two successes in battle or campaign," or those who thought that General Rawlins supplied the general with ideas. Badeau, vol. ii., p. 191, says: "But it would be a mistake to imagine that he" (Rawlins) "was entitled to the credit of Grant's conceptions, some of the most successful of which he earnestly opposed. It did not take Grant and Rawlins to make Grant, as some have said who knew neither intimately."

The question as to who supplied the ideas we will get at, if possible, and it was this question that got Badeau into a peculiar position. He had a difficult task before him. It reflects credit on the people to know that it gave them pleasure, until lately, to listen to the praises bestowed on the general-in-chief of the Union armies. As a consequence of this, and also because of his influential position for some years, rivals for public favor of any kind outdid each other in high-sounding phrases in this direction, until "the greatest man of the Saxon blood," "the greatest man on earth," became familiar terms, reminding some of us of the story of the man who had vomited "three black crows," which grew out of the fact that he had really vomited "something as black as a crow."

The highest pinnacle appeared to be accepted by the general and his "friends" as the proper estimate of his abilities, on the basis of which a new, and some thought an alarming, method for public indorsement (a third term) of this estimate was proposed.

And it was from this giddy height that the general expected to be exhibited to an admiring world in Badeau's "Military History of U. S. Grant."

On the other hand, Badeau knew the estimate that the army and impartial historians had formed of the general during and immediately after the war, and also the damaging effect of "Sherman's Memoirs" to the pretensions of the general. So he has given us an imaginary Grant instead of the real man.

He was Grant's military secretary during part of the war, and as he exhibits a capacity to discriminate between ability and the want of it, I infer that his estimate of the general was like my own, and that he would just as soon expect to hear the general propose to cut loose from the earth, and march to the moon, as to hear him propose to cut loose from Atlanta and march to Savannah, under the conditions in which the march was made. And, like some writers of fiction who insist that their stories are literally true, he pretends to be very solicitous for historical truth. In his preface he says: "I have striven to avoid unnecessary personality; but the occasional danger of this fault has been an insignificant consideration when compared with the importance of historical truth." Of the various meanings this was intended to convey, one was his unwillingness to exhibit the general, in season and out of season, as the grand luminary around which the earth and moon had the honor to revolve, and that nobody else amounted to much; but historical accuracy forced him to do it.

Lest my readers may think my conclusions premature, I quote from Badeau of January 15, 1864, vol. i., p. 554. He says: "The grand movements dictated to Sherman months afterward, and by him so grandly executed, were already marked out by the chief for himself thus long in advance."

The sympathetic reader might naturally expect "unutterable things" from such grandiloquent language.

And first, what were the "grand movements" afterward dictated to Sherman? Why, nothing but the movements, which, as I said before, must have been apparent to any intelligent person—the effort to force the confederate army as far south as possible. The Confederates had already anticipated, and prepared for the coming campaign, by fortifying every "coign of vantage" as far south as Atlanta.

The joke here is that Grant thought the coming campaign would be in an entirely different direction—he thought it would be up the valley of East Tennessee, in the direction of Virginia; and it was only after Sherman went to him to get permission to undertake the "Meridian raid" that he marked out the "grand movements for himself thus long in advance."

Sherman went to see him on the 21st of December, 1863, in regard to the raid, and on the 15th of January, 1864, he wrote Halleck in regard to the raid, and said : " I look upon the next line for me to secure to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile " (Badeau, vol. i., p. 554).

Sherman, in his Memoirs, vol. i., p. 386, says : " At that time " (December 21, 1863) " General Grant was under the impression that the next campaign would be up the valley of East Tennessee, in the direction of Virginia. " What enemy he would have found in his front in such a campaign is more than I can see.

It might also be inferred that Sherman would be astonished when informed of the grandeur of the conceptions dictated to him " months afterward, " and would form an exalted estimate of the intellect which conceived them. But, as the idea of a campaign toward Mobile was rather old with him—he had talked with Halleck about such a campaign two years before, and with Secretary Cameron three years before—why there is reason to suppose that Grant's letter in regard to the plan and conduct of the campaign did not take his breath away. Indeed, there is the suspicion of the possibility that Sherman also mentioned the idea to Grant first.

I quote the " grand movements " dictated to Sherman that my readers may see where the grandeur came in.

In Grant's letter to Sherman of April 4, 1864, which contained all his instructions in regard to Sherman's campaign, he says : " You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and get into the interior of the country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

" I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. " This is how the " grand movements " were " dictated " to Sherman. In Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 254, speaking of the fall of Corinth, Miss., May, 1862, and of Halleck as " a man of great capacity, of large acquirements, " he says : " Had he held his force as a unit, he could have gone to Mobile, or Vicksburg, or anywhere in that region, which would by one move have solved the whole Mississippi problem ; and from what he then told me, I believe he intended such a campaign, but was over-ruled at Washington. "

Thus the " grand movements marked out for himself thus long in advance " had been common property years before, and the mountain

in labor brings forth the usual mouse. But why did Grant change his mind from the impression that the next campaign would be up the "valley of East Tennessee," to the determination that it would be down toward Atlanta and Mobile, so soon after Sherman's visit to him?

We have no positive proof that Sherman suggested the idea to him, but we have Badeau's statement that Sherman suggested the demonstration against Mobile by Banks and Farragut, to help him carry out his own raid on Meridian.

Sherman also suggested that Thomas's forces at Chattanooga should also demonstrate against Johnston, to cover his advance against Meridian.

If, then, Sherman suggested these demonstrations, and if he mentioned the Mobile campaign to Halleck nearly two years before, is it unlikely that he suggested the same idea to Grant now?

Extracts from the letters of Grant and Sherman, when Grant was appointed general-in-chief, will help my reader to determine this point. Grant to Sherman: "But what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the *men* to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance you know." Sherman in reply says: "I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you."

Thus it appears that in all but two of his battles in the West he had received advice and instructions from either Sherman or McPherson. At Belmont his men had to cut their way through the enemy to reach our gun-boat, and thus avoid being all captured; and at Donelson the fighting was about over, and the sortie of the enemy checked while Grant was aboard a gun-boat, totally ignorant of the matter. Halleck gives General Smith the credit for this victory.

So all this cackling was, it appears, over another man's ideas—ideas of which Badeau's readers suppose Sherman to be totally ignorant until they were dictated to him, and probably stupefied him with their grandeur and originality months afterward.

Badeau, however, desires to be strictly just, and give credit where credit is due. In his description of the "Meridian raid," in which Sherman destroyed the Confederate railroads beyond repair in that part of the country during the war, Badeau calls attention, in a foot-

note, to the fact that Sherman suggested the demonstration against Mobile to distract attention from the real object of the movement ; but whether from a desire to save his readers the infliction of too many " words, words, words," or from a proper economy in paper, he does not record the fact that Sherman conceived and planned the raid in all its details, Grant's part in the affair being merely to sanction and co-operate.

Sherman, in his *Memoirs*, vol. i., p. 388, says : " The rebels still maintained a considerable force of infantry and cavalry in the State of Mississippi, threatening the river, whose navigation had become to us so delicate and important a matter. Satisfied that I could check this by one or two quick moves inland, and thereby set free a considerable body of men held as local garrisons, I went up to Nashville and represented the case to General Grant, who consented that I might go down the Mississippi River, where the bulk of my command lay, and strike a blow on the east of the river, while General Banks, from New Orleans, should, in like manner, strike another to the west."

The great man himself, in announcing the contemplated raid to Halleck, does not say, " I have given Sherman permission to strike a blow at Meridian and the railroads," but, as if the idea were his own, he says : " I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian" (Badeau, vol. i., p. 553). While, like master like man, Badeau seizes a pretext to claim the " germ" of the Meridian campaign. He says : " On the 11th of December Grant wrote to McPherson, who had been left in command at Vicksburg : ' I shall start a cavalry force through Mississippi, in about two weeks, to clean out the State entirely of all rebels.'

" This was the germ of what has been known as the Meridian raid." My readers must choose which they shall believe in this case, Sherman or Badeau.

How the general was to " clean out the State entirely" with a few thousand cavalry, when Sherman encountered a force estimated at twelve thousand infantry and artillery, while the confederate cavalry outnumbered ours, is the question.

But we have had enough of the Meridian raid, and shall now try to ascertain who first conceived the idea of the march to the sea.

As before stated, Sherman started with the intention of sweeping down to Atlanta, and then toward Montgomery, Ala., a point about 150 miles south-west of Atlanta and 200 miles north of Mobile, where he hoped to meet supplies and our forces from Mobile, by way of the

Alabama River. But as the latter part of the programme (the capture of Mobile) was not carried out, and as the enemy's cavalry was on his road in his rear trying to cut off his supplies, Sherman—being an unreasonably stubborn sort of man, who could not think of retreating as Grant did a year before when his supplies were cut off at Holly Springs, but would press forward instead—telegraphed to Grant, August 13 : “ If ever I should be cut off from my base, look out for me at St. Mark's, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia ” (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 42). “ This,” Badeau continues, “ was the first mention in the correspondence of either Grant or Sherman . . . of the possibility of a campaign in Georgia, entirely without a base. Doubtless the idea was presented to Sherman by the menace to his communications offered by Wheeler's cavalry,” etc.

This is where Badeau begins the real discussion of the question. His statement in the first volume he overlooks or does not mention, because, as I believe, he could give no names to substantiate that statement. Nor can this be attributed to an oversight in him, for when Grant mentioned his idea of moving to Spottsylvania Court-House from the Wilderness, about a day before the order was given, Badeau hastens to put that fact on record, and give the names of the staff officers to whom it was suggested.

And as this is an original idea, which the other could not be called, we may safely assume that the names would be produced to whom Grant had “ frequently explained ” his idea at that time.

The assertion that Grant was the first to conceive the “ germ ” of the idea is founded, in this case, on a misstatement of facts—something in the way the late Lord Beaconsfield used to conduct his arguments. The noble lord would state that his opponent said thus and so—when in reality his opponent said nothing of the kind—and he would then go on to comment on what his opponent had not said.

It was on or about the day that Sherman sent his telegram to Grant that he (Sherman) had first heard of the failure to capture Mobile, and as the enemy were operating on his roads at the same date, the contingency had occurred in which he was forced to decide which way he would move if his supplies were cut off. Consequently, when Badeau says that this was the first communication that ever passed between Grant and Sherman, and when all his evidence goes to show that Grant's idea was conceived after this date—not before—then Sherman—not Grant—must get the credit of having first conceived the “ germ ” of the idea.

The capture of Mobile could not be undertaken, because General Canby's troops, who were intended for that purpose, could not be spared by the government. Some of them, indeed—the Nineteenth Corps—had to go help Grant.

Two thousand, however, were sent, under Gordon Granger, to co-operate with Farragut in securing the harbor and its forts, thus closing the port to commerce.

But as Sherman—who may not have been aware of the cause then—kept pressing Grant to know if the original plan of getting control of the Alabama River could be carried out, Grant telegraphed to him, September 10, a very brilliant idea. He proposed that Canby's troops, which could not be spared from west of the Mississippi to capture Mobile, should be shipped over 2000 miles to the Atlantic coast to "act" on Savannah, while Sherman should move on Augusta, Ga.—the Mobile idea adapted to Savannah. He says: "Now that we have all of Mobile that is valuable (the harbor), I do not know but it will be the best thing for Major-General Canby's troops to act on Savannah while you move on Augusta. I would like to hear from you, however, in this matter" (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 45).

When he wrote this he was aware that the enemy were preparing to attack Canby's troops in their own department, and that the government would not permit their withdrawal, for since Grant "seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg," as Lincoln said, the government took matters more under their own control.

And it is in this really original idea—conceived about a month after Sherman's—of acting on a point without troops to "act on" it—an idea only equalled in brilliancy by that of a campaign up the valley of East Tennessee without an enemy in front—that Badeau sees the "germ" of the march to the sea.

This substitution of Savannah for Mobile, if it could have been carried out, would more properly be called a modification of Sherman's idea instead of containing the "germ" of that idea. But if Sherman had supposed there was any chance of Savannah being captured by the troops that could not be spared to capture Mobile—so near to them—it is more than likely that he would also have proposed that idea—for Sherman took no risks that could be avoided to secure success.

Again, it was not Sherman's intention to go to Mobile; if that city had been captured, he would have made his base for his next campaign at Montgomery or Columbus, points about 250 miles north

from Mobile. So also if Savannah could have been captured by Canby's troops and supplies be sent to Sherman at Augusta, 175 miles north of Savannah, he would have made Augusta his base for his campaign north instead of marching 175 miles down to Savannah, and then marching 175 miles up again for nothing, for Augusta lay on the direct road between Savannah and Columbia, which Sherman captured first on his way north, after leaving Savannah.

Grant's words were : "Move to Augusta"—not to Savannah—so that under these conditions the march to the sea would never have been made. Then, how could Grant be the first to conceive the "germ" of the march to the sea, when his suggestion would have made it unnecessary ? Had he made this suggestion before receiving Sherman's telegram, instead of a month after, it might then be said, with some propriety, that Sherman caught the idea of going to Savannah himself when it was found that Canby's troops could not be spared for that purpose.

I insert President Lincoln's letter to Sherman on the subject as the testimony of one who knew whereof he spoke ; but I desire that my readers may judge for themselves from the evidence which I submit from Badeau's book.

The originator of an idea seldom cares much about getting credit for it, but the public don't like to see it stolen from him ; so I propose to make it perfectly clear to my readers who is the author of the march to the sea and who conceived the "germ" of that idea. This letter of President Lincoln's is the only testimony I offer that I don't find in Badeau's history. The original letter is in Sherman's possession, he says, and a copy of it is in his Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 166.

" WASHINGTON, December 26, 1864.

" . . . When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful ; but, feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering ' Nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours ; for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce, and, taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.

" A. LINCOLN."

Pursuing this movement a little further will enable us to get the chief points of Badeau's observations on the subject, and also give a good idea of the operations of General Grant's intellect.

Now, Grant's idea, owing to the uncertainties involved in it, even if he could have got troops to attempt the capture of Savannah, would have been a more perilous undertaking than the bold but well-planned march which it was designed to obviate.

Had Sherman moved to Augusta, for which he would have to fight, he would most likely have been out of supplies by the time he got it ; and had he been compelled to wait for supplies from Savannah, while the enemy were gathering around him from all points after they had laid bare the country all around him, he might have endangered his army.

With his own idea, on the contrary, he knew just what he could count on, and made his calculations accordingly. His hopes of success lay in his ability to constantly mislead the enemy as to his ultimate intentions, so that they could not concentrate against him at any point. And if he found he could not make one point on the coast, he would head for another.

The risk of delay at one point was the defect in Grant's plan. Badeau says that Grant's "plans were his own, and were invariably announced in the shape of orders" (vol. iii., p. 436). But it was just as well that he made an exception to his invariable rule in this case, instead of announcing his plan in the shape of an order, saying instead : "I would like to hear from you, however, on the matter."

Sherman's answer showed his readiness to adopt any plan that would lead to success, but he saw the weak point in this. Badeau, vol. iii., p. 46, says :

"Sherman replied to Grant's telegram the same night, promptly conforming his views to the new conception of his chief. He said : 'I do not think we can afford to operate further dependent on the railroad ; it takes so many men to guard it, and then it is nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that swarms around us. . . . If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I would march to Milledgeville and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and turn on the other. The country will afford forage and many supplies, but not enough in any one place to admit of a delay. . . .

" 'If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep

the whole State of Georgia ; otherwise I should risk our whole army by going too far from Atlanta.' "

Badeau, commenting on this, says : " Both generals were thus in favor of Sherman's cutting loose from Atlanta, but neither as yet dreamed of his setting out except to find another base already opened."

Here is where Badeau makes his first misstatement of the facts in the case. Of course it may be owing to a want of memory ; but if it is, his memory must be very short indeed, for at page 42 he says of Sherman's telegram of August 13 : " This was the first mention in the correspondence of either Grant or Sherman of the possibility of a campaign in Georgia, *entirely without a base.*"

Badeau's own words show that Sherman, at least, had " dreamed" and more than dreamed about making a campaign " without another base already opened," when he said : " If ever I should be cut off from my base, look out for me at St. Mark's, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia." Nothing there about " another base already opened."

Having in this way convinced himself that neither Sherman nor Grant had dreamed of making the march to the sea without " another base already opened," his memory plays him false again ; and after this he appears to have forgotten all about Sherman's telegram of the 13th of August, and from this time regards Grant's suggestion of September 10 as the first mention, or " germ," of the idea ; for when Sherman proposed the march a second time, Badeau says Grant had proposed a different march long before.

It could not be that Badeau would fail to perceive the " germ" of the idea in Sherman's first dispatch, when " summing up," if he had not forgotten all about it, for he said in relation to that dispatch : " Doubtless the idea was presented to Sherman by the menace to his communications," and he knows that an " idea" cannot be an idea unless it contains the " germ" of an " idea."

By keeping these points in mind, my readers will be able to decide as to the proper author of the idea.

At this date (September 10) Atlanta had been in our possession over a week, and the army was at a standstill. Sherman was watching Hood, expecting that he (Hood) would be forced to attempt some desperate movement to appease the popular outcry at the South. Meanwhile Grant had been marking out the " grand movements" for Sherman's next campaign. Badeau draws quite an eloquent, and even affecting, picture of the general and the mighty efforts he was

engaged in about this time. In vol. iii., p. 162, he says : " It was he who, seated in his hut" (if the " typo" makes it hat, I'll kill him) " at City Point, balanced the armies, and put his troops first into one scale and then into the other, according as emergency required ; it was he to whom the nation turned in its agony, knowing that it had committed its destinies into his hands, trusting him as men trust the master of a ship in a storm, as they trust an unknown power when they themselves are helpless."

Fortunately, on this occasion I can lay the result of the general's strategy before my readers as it was penned by his own hand in his letter to Sherman.

After explaining in his letter his plans to get possession of the Lynchburg Railroad running into Petersburg, the proposed capture of Fort Fisher, etc., he says : " What you are to do with the forces at your command I do not exactly see."

Fortunate and happy nation that could lean " in its agony" on such a strong, unbroken reed ! " He balanced the armies, and put his troops first into one scale and then into the other," but he could not see what to do with an army of ninety thousand men.

" My object now in sending a staff-officer to you is not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views." How could he " suggest operations" when he could not see what to do with Sherman's army ?

And yet this man, while here admitting his incapacity for his position and his reliance upon his subordinate for a plan of campaign, wrote a few years ago that it might be necessary to elect a president for a third term, meaning that he himself was the only one that could get the nation out of a " box" if it got into one. Such is life !

Badeau's assertion that " his plans were his own and invariably announced in the shape of orders" is good—good for Badeau.

Badeau also says : " But it was never his nature to seek advice." Here he sends an officer to get Sherman's " views," while in his letter to Sherman on coming East he admits his indebtedness for their " suggestions and advice." But it appears the general had a cunning method of giving a different twist to the suggestions of others, so that they did not know the offspring of their own brains when they met them. Badeau says : " Even when he seemed to adopt the views that were presented to him, those who offered them never knew it at the time, nor did they ever know whether he had conceived them in advance." (He had them there.) " All was left in that

obscurity which enveloped so much of his intellectual individuality." Wonderful man indeed !

This letter to Sherman was written September 12—two days after his suggestion to act against Savannah with Canby's troops, while Sherman should move on Augusta, and is its own evidence of the absurdity of that suggestion—to "act" with troops that could not be got to act—for he admits that they could not be got for that purpose, and mentions the reason. He says : " If it had not been for Price's movement Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile." So, had it not been for the naughty Price (Confederate commander in Texas) Mobile might have been taken, and Canby's troops might have been spared to "act on" Savannah also.

This is really childish ; instead of accepting accomplished facts as such, his "grand movements" in this case consist of telling Sherman "what might have been."

He might just as well have said : " If it had not been for Lee's movements I might have taken Richmond."

He says : " From your command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken" (this was Sherman's suggestion of May 30) ; but these troops had to be sent to re-enforce Rosecrans in Missouri. Badeau, vol. iii., p. 44, says : " These dispositions" (of the enemy) " not only made it necessary to send A. I. Smith to the support of Rosecrans in Missouri, but compelled Canby to abandon the idea of re-enforcing Granger before Mobile."

Again : " With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah." (The trouble in this case would be that one half of Farragut's force could accomplish nothing at either place.) " You could then move, as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally." (But Sherman would not risk his army until he saw that either Mobile or Savannah was taken—the drawback here again.) " Whichever one should be abandoned by the enemy you could take, and open up a new base of supplies." In these defective suggestions of what he might have done, if the enemy had not upset his plans, there is no hint about Sherman marching to Savannah when in our possession, but that he could threaten Macon and Augusta "and open up a new base of supplies."

The trouble with the general is that he talks in this letter of what might have been, instead of suggesting a plan of operations, or of

marking out his plans (which always "were his own"), and announcing them (as he "invariably" did) "in the shape of orders."

What business man could succeed if he only talked to his representatives "on the road" of what might have been sold last year?

And I can see no reason why the general made the suggestion by telegram two days before, and then showed in his letter that there was nothing in it, except his desire to have the Administration think that he was struck with an idea occasionally. But as they would not allow Canby to leave Texas, and as they soon after got Sherman's answer that the plan might result in the loss of his army (all telegrams passed through headquarters at Washington), I fear they were not reassured concerning the general's strategy.

I can understand, on the contrary, why the general sent his letter two days after by a staff-officer. It would not sound so well to say by telegram: "What you are to do with the forces at your command I do not exactly see," or "I want to get your views."

And notwithstanding Badeau says, "It was not in his (Grant's) nature to seek advice—he only sought information," I confess I was a little suspicious of the general in that direction when I first began to read up his "record," and saw, as early as 1862, his order to Sherman to "meet me at Columbus, Ky., on Thursday next. If you have a good map of the country south of you take it up with you" (Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 278). Or when he received a dispatch from Halleck at Washington to telegraph what his present plans were in regard to the first movement against Vicksburg, he should write to Sherman: "I wish you would come over this evening and stay to-night, or come in the morning. I would like to talk with you about this matter."

Sherman says Grant gave him permission to make the "Meridian raid"—Sherman's own idea—but Grant's dispatch to Halleck contains no hint that it was Sherman's idea. He says: "I have directed Sherman to move to Meridian." It was the same with the Atlanta campaign, when changing his mind so suddenly after Sherman's visit to him, from the impression that "the next campaign would be up the valley of East Tennessee," to be down toward Mobile.

He informed Halleck: "I look for the next line for me to secure would be from Chattanooga to Mobile." There is no sign of Sherman's hand here.

So I imagine it would be in this case. He would get Sherman's

"views" by letter and through the conversation of the staff-officer (Colonel Horace Porter) who conveyed these letters, and then from "his hut" at City Point, where he "balanced the armies," he would write out a plan of campaign and have it wired to Sherman. Thus his superiors would think "his plans were his own"—not Sherman's.

As an example of his appropriation of other men's ideas without giving them credit for them, I give his letter to Halleck of January 19, 1864, in answer to a request from Halleck to give his views in regard to a campaign in North Carolina during the winter, before he was appointed lieutenant-general.

General W. F. Smith was at that time chief engineer on Grant's staff, and I think he had been suggesting a campaign to Grant to start south from Mobile and work into Georgia during the winter, and other movements, which Grant proposed to Halleck, and as they were good ideas, Halleck was probably impressed with a higher opinion of Grant's abilities than formerly. The plan he proposes in this letter is an excellent one. Seizing Raleigh, N. C., would most likely have drawn Lee south of Richmond, as it controlled the railroads and supplies leading into Richmond from the south; but as the plan was not adopted, Badeau says "these ideas were all Smith's."

Had it been adopted poor Smith would not have got much credit for it. My readers can judge from the letter whether Halleck would suspect the ideas to be "all Smith's."

It is an exposition of real "grand strategy," for Raleigh was the point that Sherman afterward aimed at, so as to compel Lee to come out and fight him, or surrender Richmond and Petersburg.

Grant says: "Heretofore I have refrained from suggesting what might be done in other commands than my own, in co-operation with it, or even to think much over the matter." (I can readily believe the general did not delight in planning campaigns—it was not in his line.)

"But as you have kindly asked me in your letter of the 8th of January, only just received, for an interchange of views on our present situation, I will write you again in a day or two, going outside of my own operations."

During the "day or two" he got Smith's "views," which Badeau admits *now*—the plan being rejected. *Then*, the letter said nothing about Smith.

Grant says: "I would respectfully suggest whether an abandon-

ment of all previously attempted lines to Richmond is not advisable, and, in lieu of these, one to be taken farther south. I would suggest Raleigh, N. C., as the objective point, and Suffolk as the starting point. Raleigh once secured I would make Newbern the base of supplies until Wilmington is secured. A moving force of sixty thousand men would probably be required to start on such an expedition. This force would not have to be increased unless Lee should withdraw from his present position. In that case the necessity for so large a force on the Potomac would not exist. A force moving from Suffolk would destroy, first, all the roads about Welden, or even as far north as Hicksford. From Welden to Raleigh they would scarcely meet with serious opposition.

"Once there, the most interior line of railway still left to the enemy—in fact, the only one they would then have—would be so threatened as to force him to use a large portion of his army in guarding it. This would virtually force an evacuation of Virginia and indirectly of East Tennessee." . . . (As I said before, brains count fast in war ; a mere butcher is nowhere.)

"It would throw our armies into new fields, where they could partially live on the country, and would reduce the stores of the enemy. It would cause thousands of North Carolina troops to desert and return to their homes. . . . It would effectually blockade Wilmington, the port now of more value to the enemy than all the balance of their sea-coast. Other advantages might be cited which would be likely to grow out of this plan, but these are enough. From your better opportunities of studying the country and the armies that would be involved in this plan, you will be better able to judge of the practicability of it than I possibly can."

The general modestly finishes with assumed humility :

"I have written this in accordance with what I understood to be an invitation from you to express my views about military operations, and not to insist that any plan of mine should be carried out."

This is the way "his plans were his own." "He never sought advice, only information." According to Badeau, ideas are "only information." Who is Badeau ? "Who the devil is he ? Why didn't he have thirty thousand pounds a year ?"

"When, however, he visited the East in person," Badeau says, "and studied for himself the situation there, he at once abandoned these plans and views" (vol. iii., p. 559).

The plain truth is that when he came to Washington he found

everything planned out for him. The Army of the Potomac was interposed between Washington and Lee, with the understanding that this relation must be preserved in all operations. Some of his political friends, who took to themselves the credit of "bringing him out"—thinking that brains were as unnecessary in war as in politics—had him brought East to "fight" the Army of the Potomac. The government, however, kept Meade in command of that army to extricate it out of danger, should that become necessary. Badeau says: "Grant had supposed it to be a foregone conclusion that the commander of the Army of the Potomac was to be relieved. On arriving at the Capitol, however, he discovered that the government had no desire for a change" (vol. ii., p. 18). Halleck was also retained over him, but under another name—chief of staff to the commander of the army and navy—the President.

It is also a coincidence (I'm going back to the "march to the sea" in a moment) that at the moment when Grant was getting the "views" of his subordinate in this roundabout if not underhand way, many persons were asking for Sherman's appointment to be general-in-chief instead of Grant, on the theory, I suppose, of the "survival of the fittest," or that "success is the test of merit." Sherman had just taken Atlanta and concluded one of the most brilliant campaigns in history, while Grant still sat helpless in front of Petersburg. Of course the people were not aware that the "grand movements" executed by Sherman were dictated by Grant, otherwise they would have given all the credit to Grant. On this Badeau observes: "Although the campaign in Georgia had been ordered by Grant" (as a schoolboy might order it), "and formed an essential part of his schemes, its immediate result, so far as he was concerned, was to lessen his hold on the country, and make many declare that the right man for commander-in-chief was the general who had captured Atlanta, not the one who still lay outside of Richmond" (vol. iii., p. 11).

Sherman, accordingly, gave his "views." But sending Canby's troops from the Mississippi to "act on Savannah" did not form part of his plan.

Badeau makes it appear that Sherman's opinion or advice in regard to Grant's plans in the East was gratuitous, and that Grant only asked him a question. But why did he not make his inquiry by telegraph instead of sending a letter by an officer for that purpose? The one meant an hour's time, the other at least a week. Again, why did he

not confine his letter to this inquiry, instead of laying all his plans before Sherman? He did not ask Sherman in so many words to express his opinion on all his letter contained, but from the fact that Sherman did give his views in regard to the whole situation, I imagine he had been accustomed to do so, as indicated by a former letter between Grant and himself.

Badeau is not entirely felicitous in this instance. He begins by saying: "To invite the views of Sherman on the plans and campaigns of the future"—thus admitting that his views were invited on all—and ends by saying: "Sherman's answer narrowed itself down to a definite answer to Grant's inquiry." This means either a slight want of memory on Badeau's part or a very high appreciation of the discrimination of his readers.

As it is written in his usual brilliant way, I quote:

"To invite the views of Sherman on the campaigns and plans of the future was to set fire to an imagination" (I have said it requires imagination to conceive) "crowded with thick-coming fancies, and to open the flood-gates of an eloquence which never lacks language to embody all that his genius conceived." (It will be seen that Badeau could never mistake a wooden man for a man of genius.) "His reply covered the whole ground; touched upon the strategy of Grant in front of Richmond; discussed the capture of Wilmington and the topography of its waters; considered the value of Mobile and the possibility of Southern independence; proposed re-enforcements to Meade and campaigns for Canby; glanced at the side movements of Price and Rosecrans; treated of Hood's army and the Appalachian River; but nevertheless narrowed itself down to a definite answer to Grant's inquiry and a positive plan for his own army."

After all, the statement in Grant's letter that "Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact situation of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter," is the best proof that he wanted Sherman's views to cover "the whole ground." For why was it necessary to explain the "exact situation" otherwise?

Sherman says: "I am pleased to know that your army is being steadily re-enforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the Southside Railroad, and compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on your own terms."

This was Sherman's usual plan—the plan that won. He admits having a force “numerically double” that of his antagonist, which gave him two armies in reality to the enemy's one, so that the danger of dividing his army could not apply to him.

Grant also had double, and more than double, that of Lee, but Badeau denies this, of course.

Sherman, instead of losing half of his men in brainless assaults against fortified positions, left part of his army intrenched in front of his enemy, and with the other part he moved toward the enemy's rear. If the enemy attacked those left to “watch him,” very well. When they did attack they got repulsed—for an intrenched position gives an advantage of at least three to one. Under these circumstances but one course remained for the enemy—to retreat.

By this plan he secured Atlanta; one part—one corps in this case—was sent back from the intrenchments at Atlanta to hold the railroad bridge twenty miles north of Atlanta; the remainder were precipitated on the enemy's railroads, twenty miles south of Atlanta, which they destroyed, defeating the enemy who attacked them there—and Atlanta fell. On the same principle, but on a transcendent scale, he planned the march to the sea.

One part of his army was sent back, under General Thomas, to hold Tennessee, while the other moved forward to the coast, so that at about the same moment Thomas was annihilating Hood in Tennessee, while Sherman was capturing Fort McAllister on the Atlantic coast, a distance of some 600 miles between the first and second lines of his army.

But Grant was not the kind of man to “push out boldly” from his “left flank.” This wonderful strategist, to whom capturing cities appeared no more than driving a horse, never ventured on a movement in Sherman's style. On the contrary, with 140 against 65, when the campaign began, he was afraid to move a force against Lee's flank or rear, but kept his whole army in his enemy's front, assaulting intrenched lines with deadly effect (on his own men), until by the time he sat down in front of Petersburg, “checkmated,” he had lost about 70,000 men in killed, wounded, and missing, and had broken the spirit of the army. When he did try to get possession of the railroads leading into Petersburg in his timid way, Lee pushed him back again with heavy loss, until Sheridan came to his aid from the “valley.”

Sherman lost in his campaign against Atlanta about 31,000 men, while Grant lost during the same time about 80,000 men, and accom-

plished almost nothing. That was the way he "balanced the armies."

Sherman continues : " Now that Mobile is shut out to commerce, it calls for no effort on our part, unless the capture of that city can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and the railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia ; but until General Canby is much re-enforced, and until he can thoroughly subdue the scattered enemy west of the Mississippi, I suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Alabama River and Columbus, Georgia."

So that Grant's idea of sending Canby from west of the Mississippi to Savannah, in which Badeau sees the " germ" of the march to the sea, is not thought worthy of notice by Sherman. He says : " If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your centre" (that is, with the troops on the Atlantic coast), " and let General Canby have command over the Mississippi and the country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama. . . . And if you will fix a day to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta. The possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of Southern independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia."

(This is the way Sherman discussed the " possibility of Southern independence"—from a military point of view.)

" I will therefore give it as my opinion that your army and Canby's should be re-enforced to the maximum ; that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and its river ; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabama or Appalachian River ; that I should keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession."

There is nothing said here about going to Savannah, but that he should start for " Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston" when " the city of Savannah is in our possession."

Concluding, he says : " I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him everything that may occur to me of interest to you."

In this way his letter " narrowed itself down to a definite answer to Grant's inquiry."

No doubt the publication of these letters in Sherman's Memoirs, with other information, was a severe blow to the pretensions of General Grant.

But all these plans fell through when Hood moved and tried to force Sherman out of Georgia by cutting off his supplies and threatening to invade Tennessee.

This was the desperate campaign that Sherman was watching for, and President Davis predicted that Sherman would be compelled to retreat from Atlanta, which would prove a second Moscow to him.

But, as Swinton says, "What would have been a thorn in the side of an inferior man was to Sherman an opportunity." And the idea which at first occurred to him to be resorted to, only in case of necessity, now recurred to him as presenting an opportunity to destroy the military resources of Georgia during the war, while taking care of Hood at the same time.

At this time he had already sent General Thomas back to Chattanooga to protect his supplies, and when Hood moved he telegraphed to Grant (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 54) : "If he (Hood) tries to get on my road this side of the Eutowa, I shall attack him ; but if he goes on to Selma and Talladega" (due west), "why would it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta and then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking railroads and doing irreparable damage ? We cannot remain on the defensive."

"This," Badeau says, "at last was the full-born thought. This was the idea which was afterward embodied in the memorable march. This was to give up not only Atlanta, but the line in the rear to Chattanooga ; to set out into an enemy's country, and ignorant whether Hood would follow or not, and to push into the interior without supplies, until the sea should be reached."

This is the "full-born thought ;" but it will be seen that it only differs from Sherman's first dispatch in the matter of detail. He would certainly have to make some provision for Hood, whatever he did. And as his forces were now disposed, all he had to do was to repeat his usual strategy on a grand scale.

Then, how can Grant claim the "germ" of an idea that Sherman had been working since he left Chattanooga months before, and an idea that he recommends Grant himself to try at Petersburg ?

And it is in response to this dispatch, when Grant saw that Sherman

really meant it, that he wrote to Halleck to see where troops could be gotten from the East to "act" on Savannah, in which he said : "When this campaign was commenced nothing else was in contemplation but that Sherman, after capturing Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile."

Badeau appears to accept this as disposing of his former statement that Grant had "frequently explained" his plan of moving on Savannah to his staff.

Grant continues : "The question is whether, under such circumstances (the non-capture of Mobile), Augusta and Savannah would not be a better line than Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile.

"I think Savannah might be taken by surprise by a corps from here" (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 55).

Here he ignores Sherman's bolder, but really safer, plan, and for the (to him) best of reasons.

When Sherman proposed substantially the same idea for the capture of Atlanta, he replied that it was "hazardous." Then, how must this idea appear to him ? Why, simple madness ; and not to be mentioned among sensible men. It did not appeal to his imagination much, for the best of reasons also ; but when it was entirely successful, why then the "germ" was undoubtedly Grant's ; but—

I have now given sufficient data for my readers to decide which dispatch contained the germ of the idea—Sherman's of August 13, proposing a "campaign in Georgia entirely without a base," or Grant's dispatch of September 10, proposing that he should "move on Augusta."

Sherman said : "If ever I should be cut off from my base, look out for me about St. Mark's, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia."

Grant said : "Now that we have all of Mobile that is valuable, I do not know but that it will be the best move for General Canby's troops to act on Savannah while you move on Augusta."

Badeau's observations exhibit that defect in his memory that I have before pointed out. He says : "As to the original idea of the march, the germ was undoubtedly Grant's ; but Sherman's march was a far different one from that which Grant had contemplated. The general-in-chief, as has been shown, meant at the start to open a line from Chattanooga to Mobile ; but he did not at the start propose to abandon the railroads, and he never meant or would have proposed to leave an enemy in his rear." This is where Badeau becomes a little confused, for Sherman left Thomas to "watch" "an enemy in

his rear," while he started, as Lincoln says, on "an important new service."

To lead his readers to infer that, Sherman left an "enemy in his rear" without making proper provision to meet him, looks like a carefully designed misconstruction of the facts.

That Grant "never meant or would have proposed to leave an enemy in his rear" to be taken care of by part of his army as Sherman did, sustains my assertion that Grant would as soon think of marching to the moon as to think of marching to the sea under the conditions in which that march was made.

Sherman, he says, "did conceive his peculiar march, destroying Atlanta as Cortez burnt his ships; but Grant had conceived another march much earlier. Grant first proposed that Sherman should march to Savannah whenever Canby was ready to meet him."

This shows that Badeau regards Sherman's second proposal as his first, for the proposal to destroy the railroads was only a prudent detail, to prevent the enemy from using them. Again, Grant did *not* propose "that Sherman should march to Savannah whenever Canby was ready to meet him," and while Grant had conceived another march (to Augusta, not Savannah) much earlier than Sherman's second proposal, he *did not* conceive this march before Sherman's first proposal.

Having convinced himself that Grant had conceived the "germ" of the idea, he becomes generous in his way, and adds: "But—and this is the greatest and most audacious part of Sherman's conception, and this is all his own—he was willing to move to the sea, after he knew that Grant could send no forces to meet him." He might have added, if his defective memory had not again betrayed him, that Sherman "was willing"—"if cut off from his base"—"to move to the sea," *before* as well as "after" he knew all this.

He now sets forth the risks: "If Grant was able to care for the region that was left behind" (Thomas was intrusted with that task by Sherman) "so much the better; but if disaster came in the rear, what then?"

I would say it was Sherman who "balanced the armies" this time—not Grant.

"While if by any chance evil happened at the East" (this sounds like the enthusiastic inventor of a movement!) "Lee might detach, or Davis assemble, an army" (where from?) "between him and the sea. Grant had indeed contemplated opening a line to the coast, but

still it remains that it was Sherman who proposed this severance to Grant—the march to the sea” (that sounds more like the thing), “in ignorance of what the rebels might do in his rear, or what enemy might be found in his front, and without knowing where he should be able to strike the coast. . . . All this was indisputably and absolutely and exclusively the idea of Sherman. . . . All this was Sherman’s own suggestion. There can be no depreciating the daring or the originality of the idea” (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 66).

Yet while admitting that the idea was suggested by Sherman, he says, in vol. ii., p. 24 : “Grant had no fears that his conceptions would not be executed ; no apprehensions that his friend and subordinate would claim to have suggested when he only obeyed.”

Can any one doubt Badeau’s want of memory now ?

It is a fact ; Sherman’s Memoirs took the wind out of the sails of a certain pretender, and I think they were written at that time, only because this person was assuming what Gambetta calls “*Cæsar*ian airs.”

As to the courage to execute : “when the full-born thought” was proposed and repeated two or three times with the reasons for making it explained, did Grant acquiesce ? It appears not, according to Sherman’s Memoirs. Grant and Sherman disagreed as to what should be done when Hood moved north-west ; but Grant and President Davis agreed perfectly as to what should be done. Both concluded that Sherman must follow Hood. This was President Davis’s plan, to force Sherman to retreat from Georgia by cutting off his supplies. He said that Sherman would either have to “retreat or starve” (he didn’t know Sherman), and that the Confederate army would soon again be treading the soil of Tennessee. And Grant fell into his little trap. He had no trouble now in seeing what to do with Sherman’s troops. Follow Hood was Grant’s idea. Follow Hood was Davis’s idea.

My readers may not be aware that there is quite a resemblance in the appearance of the general and Mr. Davis. I saw both of them when in their prime. They are about the same height and build of frame, but Mr. Davis had a more refined and intellectual cast of countenance than the general, and looked the abler man of the two.

After Sherman had repeated his request for permission to make the movement four times, Halleck sent him a dispatch “which intimated that the authorities in Washington were willing that he should undertake the movement,” naming the point on the coast where the fleet would await his arrival.

In about two weeks after, when Grant knew that Sherman was going, and that his consent was unnecessary, he gave it, suggesting in the mean time a cavalry raid instead.

There is a direct contradiction between General Sherman and Badeau on this point. Badeau says that Grant gave his consent on the 11th of October at 11.30 P.M. and again next day, but that the wires were cut at that time, and these dispatches did not reach Sherman. The wires were cut at this time for a few days south of Chattanooga, but all dispatches from Washington were sent, first, to General Thomas at Nashville, and he forwarded them to Sherman; and it is somewhat singular that these two dispatches were the only ones that did not reach Sherman. Thomas heard nothing of them, for on the 17th he telegraphed to Sherman: "Mower and Wilson have arrived and are on their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of turning Wilson loose (the cavalry raid he proposed) rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as General Grant cannot co-operate with you."

Sherman says: "So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General Thomas heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign" (Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 157).

And it was during the time the wires were cut that he got Halleck's dispatch, sent by courier from Chattanooga. Why did he not get Grant's two dispatches also?

Fortunately for the North it was not what Grant thought about Sherman's campaigns that influenced the government, but what Sherman thought.

Lincoln's letter says: "But, feeling that you were the better judge, . . . I do not interfere."

On the 2d of November Grant gave his consent, and it will be seen by it that he had proposed following Hood only the day before; but from Sherman's answer he must have seen that the movement was under way.

"November 2, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN: Your dispatch of 9 A.M. yesterday is just received. I dispatched you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it worked so far north, ought to be looked on as the 'object.' With the force, however, that you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.

"I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose."

Sherman adds : " This was the first time that General Grant assented to the ' march to the sea,' and although many of his warm friends and admirers insist that he was the author and projector of that march, and that I simply executed his plans, General Grant has never, in my opinion, thought so or said so" (Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 166).

So far from heartily favoring the project, General Grant's language would seem to point the other way.

On the 29th of October, only four days before, he said to Rawlins : " General Sherman will be instructed that no force, except that already south of the Tennessee, will be used between the Tennessee River and the Atlantic. . . . If he goes south, he must take care of himself without the support of a pursuing column" (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 156).

The idea of a " pursuing column" to take care of Sherman is good. This sounds more like the language of chagrin at being overruled than of common-sense. Where would he get the men ? How could they subsist, after Sherman ate up everything in his path ?

Badeau explains Grant's dispatch of the 1st of November advising Sherman to follow Hood, by saying that Rawlins, who was intensely opposed (Badeau says) to the march, had prevailed upon the government (while he was going through Washington to the West) to send a dispatch to Grant asking him to reconsider his decision, that is, his consent, which Sherman says he had not given. The government was " the more ready for this," he says, " as both the President and the Secretary had been steadily hostile to the movement from the beginning" (vol. iii., p. 157).

If Badeau had inserted this dispatch from the government to the general in his book, it might have helped our faith in the statement—seeing that Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck, and Rawlins are dead ; still, contradictory as it appears, I would not like to say that the incident did not occur.

Badeau says that Rawlins in this committed an act of downright insubordination, and that Grant never knew of the origin of this dispatch until after his death. Who told Grant of it then ? We are to understand, I suppose, that Grant would have been indignant had he known it. 'Tis always so. One must not express what he may think would be best for his country, if it reflects on the infallible judgment of some small man " dressed in a little brief authority."

If Rawlins thought the march to the sea was a dangerous move-

ment, I honor him for doing everything in his power to prevent it, if Grant had approved it an hundred times. And if Garfield thought Rosecrans unfit to command I approve of his desire to have him superseded. Loyalty to your country, to liberty, is the first duty. I would try to have my own father removed under such circumstances.

Badeau's readers must be impressed with the awful responsibility which rested on the general at this time. Nor would he be relieved of the burden. He says : " Neither his civil superiors nor his military subordinates could relieve him of this burden. In case of failure the country would censure him, not the President. If Thomas should be destroyed and the North invaded "—

(Think of it ! Hood had 35,000 men to destroy Thomas with 65,000 men, and after that invade the North ! Awful thought !)

" If Sherman should be intercepted and suffer the fate of the French in the Moscow campaign, it was Grant who would be held to account." An awful responsibility indeed ! Grant told Sherman in one of his dispatches that he believed he " would be bushwhacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home." What was the Moscow campaign in comparison to such a fate for Sherman's 60,000 veterans ?

And yet, " marvel of it all," he could turn from these tremendous responsibilities of which he was determined not to be relieved, " to descant on the qualities of a horse," or it may be a cigar. Marvelous man indeed !

But the " marvel of it all " was that no one could see any sign of unusual capacity about the general or his methods. Badeau says : " It is impossible to understand the early history of the war, without taking it into account that neither the government nor its important commands gave Grant credit for intellectual ability or military genius." Again, after the checkmate and countermarch at the North Anna River in Virginia, he says : " When all was over, Grant had no warmer admirers than the officers and men of the Eastern armies ; but" (another but) " their admiration was the growth of a year" (vol. ii., p. 263).

What stupid officers and men, to have taken a whole year, and until " all was over," before their admiration assumed due proportions ! But what about the regular army officer (Dodge, " Bird's-eye View of the Civil War") who now criticises the general for losing half of his men by hurling them against fortified positions without accomplishing anything that could not have been done by manœuvring ?

Of Sherman, Badeau says : " No one could be with him half an hour and doubt his greatness" (except a politician).

As to enthusiasm, fire, magnetism, Badeau says, Grant " had not a particle of what men call enthusiasm." He says : " He was always cool and collected in battle." " In battle . . . the whole man became intense as it were with a white heat."

My readers can have their choice.

I give one more quotation on this subject, as it sounds so like the general : " Indeed, from the moment when he accepted the modifications which Sherman proposed the plan became his own."

" The plan became his own" naturally enough, but what plan did Sherman modify ? Was it Grant's ? or was it his own ? or was not Sherman's march as proposed a second time the same as the first, with the details added ?

Where has the general shown so far the capacity to conceive, the courage to execute, or the enthusiasm to fire his men ? Where has he awakened the poet's fire ?

" Then cheer upon cheer for bold Sherman
 Went up from each valley and glen,
 And the bugle re-echoed the music
 That came from the lips of the men ;
 For we knew that the stars in our banner
 More bright in their splendor would be,
 And that blessings from Northland would greet us
 When Sherman marched down to the sea.

CHORUS.

" Then sang we a song of our chieftain,
 That echoed o'er valley and lea,
 And the stars in our banner shone brighter
 When Sherman marched down to the sea."

CHAPTER III.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS.

WHEN Sherman reached the coast Grant appeared to be in the same predicament as to what he should do with Sherman's forces as at Atlanta.

First he thought of keeping Sherman at Savannah or Augusta, and then, again, of bringing him, with part of his infantry, by sea to Petersburg.

It did not appear to strike him that Sherman could march up to Petersburg overland, scattering all opposition in his path. In his first letter he begins with his usual parade of not intending to give directions when he really had no directions to give.

He wants to get "directions"—"views"—himself.

He says: "In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from East to West possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta."

Evidently he did not know that it was Sherman's idea in his campaign to the sea to destroy these "through routes" and the military resources and supplies of this link between the East and West of the Confederacy—to tear out its bowels and then to strike up at its heart—Richmond.

"This condition," he says, "will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other post to the east of Savannah and Branchville."

Three days after, he writes: "I have concluded that the most important operation toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army."

"My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify it and leave all your artillery and cavalry and enough infantry to protect them. With the balance of your command come here by water

with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person" (Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 206).

Ay, that's what he wanted. "You." It was not infantry he wanted, for he must have had at that time nearly three men to one of Lee's.

Sherman says : "These letters gave me great uneasiness, for I had set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to be near ; for me to embark for Virginia by sea was so complete a change from what I had supposed would be the course, that I was very much concerned."

Again Grant did not consult Lee in this matter. That general might have thought the time had come to evacuate Richmond and drop down the seaboard, while Sherman was coming up in ships. As Sherman said the "Confederacy might survive the fall of Richmond but not of all Georgia," and the withdrawal of his army would leave all the territory south of Petersburg still in the hands of the Confederacy, Grant could not have overhauled Lee at that time, as Sheridan was still in the "valley."

The government and Sherman knew the surest way to close hostilities, which was to cut off the confederate retreat south and gradually close in on them and curtail the area from which they could draw supplies, until actual want would compel them to attack him or surrender.

These letters from the general were sent to Sherman without going through Washington, and although Badeau says that he "announced judgments, made apparently at the moment, which he never reversed, and which the world has never seen reason to reverse," yet as soon as the war department heard of his decision in this matter they "reversed" it instantly, while Stanton himself started soon after to hurry Sherman up, representing to him that the country could not possibly carry on the war for another year, etc.

Of this campaign Sherman says : The relative importance of the march to the sea and of that from Savannah northward, "I would place at one for the former, and ten for the latter."

In countermanding these orders of Grant's, Halleck is careful not to do it in an offensive way. He says : "Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his last dispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to Richmond." (It was an order—no suggestion—"come here by water with all dispatch.") "He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire force, at least for the present. . . ."

"General Grant's wishes, however, are that this whole matter of your future actions should be entirely left to your discretion . . . we can send you a number of complete batteries of artillery."

This was a change from leaving "all his artillery," and suggests what Halleck thought Sherman would do. This stopped all preparations for the sea trip, and allowed Sherman to go on as he thought best. Halleck concludes: "Our last advices from you was General Howard's note announcing his (Sherman's) approach to Savannah."

Two days after Halleck, in anticipation, wrote: "I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign—the capture of Savannah. When Savannah falls, then for another wide swath through the centre of the Confederacy. But I will not anticipate."

Then, after indicating what the government hoped would be Sherman's plan—for they stuck to Lincoln's idea that Sherman was the best judge of what to do—he adds: "General Grant is expected here this morning, and will probably write you his own views."

Sherman understood the tenor of these letters, as will be seen by his reply to Halleck. They countermanded Grant's first plan of sitting down at Savannah and his last idea of embarking for Richmond, and gave Sherman complete liberty to act as he thought best; whatever he decided on would be approved. If Grant wished to approve, all right; if not, it was all right.

When Grant wrote "his own views" from Washington—of course he had no "views" to write—they told him that it would take two months to get Sherman's troops to Richmond by water, and all that, until he saw at last that the transfer would not be allowed at all without being told so in so many words.

To him there were only two plans possible, and when one was prohibited he fell back on the other.

Sherman would not be mad enough to try to march up by land. Johnston, Beauregard and others might crush him, and even Lee might slip out some night, destroy him, and get back again before Grant could learn of it. The general had been considerably toned down since he fronted Lee, from his expectation of being able to "destroy" him in his first engagement, and certainly "on this line" (between the Rapidan and Richmond) he descends to the hope of being able to "annoy" him occasionally.*

* When Sherman started on his march to the sea Grant said to Halleck: "Sherman's movement may compel Lee to send troops from Richmond,

"It took a hero" (like Grant) "to command an army."

He said: "I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of your army here and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be taking has shaken me in that opinion." (The only turn in affairs was the government's decision.)

"I doubt whether you may not accomplish more toward the result where you are than if brought here, especially as I am informed since my arrival here that it would take about two months to get you here with all the other calls there are for ocean transportation."

"Where you are" can only mean that Sherman was to sit down there as at first proposed, just as he was sitting down in front of Petersburg. No wonder the nation relied upon him "in its agony."

But now he talks like himself: "I want to get your views about what ought to be done and what can be done."

Sherman replies: "I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, . . . and in about ten days I expect to be able to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought over them so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight." (This was what the nation wanted to lean on.) "I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point." He then goes on to elaborate his plans, which were so high over the heads of his enemies that they could not—certainly did not—anticipate or counteract them.

In this we see one of the secrets of genius—hard work. Sherman thought over his plans "so long and well." Sheridan fell asleep—when he got a chance to sleep in his campaigns—"with a map in his hand." But Grant had so many horse stories to tell, and so many cigars to smoke, that he had not time to bother about plans of campaign.

"The labor we delight in physics pain."

And each delighted most in the labor for which he was best adapted. Result: Sherman and Sheridan vanquished their opponents; Grant was "checkmated."

"How do you mix your paints?" said a lady to an artist. "With my brains," he replied.

These two generals won their victories with their brains. The more brains, the less men required; the less brains, the more men.

and if he does, I want to be prepared to annoy him" (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 172).

"Send me all the infantry you can rake and scrape."—Grant to Halleck.

"I want no re-enforcements."—Sherman to Grant.

In this campaign Sherman with 60,000 men expected to be able to whip Johnston's forces, and, if necessary, to hold his own against Lee and Johnston combined, without getting any re-enforcements.

His reply to Halleck assumes that Grant's "views" would be ignored, except as an unnecessary approval of his plans, for he says in conclusion: "From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too late. I do not wish to be rash, but to give my rebel friends no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage."

Yet he begins his letter like Halleck: "I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about embarking my troops for the James River, leaving me free to make the broad 'swath' you describe."

He then gives substantially the same plan as that submitted to Grant, and says: "I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them—as, for instance, my recent campaign."

(After he left the intrenchments at Atlanta for his raid around that city, the inhabitants thought that the "Yankees" had fled, and ladies came from Macon by rail to celebrate the event, but they soon discovered their mistake.)

Not only are bold moves in war disconcerting to the enemy and more easy of execution and decisive than timid ones, but it is this boldness of thought as opposed to tameness, whether in designing a picture, a house, or a campaign, that marks the line between genius and mediocrity.

A young French lady found a recent novel so "flat, stale, and unprofitable" that she committed suicide.

Sherman says: "I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point. . . . I do not believe that any one general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle."

And yet he himself had handled a hundred thousand men in battle to the satisfaction of the country.

What does this mean, between Sherman and Halleck?

And why does he ask Halleck to criticise his plans instead of waiting to get orders from Grant ? In plain words—such as a high private has the privilege of using—it means : Grant is a failure.

The general is no failure with Badeau, however, for in his tables of contents we read repeatedly, with variations : “ Strategic principles of Grant—Characteristics of Grant’s strategy—Success of Grant’s combinations—Supreme responsibility of Grant—Comprehensiveness of plan—Completeness of combinations ”—and in this movement of Sherman’s, lest any one who had read Sherman’s Memoirs should doubt it, he has it : “ Sherman starts—General control of Grant—Self-reliance of Grant,” etc.

In Grant’s reply to Sherman he begins as usual : “ Before writing you definite instructions for the next campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done.” (But now Lee’s ghost starts up before him, and he says :) “ In the event you should meet Lee’s army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast.”

“ I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take.” (He might just as well.) But again his fears overcome him, and he says : “ It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg ; but failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports held in North Carolina by us. From there you could take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance.”

It is unnecessary to say that Sherman had canvassed all the probabilities and possibilities of the movement long before ; his army could live on their horses and mules for three months, he says, and want of supplies was about the only thing that he feared.

When Sherman reached Goldsboro, N. C., he made a visit to City Point while his army was refitting, calculating to resume his march on the 10th of April.

There he met President Lincoln, General Grant, and many officers of the army and navy. There was no council of war held, for the original programme was to be carried out : Sherman would march on—if Lee did not evacuate Petersburg—until he connected with Grant.

Badeau seizes upon this opportunity to say : “ There was nothing like a council of war, for Grant never held one in his life. He listened always with proper deference to the views of those who were entitled

to offer them, and was never unwilling to receive orders or information from any source ; but his plans were his own, and were invariably announced in the shape of orders. Even when he seemed to adopt the views that were presented to him, those who offered them never knew it at the time, nor did they ever know whether he had conceived them in advance.

"In this crisis he asked no advice on military matters from the President, who offered none ; and he listened to Sherman's eager and restless eloquence suggestive and advisory, yet deferential and subordinate, but said nothing in return more definite than he had written. If there was a man living whose advice in such matters he would have sought, that man was certainly Sherman ; and, as he had written and said, if Sherman had been his superior, Grant would have obeyed him absolutely ; but it was never his nature to seek advice, he only sought information, and without vanity or self-assertion, he came to his own conclusions. He did this always. He did this now" (Badeau, vol. iii., p. 436).

There were only four persons present at this interview—President Lincoln and Grant, Sherman and Admiral Porter, who says "that while Lincoln and Sherman were talking about the terms to be given to Johnston, should he surrender, 'General Grant sat smoking a short distance from the President' and only made one remark." That is the way he "listened to Sherman's eager and restless eloquence suggestive and advisory, yet deferential and subordinate, but said nothing in return more definite than he had written."

To think that the "historian" of the "greatest man" should have to descend to this to make a reputation for him !

Even at the time of which he is here writing, Sheridan—who had just come from the "valley"—made Grant a proposition, and afterward carried it out without asking his consent, which changed the entire programme, and shortened the duration of the war at least a month.

Grant had been trying to turn Lee's right flank for over nine months, but was always pushed back again with loss, and now with 162,000 against 37,000, or over four to one, he only hoped to make a cavalry raid on Lee's railroads.

But Sheridan proposed to "finish the job now" instead of going on the cavalry raid, and with his cavalry and one corps of Grant's discouraged infantry, he turned Lee's right flank at Five Forks,

giving Lee's army the greatest defeat it ever sustained, and compelled the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond.

If the general is "the greatest man of the Saxon blood," there may be some point in the foreigner's criticism of Americans. Said he : "What first struck me, was the superiority of the women and the inferiority of the men."

CHAPTER IV.

GRANT'S WESTERN CAMPAIGNS.

THE campaign against forts Henry and Donelson, which first brought the general's name before the public, was conceived, it appears, by General Halleck a month before it was undertaken.

Sherman says : " Though it was midwinter, General Halleck (commanding our armies in the West) was pushing his preparations most vigorously. I remember one night sitting in his room with him and General Cullum, his chief of staff, talking of things generally, and the subject then was of the much-talked-of 'advance' as soon as the season would permit.

" He had a map on his table, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, 'Where is the rebel line?'

" Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, forts Donelson and Henry, and Columbus, Kentucky. 'That is their line,' said Halleck.

" 'Now where is the proper place to break through it?' and either Cullum or I said, '*Naturally* the centre.'

" Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other, near its middle, and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River, and he said : 'That's the true line of operations.' This occurred more than a month before General Grant began the movement, and, as he was subject to General Halleck's orders, I have always given Halleck the full credit for that movement."

This idea of regarding these positions as points on one line, by breaking which at the centre would compel the evacuation of the others, was real "grand strategy" as the result proved, for the enemy fell back from both wings, after the fall of Donelson, giving us the whole of Kentucky and Tennessee.

Again Badeau differs with Sherman and says : "Halleck's whole share in the design or execution of this campaign was confined to forwarding re-enforcements, a duty which he performed with vigor and alacrity."

In a foot-note he says : " It has been alleged that General Halleck planned the Donelson campaign, and is entitled to the credit of its conception ; but it is only just to say that I never heard that General Halleck himself put forth any such claim" (Badeau, vol. i., p. 52).

But in support of Sherman's statement we have Cullum's reply to Grant in front of Donelson.

He said (Badeau, vol. i., p. 41) : " ' The ammunition you want is not here ' (Cairo). Cullum, however, wrote encouragingly : '*You are on the great strategic line,*' and prophesied speedy success."

I have already noticed Badeau's want of memory, and this shows what a good memory an "historian" should have, so as to know what to publish and what to suppress.

I want to see the soldier who would consider General Grant capable of regarding the positions occupied by the enemy—hundreds of miles apart—as one line, the breaking of which at the right point would compel the falling back of the whole.

I happened to have a few words with Halleck at Georgetown, D. C., as we were moving toward Gettysburg, and I agree with Sherman that he was a man of ability.

In fact, he was too able a man to suit Grant, when the latter got to be lieutenant-general. Halleck formed the correct estimate of the general from the first, and as chief of staff to the President, Grant knew that he saw through his blunders, and wanted him removed, given a command first in Texas, and again on the Pacific coast, but the government wanted all the military brains they could muster.

I think it was through Halleck that Sheridan was brought east, and afterward got command in the valley.

At Fort Henry the army was not engaged, the navy silencing the guns of the fort. It was intended that the army would get up in time to capture the garrison, but it was too late. Greeley says : " General McClelland, as Commodore Foote had apprehended, had not yet worked his way to the main road from Fort Henry to Donelson. Had he been directed to start at six, instead of eleven, he would probably have intercepted and captured Tighlman's entire force."

The capture of Fort Henry must be credited to the navy.

At Donelson, the result was decided while Grant was aboard a gun-boat. The enemy made a desperate attempt to cut their way out, but were repulsed by a great effort on our side, the division commanders re-enforcing each other as best they could during Grant's absence.

Badeau says : " Grant was returning to his headquarters from the flagship, at about nine o'clock, when he met an aide galloping up to inform him of the assault. This was the first information he had of the battle ; he next met General C. F. Smith, who had not yet been engaged, and learning from him the position of affairs on the right, directed him to hold himself in readiness to assault."

A request was sent to Foote to have all the gun-boats make their appearance to the enemy. " A terrible conflict," he said, " ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy, is much more so. If the gun-boats do not appear it will reassure the enemy, and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge to save appearances" (vol. i., p. 45).

Smith accordingly made a charge on the enemy's right, and secured a lodgment in his outworks, and during the night the enemy decided to surrender.

Whether Smith suggested these ideas to Grant or not does not appear, but Halleck three days after telegraphed to Washington : " ' Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You can't get a better one.' Grant also recommended Smith for a major-general for his behavior during the campaign" (Badeau, vol. i., p. 53).

About this time the general's conduct was very unsatisfactory to his superiors. Halleck telegraphed to McClelland (then general-in-chief) : " I have had no communications with General Grant for more than a week. . . . He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. . . . I am worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency."

Accordingly, on the next move down the Tennessee to Pittsburg Landing, General Smith was put in command ; but as Smith died soon after, from the effect of a slight accident to his leg, which mortified, Grant was again placed in command.

At this point the battle of Shiloh was fought. Greeley says Grant was " severely criticised for this battle," and for that reason I shall pass it over, my desire being to see how he acted when he had everything in his favor. It was at this battle that Sherman showed his

capacity, and McClelland his good sense, for doing just as Sherman told him, although Sherman was his junior. It was these two, acting in concert, that saved the day. Grant arrived on the ground when defeat seemed imminent, and many had fled to the rear, just as Sheridan had arrived at Cedar Creek ; but there the parallel ends.

Greeley, speaking of the confederate commander, says : " He was doubtless aware that the command of that army (Grant's) had just been turned over by General C. F. Smith, an experienced and capable officer, to General Grant, so recently from civil life."

The general was " recently from civil life," but he had been educated at West Point, and went through the Mexican War before he resigned from the army.

Badeau says : " Grant invented the long campaigns without a base which astonished the enemy and the world."

My readers will have to decide whether the march to the sea can be included in these " long campaigns."

There is no evidence to prove this statement to be correct ; on the contrary, when he had an excellent reason for inventing a short campaign even, he failed to do it.

When his supplies were destroyed by the enemy at Holly Springs, Miss., in his first campaign against Vicksburg, he promptly retreated, subsisting on the country to go back—not forward—although he only had to march forward about seventy-five miles to unite with Sherman, at the mouth of the Yazoo River, who was attacking the enemy in front, and hourly expecting to hear Grant's guns on their flank and rear.

It appears other commanders would have made the attempt, for Rosecrans had asked Grant's permission to follow the enemy from Corinth and subsist on the country, months before, but he would not allow it.

In the first campaign against Vicksburg, it was designed that Grant should move forward by the railroad through the interior, and thus strike the rear of Vicksburg, while Sherman moved down the Mississippi and would try to force a landing at a point north of and in the rear of Vicksburg, and thus meet Grant with supplies and provide a new base, independent of the railroads.

It was assumed that the garrison at Vicksburg would oppose Sherman's landing, but Grant would prevent the enemy in his front from concentrating on Sherman. The enemy, however, were too smart for Grant. The general had accumulated supplies at Holly

Springs, and left the place in charge of an incompetent commander—one who had evacuated Iuka without a blow—and the enemy's cavalry burned all the supplies.

But notwithstanding the fact that the enemy were leaving his front to concentrate on Sherman—thus giving him every chance to move forward and forage on the country—he turned back and left Sherman to attack an impregnable position from the front, which of course compelled him to retire also.

This was the way "Grant invented long campaigns without a base." He found out (in marching to the rear) that an army could subsist on the country.

Had he pressed forward he could have taken the enemy in flank and rear, and uniting with Sherman they could have been in rear of Vicksburg six months earlier than they got there at last. They would then have been in a position to move against Mobile early in the spring, and could have occupied Montgomery, Alabama, and probably Atlanta, Georgia, a year before it fell, without the disaster of Chickamauga or the battle of Chattanooga or Knoxville.

Of course a man like Grant could not admit by implication or otherwise that he had made a blunder (Badeau only reflects Grant), so instead of making a fresh start, as he should have done, he withdrew from that line altogether, as if the advance by that line were impossible of accomplishment.

And then commenced that wearisome and fruitless pecking around Vicksburg for an opening to land his army until at last the navy ran the gauntlet with supplies, and a landing was effected south of that place.

While army and navy were exhausting themselves in useless experiments, Sherman, who saw all along the proper line for the advance on Vicksburg, proposed substantially the former movement, but as that would have been an acknowledgment that Grant was wrong in abandoning the interior line, he hung on to his futile attempts through bayous, ditches, and canals while disease, was decimating his troops. When the last resort was successful and he did not have to fall back on the former plan, Sherman's proposition was given out to the press as a "protest."

Sherman gives Grant full credit for the design and execution of the Vicksburg campaign, although others give Rawlins the credit for it; but in speaking of Grant's failure to press forward at the critical moment in the first campaign, he says: "I have never criticised

General Grant's strategy on this or any other occasion, but I thought then that he had lost an opportunity which cost him and us six months' hard work, for he might have captured Vicksburg from the direction of Oxford in January, quite as easily as was afterward done in July, 1863" (Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 317).

Badeau gives a funny reason for Grant's retreat at that time. After showing, to his own satisfaction, that Grant did not promise co-operation with Sherman's expedition, he says : " It was, however, understood in conversation that in case Pemberton" (enemy) " retreated, Grant would follow him up between the Yazoo and the Big Black River to the Mississippi" (vol. i., p. 136).

And then in vol. iii., p. 641, he says : " He had never receded one step in any of his campaigns except at Holly Springs, and then the rebels were in retreat before him, and Grant, unable to follow fast enough to overtake them, withdrew, only to advance on another line." This was the very reason why he should have run after them. This was what Greeley has called on another occasion a " back-to-back race."

Again Badeau says : " General Grant has told me, when discussing this campaign, that had he known then what he soon afterward learned—the possibility of subsisting an army of thirty thousand men without supplies other than those drawn from an enemy's country—he could at that time have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in capturing the place."

So then it was not because the enemy ran so fast that he " withdrew," but because he wanted the fire. And yet this is the history which we are told must be beyond all others the correct one.

Grant's first idea, according to Badeau, was that Vicksburg would be evacuated if he could get near enough by land to threaten it. There were no good reasons for such an assumption then, and I presume that he was about the only one that labored under that hallucination. His idea too that Sherman might land from the Yazoo River and surprise the garrison was not shared by Sherman then, for in Sherman's order to his generals he assumed that Vicksburg was well fortified against an attack by land.

In the movement down the railroad toward Vicksburg, it was through Sherman's suggestion that the enemy were induced to fall back from Grant's front and abandon a formidable position ; but I see no credit given for the idea. Badeau says : " He" (Grant) " announced, on the 24th of November" (to Halleck) " that he had

given orders for the advance of his entire force, including Sherman ; had written to Steele, in Arkansas, to threaten Grenada, and had asked Admiral Porter to co-operate" (vol. i., p. 132).

Sherman, speaking of this movement, in which it appears (from Sherman) his advice was sought by Grant—Badeau to the contrary notwithstanding—says : " He" (Grant) " explained to me that he proposed to move against Pemberton, then intrenched on a line behind the Tallahatchie River. . . . He further said that his ultimate object was to capture Vicksburg. . . . I suggested to him that if he would request General Curtis to send an expedition from some point on the Mississippi near Helena, then held in force by us, toward Grenada, to the rear of Pemberton, it would alarm him for the safety of his communications, and would assist us materially in the proposed attack on his front. He authorized me to send to the commanding officer at Helena a request to that effect, and, as soon as I reached Memphis, I dispatched my aide, Major McCoy, to Helena, who returned, bringing me a letter from General Steele. . . . This letter contained the assurance that he would send a large force from Friar's Point, under General A. P. Hovey, in the direction of Grenada" (Memoirs, vol. i., p. 279).

Again, in arranging for the expedition, which Sherman was to make in co-operation, Sherman was invited to give his views. Grant said in the dispatch : " Come over and we will talk this matter over." Sherman says : " I repaired at once to Oxford, and found General Grant in a large house with all his staff, and we discussed every possible chance" (Memoirs, vol. i., p. 281).

Once a landing was made in the rear of Vicksburg, the rest was merely a matter of time. The idea was the same as that adopted with success at Island No. 10 by Pope, and I heard an officer at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, say that Pope was indebted for his success in the West to a suggestion made by one of the privates of his army. So the world goes.

The plan of marching against Jackson, Miss., about fifty miles directly in rear of Vicksburg, to cut the railroad and prevent reinforcements from reaching the enemy, was anticipated in substance by Sherman's order to his division commanders in his co-operating expedition against Vicksburg and Haines' Bluff.

This order also gives Sherman's views in regard to Vicksburg, which explains the reason why that place would not be evacuated, even if Grant did get to Jackson in its rear, as Grant thought until he

saw Sherman about it—for the enemy would still have the Mississippi below and a railroad to the west and south to keep up their supplies. And I assume that it was these misapprehensions of the true philosophy of strategic movements, and the apparent ignorance of what constituted a strategic point or movement, that made Sherman say in his letter to Grant : “ My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand strategy.”

Sherman, in his instructions to his generals, says : “. . . Our object is to secure the navigation of the Mississippi and its main branches. . . . The enemy still holds the river from Vicksburg to Baton Rouge, navigating it with his boats, and the possession of it enables him to connect his communications and routes of supply, east and west. To deprive him of this would be a severe blow.”

This shows that our possession of Jackson would never compel the evacuation of Vicksburg.

And for the same reason Lee was able to stay in Petersburg nine months ; Grant was never able to make a complete half-circle around that place—he only besieged one corner of it—and Lee was able to keep his “ routes of supply” open to the south until Sheridan came along.

“ Vicksburg,” Sherman said, “ is doubtless very strongly fortified, both against the river and land approaches.

“ Already the gun-boats have secured the Yazoo up for twenty-three miles to a fort on the Yazoo at Haines’ Bluff, giving us a choice for a landing-place at some point up the Yazoo below this fort.

“ But before actual collision with the enemy, I purpose . . . to proceed to Milliken’s Bend, and there dispatch a brigade . . . to the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railway” (across the Mississippi from Vicksburg) “ to destroy that effectually . . . then to proceed to the mouth of the Yazoo . . . to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, and then to reach the point where the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crosses the Big Black River” (to destroy the railroad bridges), “ after which to attack Vicksburg by land while the gun-boats assail it by water” (Memoirs, vol. i., p. 287).

This plan of landing north of Vicksburg and marching inland to destroy the railroad and bridges held by the enemy at this central point, before marching against Vicksburg, was substantially the same idea as landing south of Vicksburg and moving against Jackson to destroy the railroads at that point before moving against Vicksburg.

It required no genius to drive Pemberton into his intrenchments,

for he refused to obey the orders of his superior, General Johnston ; besides, there was a Union man in Jackson who undertook to convey Johnston's orders to Pemberton, but who took them to Grant instead (Badeau is my authority). Under such circumstances, and with a superior force in numbers, Grant could not very well be unsuccessful.

Badeau says : " The rebel movements in this campaign could hardly have been better contrived to facilitate the movements and objects of the national commander " (vol. i., p. 285).

An incident in this campaign illustrates the difference between Grant and Sherman. When Sherman withdrew from the attack on Haines' Bluff, on the first expedition, because of the strength of the enemy's works and their scientific arrangement, with the concentration of all the enemy's forces against him when Grant " withdrew," Sherman's withdrawal was called a " repulse " at the North.

And when waiting opposite Vicksburg to cross the Mississippi, Grant sent him a letter, stating that he proposed to cross over with the head of column, and that Sherman's time might be usefully employed by making a feint on Haines' Bluff again.

" But he did not like to order me to do it," Sherman says, " because it might be reported at the North that I had again been ' repulsed ' . . . of course I answered him that I would make the ' feint ' regardless of public clamor at a distance " (Memoirs, vol. i., p. 318).

And Sherman made such a " clamor " with his " feint " that the enemy thought it was the real attack, and sent a large body of men to oppose it.

Sherman cared not what the world said so long as he did what he conceived to be his duty.

In Grant's case, however, Badeau takes great pains to show that when he " withdrew " from Holly Springs it was then just the time to take to the water, instead of to the land ; had he taken to the water before that exact date, then the enemy might have done this, that, or the other thing, and so on to the end.

Grant never made a mistake in his life. Sherman, on the contrary, admits that he did. When Johnston attacked him at Bentonsville, N. C., he thought he made a mistake in not following up the advantage won by a daring general. He says : " The next day . . . we remained quiet till about noon, when General Mower, ever rash, broke through the rebel line on his extreme left flank, and was pushing straight for Bentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek.

I ordered him back to connect with his own corps, and, lest the enemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line to be engaged with a strong skirmish fire.

"I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followed Mower's lead with the whole of the right wing, . . . and it could not have resulted otherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superior numbers."

Neither did Sherman try to punish or get rid of this rash general for this exploit, but promoted him from division to corps commander.

On the other hand, putting down the rebellion, having a competent military adviser for the government, the failure of the republic even—all these things were as nothing compared to the audacity of reflecting on the judgment of some great little man ; and so Halleck must go to the Pacific coast—but he didn't.

When a man of some taste is engaged in a distasteful work it is natural that he should show his repugnance occasionally. Badeau seizes this incident in Sherman's Memoirs to give Grant a rap across the knuckles. He says : "Sherman admits that he committed an error in not overwhelming his enemy. Few soldiers, however, are great enough to accuse themselves of an error" (vol. iii., p. 432).

This is the only occasion in which he breaks out under his inodorous load, but proceeds with the manufacture of his hero by every means at his command. But here is where the trouble comes in.

It takes a real artist to make the imitation pass for the reality among artists. I think I could have done better myself. I could have built up a hero who would have lasted for twenty years (which is long enough) or more, unless some accident happened to expose the fraud. I used to dabble a little in clay myself, and have used plaster of Paris in such connection with other materials that every one supposed it was solid iron. One dealer was astounded when I told him, and a lady whose parlor fountain froze and burst (an accident which could seldom happen) wrote : "What did my eyes behold ? Plaster of Paris !"

It would be the same with the general : so long as no unforeseen accident happened to him I would guarantee to represent him to be of any quality of clay he chose, without fear of detection, unless he burst.

I certainly would have avoided those glaring contradictions to which Badeau has exposed his clay.

I tell you it was an unlucky day for the republic when that politician thought Sherman insane, when he mentioned the force it would

take to go to the Gulf of Mexico. Sherman was then senior to Grant, and would doubtless have been given the command of that department by Halleck, only for fear of flying in the face of public opinion. Had Sherman got command a year before he did, I think it would have made nearly a year's difference in the duration of the war.

At the battle of Chattanooga or Missionary Ridge we can contrast the methods of Generals Grant and Sheridan.

Grant had two men to one of the enemy, and in such cases superior generalship would not be satisfied by pushing an enemy off a position, if there was a possibility of getting to his rear and bagging him.

There was a road to the enemy's rear by which he might have been compelled to come down from his almost impregnable position or get caught in front and rear. In such cases the vice is better than the battering-ram. But as the general was anxious to send relief to Knoxville at that time and had many difficulties to contend with, I will not attempt to detract from the opportune victory he won on that occasion.

I like Sheridan's plan, however, as shown in his pursuit of the enemy after the battle.

As Sheridan never cared to get credit for his ideas or efforts—any one might appropriate them and call them his own—Badeau does him full justice where it does not conflict with the real object of his "history."

After the successful assault of Missionary Ridge, Sheridan started promptly in pursuit with his own division. Badeau says: "About a mile in rear of Missionary Ridge the road runs along another high and formidable hill, on which the enemy had posted artillery supported by a heavy force of infantry. Sheridan's men, however, charged again, clinging to the face of the mountain as they had done a few hours before on Missionary Ridge. Meanwhile, Sheridan sent regiments on either side to flank the enemy; . . . outflanked on right and left the enemy fled, leaving the coveted artillery and trains. Those who escaped capture were driven across Chickamauga Creek" (vol. i., p. 512).

Here Sheridan did not depend on his men's ability to carry by assault artillery and infantry posted on the top of a "formidable hill," but "meanwhile" sent flanking columns right and left, which, with scarcely any loss, secured artillery, trains, and probably most of the infantry. As Shakespeare has it,

"The victory is twice won that brings home full numbers."

CHAPTER V.

IN THE WILDERNESS AND SPOTTSYLVANIA.

WHEN the general came East he had choice of at least two plans. His forces, including Butler's army, menacing Richmond numbered 170,000 men.

Lee's army numbered 65,000 men, and there may have been 10,000 men in the fortifications around Richmond.

Had he sent half of this force, 85,000 men, up the James River in rear of Richmond, instead of 30,000, there would have been a different story to tell. Nothing could prevent 85,000 men from taking Richmond in rear except Lee's army. Lee would therefore be compelled to fall back on Richmond. If he kept his army in Richmond his supplies would be cut off from the south ; also from the north by our army advancing from that direction. Therefore if he desired to continue the war he would have to abandon Richmond and retire south of Petersburg. Deprived of the war material at Richmond, and of the larger part of Virginia, his army would have been much weakened by desertions of Virginia and North Carolina troops, while we could have easily concentrated an army of 200,000 men at Richmond to push him down through the Carolinas, and the war could have ended with the fall of Atlanta. As it was, when Atlanta fell, the Governor of Georgia thought of declaring for the Union.

This plan would have satisfied the government, who would have no fears for Washington with 85,000 men between that city and Lee's army, besides the 40,000 reserves which were afterward sent to Grant, and the garrisons in the defences.

It appears, however, that Grant expected at first either to destroy Lee or drive him into Richmond, and besiege him there from the north, while Butler would advance in co-operation and cut Lee off from the south.

It is not flattering to the general's intelligence if he thought that the Confederates would allow 30,000 men to cut Richmond off from

the rest of the Confederacy in this way, but we pass that, to see how he went to work to "destroy" Lee.

Grant had for this purpose 140,000 men against 65,000 under his antagonist, and to a man who appeared to think "no more of capturing cities than of driving a horse" this would appear an easy job.

This proportion would give him 70 to hold 65 in front and 70 more to envelop them in flank and rear, or such other proportions as good generalship might suggest. For instance, when Lee struck Hooker on the flank at Chancellorsville, he held him in front with 15,000 and sent 35,000 to attack him in flank and rear. The result we know.

But when a man "who balanced the armies" masses 120,000 in front of an enemy of 55,000 (leaving out the cavalry of both armies) instead of surrounding them, and then fears that the enemy may divide his small force to envelop his flank and rear—when it is feared that 11 may surround 24, and through this fear men enough are kept to hold a position in rear of one wing, when their presence in front would have secured a positive victory instead of a momentary success, and when on the other wing the flank is actually turned and prisoners captured by the thousand by this small force—then the drama of war becomes a farce—for one side at least.

As I said at the beginning, when the average commander is confronted by a man of genius, he is all at sea; and it appears to have been so in this case, for when Grant was allowed to cross the Rapidan River without serious resistance, he thought that Lee had fled, and when the advance of the opposing armies met in the Wilderness, it was said at headquarters that "the enemy have left a division to fool us here, while they concentrate and prepare a position toward the North Anna."

Swinton says: "It was not deemed possible that Lee, after his defensive line had been turned, could have acted with such boldness as to launch forward his army in an offensive sally." Another bold, bad man.

It has been truly said that a "soldier wanting in boldness is only half a soldier."

Swinton continues: "It was therefore at once resolved to brush away or capture this force; but as this determination was formed under a very erroneous misapprehension of the actual situation, the means employed were inadequate to the task" (Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 420).

As Grant had greater odds in his favor than any former commander, and as it was also probable that Lee might have a wholesome fear of the Western victor, he thought it possible, and even probable, that Lee might retire into the defences at Richmond without a fight, for he said to Halleck at the beginning of the movement : "Forty-eight hours will decide whether Lee will stand this side of Richmond."

But neither numbers nor name appeared to affect Lee, who telegraphed to Richmond : "The enemy crossed the Rapidan at Ely's and Germania fords. Two corps" (about 40,000 men) "of this army moved to oppose him—Ewell's by the old turnpike and Hill's by the plank road. They arrived this morning (May 5th) in close proximity to the enemy's line of march."

When our advance met the head of one of these columns on one of these roads, they attacked the enemy and drove him back some distance, but were in turn overpowered and repulsed. One division of the Fifth Corps was engaged at first, but when other divisions or brigades were driven back with loss, General Warren commanding, represented the proper course to be adopted. Swinton, p. 421, says : "General Warren urged a just view of the situation. If, as was believed at headquarters, there was but a rear guard in his front, the attack could have little effect on the great campaign in which the army was entering ; but if the enemy was present in force, time should be allowed to form a really weighty attack. But immediate action, with such means as were at hand, had been determined upon."

So as soon as a division got up and was formed into line, it advanced against the enemy, who would strike it suddenly on the flank, and push it back with loss and in disorder. The next division would be struck on the other flank, and a couple of regiments would be captured, while a brigade would find itself cut off, and work itself out by the rear of the enemy.

Thus, instead of capturing a division of the enemy or brushing it aside, the result of the first meeting between the "plain, good man" and the "bold, bad man" was a loss to the Fifth Corps of about 3000 men in killed, wounded, and missing. And what was worse was the demoralization of the men and the loss of confidence in Grant by the Fifth Corps, which was never restored during the war.

Swinton, speaking of this corps when it met the enemy again at Spottsylvania, says : "Owing to their severe experience in the Wil-

derness, and the night march, without rest, the men were in an excited and almost frightened condition, and the tendency to stampede was so great that Warren was compelled to go in front of his leading brigade. When, therefore, they received a fire in front from the redoubtable foe they had left in the Wilderness, the line wavered and fell back in some confusion."

And yet this same corps and the cavalry under Sheridan at Five Forks gave Lee's army the most disastrous defeat it ever suffered, but while under Grant and his methods its efficiency was impaired fully thirty per cent from the first hour it met the enemy under him.

When it was found that the enemy was in force on these two roads, then headquarters got a great scare.

We had only one division (Getty's, Sixth Corps) on one of these roads, while Hancock's corps was marching on a third road, miles to our left. It was thought, of course, that Lee would break through Getty's force on this centre road, and cut our army in two, and probably whip each part in detail. Thus again the general was caught napping.

So, in great trepidation, messenger after messenger was hurried after Hancock, to bring him to the aid of Getty, and at last Getty was ordered to attack the enemy alone, to put a bold front on, before it was possible for Hancock's men to get up.

Had all of Lee's army been up that day; this would most likely have been his tactics; but as he only had about 15,000 men on this road (one division of Hill's corps being still absent) he had not enough men to make the attempt.

At the time Hancock got the order to re-enforce Getty, his head of column was opposite to a road that would have brought him against the right flank and rear of the enemy. Had he been moved against the enemy's right flank, with Getty's co-operation in front, there could have been little doubt of the result, for, combined, their force numbered about 35,000 on flank and front, as against 15,000 of the enemy.

As it was, Getty attacked an intrenched position and was repulsed, and as fast as Hancock's corps came up and were hurriedly advanced to the attack by divisions, they were repulsed also.

Thus ended the first day's operations—repulse and discouragement—and all because a general who could capture cities so easily could not anticipate what a real soldier would do.

The general's plan to "destroy" Lee consisted in massing his

army in front of his enemy (except what he kept to protect his flanks from being turned by the enemy), and butting at him in regular battering-ram style, although Badeau says "there was no blind butting." He was afraid to send a force to threaten Lee's flank lest it might get gobbled up.

He failed to crush Lee in this way, because that general always protected his troops behind intrenchments (when on the defensive), which gave him an advantage of at least three to one—Badeau says five to one—but as Grant had only a little over two to one the result could have been foretold.

Inside of thirty days he lost 60,000 men in killed, wounded, and missing, and was balked on two or three different lines of campaign against Richmond.

At the Wilderness he was stopped from going by the way of Gordonsville or Louisa Court-House. At the North Anna River he had to turn aside from the direct north route, and at Cold Harbor he could not force his way from the York River route, because here his army positively refused to do any more "blind butting."

After Cold Harbor, Swinton says of the Army of the Potomac : "Shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers killed and wounded, it was the Army of the Potomac no more."

While the enemy he expected to destroy had lost only 18,000 men, and were naturally much elated. This was not the kind of balancing of the armies that Badeau meant, but it suited the enemy well enough.

It was on the second day in the Wilderness that it was feared the 11 would be divided and a part sent to envelop the 24 in flank and rear, and the history of this day shows how this fear prevented Hancock from securing a substantial victory at the opportune moment.

The army having got into position during the night, the order was given to attack in the morning, and Hancock was warned of the expected attack on his flank, and was therefore compelled to leave two of his divisions (one half of his corps) in his rear when he advanced to the attack in the morning. Hancock had, however, Getty's division and another from the Fifth Corps, and thus strengthened he drove the enemy out of his intrenchments in confusion, for over a mile, back on their trains and headquarters ; but now, when another division would have enabled him to drive the enemy from the field, they were kept in rear to defend a supposed attack from

that quarter, while the enemy they were waiting for was at this juncture hurled against Hancock's front, and forced him back in disorder in return.

Of this Swinton says : " It was known during the night that Longstreet's corps, which had not been in the previous day's action, was marching up from the direction of Orange Court-House to reach the field by a route that would strike Hancock's left flank and rear.

" That officer was cautioned officially to beware of this. It was with the view to provide against this menace that in attacking in the morning Hancock advanced only his right" (two divisions), " and allowed his left" (two divisions), " under General Gibbon, to remain on the original line on the Brock Road—the road on which it was expected Longstreet would come up.

" Now, at the time Hancock began his attack, Longstreet was really making the movement indicated ; but Hancock's assault was executed with such energy and so completely disrupted Hill that Lee found it necessary to recall Longstreet and bring him forward to meet the more pressing necessity in his front. Hancock, however, unaware of this, still looked nervously to his left ; and though, after his successful advance, he directed General Gibbon to advance" (from the rear) " and press the enemy's right, the fear of the approach of Longstreet's corps gave such constant apprehension that Gibbon advanced only one brigade."

Hancock's report says : " Had my left advanced, as directed by me in several orders, I believe the overthrow of the enemy would have been assured."

Thus the general-in-chief succeeded in infusing his own timidity into all but the boldest officers, even to the extent of disobeying orders. " It takes a hero to command an army."

Fortune favors the brave, and, it appears, delights to overwhelm the timid, for the scare was kept up, although Longstreet, when starting on the movement later in the day, was accidentally shot by his own men, when the movement was suspended. (And it was near this spot that " Stonewall " Jackson was accidentally shot by his own men a year before while making a flank attack on Hooker. In this way the Confederates " balanced "—the brains in part—between the two armies.)

But if Longstreet's ghost was laid for a time (he was only wounded), others arose in the persons of Sheridan and Stuart (cavalry generals). Swinton says : " This apprehension was throughout the

forenoon constantly revived and strengthened by various incidents that befell. Thus about eight o'clock an outburst of fight was heard considerably to the left, where Sheridan, with a division of horse, had engaged the enemy ; but, instead of encountering Longstreet, as Hancock supposed, it turned out to be Stuart's Cavalry he had met." And, as if the gods themselves had conspired against timid generalship, a column of infantry soon after appeared marching boldly against Hancock's flank. Strong earthworks were hurriedly constructed across the road, and three brigades were held ready to resist them, but still they pressed forward.

Swinton says : " Some time after this there came a report that infantry were moving upon the Brock Road from the direction of Todd's Tavern, about two miles from Hancock's left, and as he knew he had no infantry in that quarter, he again supposed it to be Longstreet, and took measures to meet him. But the reported column of infantry proved to be a body of several hundred Union convalescents who had come to the front by way of Chancellorsville, and were now following the route of the Second Corps around by Todd's Tavern.

Thus it was that the suspicion, continually awakened, that Longstreet was moving to turn Hancock's left flank, resulted in paralyzing a large number of his best troops—troops that would otherwise have gone into action at the time when the disruption of Hill's force opened a rare opportunity for a decisive blow."

The result of this day's operations was that our forces were pressed back into their intrenchments, and the enemy amused himself about sunset by turning our right flank, held by the Sixth Corps, and capturing about 4000 prisoners.

Loss in the two days, about 20,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Confederate loss about 8000.

In striking contrast to this timidity and bungling was Sherman's order to McPherson at the same date to strike the railroad twenty-five miles in Johnston's rear, and hold it with his army of 23,000 men against " Johnston's whole army," if necessary.

Sherman says : " McPherson had in hand 23,000 of the best men of the army, and could have walked into Resaca" (then held by a small brigade only), " or he could have placed his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army with the knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels.

" Had he done so, I am certain that Johnston would not have

ventured to attack him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place, and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and wagons at the very beginning of the campaign.

"Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little timid" (Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 34).

Some of Badeau's comments, on this battle are good reading. He says: "The national superiority in numbers was an impediment rather than an advantage."

But he spurns the assertion, that some writers have made, that the general had no plans. He says: "It is amusing to observe the complacency with which writers who did not know and could not understand Grant's plans have therefore assumed he had none. It has been asserted that in the operations of the 6th of May" (second day's) "there were neither combinations nor grand tactics—that the order of battle was simple and to all the corps—attack along the whole line.

"Hancock had fully half the army under his command, and this most military men would consider a 'combination.'"

This Badeau takes to be a complete crusher to those who thought the general had no plans, but he could give no better illustration of the general's incapacity to use his troops to advantage, even in the plan which his own timidity and the knowledge of his inferiority to his foe compelled him to adopt.

Badeau does not deny that Lee had two of his three corps—two thirds of his army—in front of and threatening the flank of Hancock. Therefore Hancock should have had two thirds of the army under his command instead of "half," in order to overcome his enemy. The general's balancing was at fault there.

This is the reason why Hancock failed to gain a complete victory in the morning, for his report says that if one division (about 7000 men) "had advanced as he had directed in repeated orders," he had no doubt of the overthrow of the enemy. This does not sound as if "superiority in numbers was an impediment"—at least with Hancock.

Two thirds of the army would have given Hancock about 20,000 more men to complete the "disruption of Hill" without calling on the divisions that were waiting to receive Longstreet in the rear.

The problem was very simple, and yet the disposition of Grant's force was entirely inappropriate.

The contending armies were astride two roads which were divided by a forest. On one of these roads Lee had two thirds of his army ; on the other, one third. And to "attack all along the line," our disposition should have been the same.

In round numbers Lee had 60,000 and Grant had 100,000 men (for Burnside had not yet arrived—20,000—and we will count him out).

Lee put 40,000 on one road and 20,000 on the other.

Grant put 50,000 on one road and 50,000 on the other.

The balance should have been :

Lee, $40,000 + 20,000 = 60,000$ in all.

Grant, $66,000 + 34,000 = 100,000$ in all.

This would have given Hancock over two divisions more than he had to complete the "disruption of Hill," and, as Burnside was coming up then with 20,000 men, what was to hinder the complete overthrow of the enemy ?

This is the general whose plans able writers "could not understand," and to whom "superiority in numbers was an impediment rather than an advantage."

Badeau is right ; "superiority in numbers" is no advantage to a man who cannot handle them.

But look at the possibilities within the grasp of the Federal commanders, during these two days, at the very beginning of their campaigns. At the East as in the West, "one half of the enemy, with all their artillery and trains," might have been captured, were it not for the timidity of McPherson in the West and the timidity and stupidity of the general-in-chief in the East. How farcical it sounds to talk about this man capturing cities as easily as he could drive a horse !

Yes, sir, I maintain that when Sherman wrote that "bold conceptions were more easy of execution than more timid ones," and that "no man could command more than sixty thousand men," he meant that Grant was a failure—that he had been weighed and found wanting—that he had neither the capacity nor the courage to plan a bold campaign, nor the courage to take a proper risk in battle, or to fight one properly any way.

Even Hancock's momentary success was to be attributed to the fact that one division of ours, that was sent to him from the Fifth

Corps, got on Hill's flank, and not to the attack in front, or "all along the line."

Badeau has to put forth his best exertions on this occasion, and imaginary movements and motives are attributed to Lee, that Grant may anticipate and circumvent him, for it was only two days before this that Badeau says: "Marvel of it all, he was not unwilling to turn from these momentous themes to descant on the making of a fire or the qualities of a horse." True, he admits that it was not a very complete victory. He says: "He" (Grant) "would indeed have desired a more complete success, and did not assume to call this victory. . . . Lee was not destroyed, it is true, but his army was weakened materially and morally; and whether his spirit was cowed and acknowledged its master, or whether Grant's skill was so absolute as to allow no opportunity," etc.

But what struck Badeau, almost as much as the general's "absolute skill," was his apparent unconsciousness of his greatness.

When Warren's divisions were severally repulsed, on first meeting the enemy, the general went out with Warren to the front to see what it all meant—being so different from what he expected. Badeau says: "There was no splendid daring or enthusiasm in his manner; he behaved exactly as at ordinary times, made no comment on the exposure" (there was no fighting just then), . . . "and returned to headquarters as composedly and apparently as indifferent as when he set out."

That the bewildered general should exhibit no "splendid daring or enthusiasm" at that moment, is indeed wonderful. That is the way he behaved in battle, as described in page 108, vol. ii.; but at page 21, same volume, Badeau says: "In battle, however, the Sphinx awoke, the riddle was solved; . . . the utterance was prompt, the ideas were rapid, the judgment was decisive; the words were those of command; the whole man became intense, as it were, with a white heat. His nature, indeed, seemed like a sword, drawn only in the field or in emergencies, at ordinary times a scabbard concealed the sharpness and temper of the blade; but when this was thrown aside, amid the smoke and din of battle, the weapon flashed, and thrust, and smote—and won."

But, like a true Boniface, Badeau provides dishes to suit all tastes, and says in still another place: "He was always cool and collected in battle;" and he pictures him after this battle as some of my readers may see him in their "mind's eye."

When Lee could not be found on the morning of the third day (he had retired into a new line of intrenchments), Grant, it appears, was again all at sea. Badeau says : " Grant was apprehensive lest the rebels should have entirely disappeared, contemplating an attack in some other quarter, and were preparing to forestall the national movement to the left (to Spottsylvania). His own designs could not be carried out if there was danger of any serious interruption" (vol. ii., p. 133).

That is the trouble with cast-iron plans and cast-iron men ; they have no elasticity.

Suppose now that the general was elected for a " third term." What would he do if men like Sherman or Sheridan rose up in rebellion against him ?

Badeau's statements in regard to the losses on both sides and some of the conclusions he draws are as various as his portraits of the general.

He cuts 7000 off the Union loss as officially given, and assumes that the enemy's loss must have been equal to that—13,000. He then figures out, by a comparison of two monthly returns of a confederate corps, that Lee's loss would have been 25,000.

If this was so, then Grant might " assume to call this victory," for this was destroying nearly half of Lee's army.

And yet in the face of this he says that many generals in Grant's place would have retreated. He says : " Many generals in his place would have retreated at once. Weak men would have been alarmed for the communications of their army ; others would have been appalled at the magnitude of their losses or confused by the obstruction of their plans." If he only lost 13,000 out of 140,000—according to Badeau—that was a mere bagatelle.

This does not sound like victory, but it does sound like Badeau. " Who is he ? Who the devil is he ?"

Sherman admits having about double the numbers of his enemy, but Badeau cuts 26,000 from the report of Secretary Stanton. He accounts for the discrepancy by saying that 116,000 was all that was " equipped." Who will believe that in the third year of the war there were 26,000 men in the Army of the Potomac without arms to fight with ? On the contrary, I noticed the wise provision made by the War Department when sending convalescents or recruits from Washington to join their commands in the field, each man—infantry, artillery, or cavalry—was provided with a musket. We had

several join our battery at Spottsylvania Court-House, and each of them had a musket and accoutrements.

Badeau also adds about 10,000 men to Lee's army, making it 75,000. I am a little surprised that he did not make it more. This is the way *he* "balanced the armies." Swinton puts Lee's force at 62,000, but I have added 3000 to give the general the benefit of any doubt in the matter.

Greeley, as if ashamed to put the numbers in each army side by side, contents himself by giving the Union losses in battle—which are the same as that of Swinton.

I presume, however, Badeau includes Greeley in the number of "writers hostile to the National cause," who said that Grant did not expect to meet Lee in the Wilderness. Of course Badeau denies that Grant did not expect to meet Lee there, but gives one indignant denial as his only proof.

He also calls attention, in a foot-note, to the fact that Grant mentioned the movement to Spottsylvania Court-House to several of his staff on the day before it was made, as if it were something very remarkable. He gives the names of the staff-officers this time.

To me, this means that at least five minutes before that General Meade had suggested the move to the general; but I may be mistaken.

When it was announced by the press that Grant would make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, I assumed that he would not take command of that army, but would allow Meade to fight Lee in his own way, suggesting, of course, any improvements he might see to Meade's plans. This also appeared to be Meade's understanding at first, for in speaking of the way he intended to manœuvre Lee out of his position, Grant interrupted him by saying: "Oh, I never manœuvre." Swinton is my authority for that.

Of course, this changed the position of things. He was not to devise, only to execute what he was told. Still, as his patriotism was superior to his vanity—he had no vanity when it came to the point—and he saw that the battering-ram policy was a failure, it is my impression that he suggested this idea to Grant. In fact, I give him the credit for all the flank movements made until Cold Harbor was reached. This, however, is only my impression.

To put my impressions in arithmetical order they would stand: What Sherman was to Grant: what Fitz-John Porter was to McClellan: so was Meade to Hooker and to Grant. I may here add

that the ablest man I remember seeing in the army next to Sheridan was Fitz-John Porter. Meade lacked the physique necessary to a great commander in the field. And by the law of the survival of the fittest, I believe that if Porter had not been sacrificed to cover the failure of Pope, he would have got command of the army after—if not before—Hooker's failure. He looked to me to be fully the equal of Lee, and resembled him in appearance. As to his not supporting Pope, the best proof of his desire to sustain the Union army, whoever commanded, is shown by an incident that occurred before he joined Pope. When moving down the peninsula, to take ship and join that general, he had orders from McClellan to halt at Williamsburg until the rest of the army got up, for fear of an attack by the enemy ; but from an intercepted letter, from a Confederate, he learned the confederate tactics to be : to crush Pope before McClellan's forces could join him. So, instead of halting, he took the risk of disobeying McClellan's order, and hurried his troops to the point of embarkation as soon as possible. This I gather from Greeley's history.

Of course everybody was laughing at Pope's order from his "headquarters in the saddle ;" but I presume Porter was like myself and the rest of the army in this regard—we cared not if the devil out of hell commanded, if he only led us to victory.

There is no use, however, in speculating about what might have happened, although there is very little doubt that if Sheridan had got command at this time instead of Grant, Lee would not have had many men left by the time he got to Richmond.

Grant was right when he said that there was "no more vigilant or sagacious officer in this or any country than General Sheridan."

What Badeau calls attention to as something remarkable—the fact that Grant proposed a new movement after he saw the game was up in the Wilderness—does not redound much to the general's credit, if that was the first time the idea occurred to him. He had been in command of the armies two months, and all these movements—the possibility of what Lee would do, if he turned his right flank, or attacked his left flank—and every possible manœuvre and contingency should have been studied over weeks before. The general's strategy, however, as laid down for Sherman and himself—"You follow Johnston wherever he goes, I will follow Lee wherever he goes"—might be called the brainless strategy, and required but little study beforehand, and no manœuvring was necessary.

But "the unexpected is sure to happen," and although he never manœuvred, as he said, yet he had not been over one day in front of Lee when he was compelled to manœuvre or retreat.

It appears Grant thought his flank movement would be a surprise to Lee, and that he would reach Spottsylvania Court-House before him.

His failure to get there before Lee he ascribes to his route of march being longer. But Swinton says, and the maps show, that his route was the shorter of the two. I had no idea, when on that night march, but that Lee was marching on parallel roads, and most likely ahead of us; for it is hard to conceal the movements and intentions of a large army from an able enemy, either by night or by day, unless skilfully devised distractions are thrown out beforehand by a still abler opponent.

The general's intentions, however, were too transparent, for his cavalry drove that of the enemy out of the road he proposed to move on that night, and our trains were conveyed to a point in readiness that day, which also became known to the enemy.

And in making this movement he was so fearful of having his rear gobbled up that he kept a large force there, when they should have been at the head of the column, overlooking, in his anxiety, the chance this again gave the enemy to cut in between the different corps, as before, and overwhelm each separately.

Swinton says: "Hancock with three divisions (about 21,000 men) was detained all day at Todd's Tavern, to meet an anticipated attempt of Lee to fall upon the rear of the Union column.

"It would probably have sufficed to retain only one brigade (about 2500 men) for this purpose. In this case Hancock would have been able to push to the critical front. His retention at Todd's Tavern was very unfortunate, and must be accounted rather timid generalship; for the army, having been cut loose from the Wilderness, should have been pushed to Spottsylvania with the utmost vigor. The situation was such as to present quite as much danger to the head of the column as to its rear; and had Warren gained Spottsylvania Court-House his position, with nothing within supporting distance, would have been very critical."

One would suppose that this poor, timid soul—timid and ignorant in design, timid in battle, timid on the march, timid in war, but bold in peace—would shun criticism rather than challenge it by assuming a threatening attitude, and inviting comparison with great names:

"Even more than Washington is he first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen!" exclaims the Earl De Blind Pool.

Now, the soldiers of Lee's army look upon Grant as a mere child in the hands of Lee, but none of them think of comparing Lee to Washington. They say that if the numbers in the Wilderness had been reversed, Lee would have destroyed or captured Grant in half an hour. My own belief is that it would have been a matter of a few hours only.

This is the way they compare Lee to Washington :

Captain Chamberlayne, in a eulogy delivered on Lee at Richmond, speaking of his repulse of McClellan from the front of Richmond, says : "It may be safely compared with the best campaigns of the greatest masters in the art of war—with Frederick's Leuthen, to which it bears as much likeness as a campaign of days can bear to a battle of hours, or with that greater feat the amazing concentration by Washington of contingents from New York and from North Carolina, of new levies from the Virginia Valley and of a French fleet from the West Indies, to besiege and to capture the army of Cornwallis."

At this rate they would allow Washington some twenty minutes to finish Grant.

At Spottsylvania the general did make a flank movement—against a wagon-train. He miscalculated on that, however, and in withdrawing his troops across a river in his rear, was charged upon by the enemy, who saw his blunder, and two brigades were only saved from capture or destruction by the bravery of the men and the precautions taken by Hancock. Swinton says : "During the afternoon" (of the first day) "a confederate wagon-train was observed filing along the road leading into Spottsylvania opposite Hancock's position. That officer was directed to make a movement across the Po, partly with the hope of capturing some of the train." (I wish to call attention to what Swinton says of the men, for Grant tried to excuse his failures to Sherman by writing after the fall of Petersburg : "This is now as good an army as any.")

"This affair, though illustrating the steady valor of the troops, was an unfortunate one in every respect.

"It was undertaken without any very well-defined military object, and abandoned under circumstances unfavorable to the spirit of the troops and highly encouraging to the enemy.

"The remarkable coolness and steadiness of the men alone saved them from a great disaster. They sustained a heavy loss, and many of the wounded perished in the fire, which started in the wood where they fell."

Lee having by this time got well fortified, Grant prepared to attack him. Napoleon did not believe in attacking fortified positions, but then Napoleon could not be repulsed and checkmated a score of times inside of a year and still be called a great general. Napoleon says : "Turenne constantly observed the two maxims : first, never attack a position in front when you can obtain it by turning it ; second, avoid doing what the enemy wishes, and that simply because he does wish it. Shun the battle-field in which he has fortified and intrenched himself."

Grant, however, did the reverse of all this : he attacked in front, he attacked a fortified position, and he did exactly as the enemy wished him to do—he attacked the strongest point in his line first.

How did he succeed ? Swinton says : "The point against which the attack was designed to be made was a hill held by the enemy in front of Warren's line. This was, perhaps, the most formidable point along the enemy's whole front. Its densely wooded crest was crowned by earthworks, while the approach, which was swept by artillery and musketry fire, was rendered more difficult and hazardous by a heavy growth of low cedars, mostly dead, the long, bayonet-like branches of which, interlaced and pointing in all directions, presented an almost impassable barrier to the advance of a line of battle. The attack of this position had already been essayed during the day by troops of the Second and Fifth Corps with most unpromising results.

"When Hancock's division joined the Fifth an assault was made by both corps at five o'clock ; but it met a bloody repulse. The men struggled bravely against an impossible task, and even entered the enemy's breastworks at one or two points ; but they soon wavered, and fell back in confusion and great slaughter. Notwithstanding the disastrous upshot of this assault, the experience of which had taught the troops that the work assigned them was really hopeless, a second charge was ordered an hour after the failure of the first.

"The repulse of this was even more complete than that of the former effort, and the loss in the two attacks was between five and six thousand men, while it is doubtful whether the enemy lost as many hundred."

It was no wonder he wanted "all the infantry you can rake and scrape."

Why all this slaughter for nothing? Because he feared "isolation." He was afraid that if he attempted to send a force on the enemy's flank it would be "isolated"—gobbled up.

By assaulting in front he assumed that his forces could only be compelled to fall back—it might be with a loss of one third or one fourth of their number—but if he attempted to send a corps or more to take the enemy on flank or rear, the whole of them might be cut off and captured. He was the only man in either army, whether on a large or a small scale, who attacked his enemy just as his enemy wished him to do.

"Find the enemy's flank and turn it," said Sheridan to Hayes in the valley; but here, when Burnside on his own account worked around Lee's right flank, while Lee's attention was called to his left, Burnside was promptly ordered to the front again.

Badeau, vol. ii., p. 165, says: "Meanwhile, on the extreme left, Burnside had pushed forward to within a quarter of a mile of Spottsylvania Court-House. The rebels were massed on the other flank. . . . The position that was attained might have been of immense advantage, for Burnside had completely turned the right of the rebel army. But the country was new to the national officers, and his corps was isolated from the remainder of the command; the enormous advantage which had been acquired was thus not used, and Burnside was drawn in nearly a mile, so that he might connect with the left of the army."

But what was the use of "enormous" advantages to a man like Grant?

Sherman attacked "fortified lines" once during his campaign. He planned it scientifically: massed two strong columns to try and pierce the enemy's lines at one or two points; had the telegraph laid to his post overlooking the battle-field, so as to transmit instantaneous orders; but neither column succeeded, and "satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking intrenched lines," he compelled the enemy, in sheer desperation, to do most of the attacking of "intrenched lines" afterward.

"If you are a great commander, come out of your works and fight me." "If you are a great commander, make me come out of my works and fight you."

Notwithstanding the poor army Grant had (judging from what he

wrote to Sherman), and notwithstanding the fact observed by Sherman in his campaign that whoever "attacked intrenched lines invariably got the worst of it," yet at Spottsylvania we broke through the enemy's lines twice, and took a lot of prisoners and guns from him; once a brigade of the Sixth Corps, under Colonel Upton, took 900 prisoners, and afterward Hancock's corps took 3000 prisoners and a lot of cannon.

But here, again, the tactics of the general was at fault. Instead of sending re-enforcements to these officers direct, after they had made a breach, he ordered assaults right and left on impregnable positions. That, of course, stopped further success.

It was very fortunate, however, that these slight successes modified the long list of bloody repulses which the army had suffered, otherwise complete demoralization might have been the result.

The results of one day, as given by Badeau, will give my reader an idea of the situation. He says: "Although the fighting of the 10th of May had been bloody and continuous—though every corps had been engaged, and at the close no ground was won, no palpable result attained, still the sacrifices" (appropriate word) "were not in vain. This day did its share to produce the result at which the general-in-chief was aiming."

If he aimed to balance the armies, he was succeeding wonderfully.

"Every manœuvre," he says, "had a meaning, every assault was timed." How "timed"? Well or ill?

"There was no blind butting at the enemy, but a constant endeavor to find his weak point" (in front).

And the lesson Lee learned from all this was: "That he had no unwary, or stupid, or timid adversary" (vol. ii., p. 168).

I like to give Badeau's opinion as well as my own, so that my readers may have a choice.

In seven days from the start he had lost about 40,000 men in killed, wounded, and missing, while the men were worn out by incessant and unnecessary hardships. Swinton says: "Language is inadequate to convey an impression of the labors, fatigues, and suffering of the troops, who fought by day only to march by night."

Like all failures, of course, the general never failed.

If he failed to destroy Lee it was because of—the wagon-train; the woods; then Warren; then Mott's division; then Burnside, Hancock, Meade; the army; and, still again, because he was a "Western general."

Strange that no one in the army ever noticed that Sheridan was a "Western general."

It was even dangerous to a general's reputation to be successful under Grant.

Of Hancock, Badeau says : "Hancock had indeed dealt the severest blow of the campaign ;" but then he goes on to attack Hancock, because he could not hold his ground against the most of Lee's army.

Grant had, as usual, kept the bulk of his army "all along the line," in front of his enemy, and ordered assaults to be made on impregnable works, as usual, to assist Hancock. In this case he afterward sent the Sixth Corps to re-enforce Hancock (at Hancock's request, it appears), but it was then too late to follow up Hancock's success, for Lee had concentrated the bulk of his army against Hancock, and forced him back on the works he had captured, and it took all of the two corps to hold their ground against the furious assaults of Lee.

Hancock's assault was made at 4.35 A.M., and at 6 A.M. the Sixth Corps arrived. Hancock's report says : "The Sixth Corps arrived at 6 A.M. ; its arrival was timely." Lee had thus an hour and a quarter to mass his army and hurl it, in charge after charge, on Hancock.

Badeau's statement is a little misleading, but it shows whose incapacity prevented better results here, as elsewhere. He says : "Wright" (Sixth Corps) "was ordered up with promptness after the earliest definite news of the victory, and arrived on the ground in fifteen minutes, but it was then too late to act offensively."

This might mean that he was there fifteen minutes after Hancock's men had leaped the enemy's works, say 4.45 or 5 A.M. ; but at page 176 he says : "The enemy made tremendous efforts to dislodge him" (Hancock), "but in vain ; his heroes seemed inspired by the sight of the works they had won, and at six o'clock Wright came upon the field." At least an hour too late.

"It is the half hours that decide battles," said Napoleon.

The general appeared to think that if he broke the enemy's lines at any point, he would give way all along the line, but the wooden-headed enemy would not fall in with that idea.

The Sixth Corps might just as well have been held in reserve in rear of Hancock, and have followed him up at once. Then Badeau might say, with some reason : "He and Wright together might have

followed up the success, and the ruin of Lee's army would have been consummated at Spottsylvania."

Still the general was learning his trade a little better, for the next time it was resolved to assault Lee's works, Burnside's corps was massed in rear of Hancock, but this time, of course, the men were mown down so fast that they had to fall back with heavy loss before reaching the enemy's works.

After demolishing Hancock, Badeau says: "It was, however, Warren's feebleness which especially prevented Grant from following up the advantages that Hancock had obtained."

Just so; as I said, the Fifth Corps had lost confidence in the general from the first, and Badeau's words confirm my opinion. He says: "Warren exhibited an unwillingness to trust that his superiors would protect or perhaps knew how to protect his advance."

Now, Warren was an officer who more especially needed to have confidence in his superiors, and his humanity revolted at the idea of wasting the lives of his men in what he and they knew to be fruitless assaults, in obedience to an ignorant, a timid, and a soulless commander.

But Warren made a great mistake, however, when he took Sheridan to be a blunderer like Grant, as when he said at Five Forks, "Bobby Lee is always getting people into trouble."

Badeau's best joke, however, is the intimation that Grant's orders suffered depreciation by passing through Meade to the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

He says: "To some, indeed, of Grant's well-wishers, one thing indeed seemed evident, after this week of battle, and that was the impolicy of retaining an officer in the position of Meade" (Meade must go). . . . "If Grant could communicate direct with his corps commanders it was believed that he might convey or infuse something of his own spirit and character" (vol. ii., p. 186).

This is not bad, considering that he blames Hancock because he could not control his men (the poor, tame creatures!) when they saw a chance for victory.

Grant at this date was recommending Meade for promotion. He said: "General Meade has more than met my expectations. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 186).

While I write, I notice a paragraph in a daily paper, which throws some light on the matter:

“ WASHINGTON, February 7, 1883.

“ **ASSIGNMENTS TO COMMAND IN 1864.**—The work of preparing the war records for publication has brought to light some interesting dispatches from General Grant upon the subjects of the assignments to command in the Shenandoah Valley after the raid into Maryland and the movements against Washington in July, 1864. It has heretofore been supposed that General Grant first insisted upon General Sheridan for that service. It now appears that he suggested General Franklin in his first dispatch and next General Meade. The further interesting fact is brought out that in case General Meade was so assigned General Grant desired General Hancock to be placed in command of the Army of the Potomac. The dispatches also show that General Grant had great confidence in General Meade, and that he spoke of him in a manner quite at variance with the later statements of General Badeau in his military history.”

Badeau says : “ Grant, however, underrated, or rather never rated at all, his own personal influence. He was not introspective. He never studied himself nor criticised his own traits. He was not conscious of his own directness ; he did not appreciate his own earnestness, nor the way in which it told on others. . . . His words and bearing were never meant to produce effect, and he did not dream of the effect they often did produce.”

My own impression of the general was that he would make a very good commander of ten thousand men, under some one that could show him just what to do.

But I think it was cruelty to dumb animals to pit him against a man like Lee.

At that date Grant commanded Burnside “ direct,” but it does not appear that he succeeded well in infusing his “ own spirit and character” into Burnside ; for in an order for an assault Grant said to Meade : “ I will send one or two staff-officers over to-night to stay with Burnside and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack” (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 171).

Now, as Burnside was as patriotic and as physically courageous a man as Grant, and possessed ten times his moral courage—he wished no one to be blamed for his failure at Fredericksburg but himself—it may seem strange that Grant feared his hearty co-operation and promptness.

From Burnside’s policy during this campaign, I assume that his experience at Knoxville had taught him more than ever before the immense advantage of an intrenched position.

At Knoxville Longstreet assaulted part of his line twice—first, with

three brigades, and then added a fourth ; but despite the fact that the work was defended by only 220 men and 11 guns, the assaults were repulsed each time. Longstreet's loss was over a thousand men, while Burnside's loss was only thirteen. It is reasonable to suppose, then, that he and his officers regarded General Grant as little better than a fool for giving the enemy such an advantage, instead of striking him on flank or rear. I remember well how handsomely he turned the confederate flank at South Mountain in the Antietam campaign.

I saw about a thousand of the enemy lying dead *en masse*, just as they had stood behind a stone wall.

So it may have required two staff-officers to convince him of the probability of success when his reason and experience taught him to expect none.

The appearance of the two generals was very unlike—the open, manly, and ingenuous countenance of Burnside offering a strong contrast to the commonplace features of Grant.

Burnside, however, was prompt in his attack, and his guns were heard before Hancock could move, by reason of the fog.

The answer to Badeau's lament was, that in ten days from that time Burnside's corps, which heretofore had received "direct" orders from Grant, was consolidated with the Army of the Potomac under Meade, "a consolidation greatly needed," Badeau says, "as well to secure unity and promptness of movement as for administrative purposes." Burnside wrote : "I am glad to get the order assigning the corps to the Army of the Potomac, because I think good will result from it" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 261).

While Badeau strains after devices to conceal failure now, the general sought devices to conceal failure then. We are assured by Badeau that "there was no blind butting ;" but that is an open question. Evidently the government had their doubts, for the assistant secretary of war, Hon. Charles A. Dana, was dispatched to the field to send independent reports to Washington of the real state of affairs, and the Hon. E. B. Washburne (Grant's creator), who accompanied the general to see him smash Lee at one blow, returned on the sixth day of failures, taking with him, however, the boast, "I propose to fight it out on this line."

The general interpreted these signs correctly, and took advantage of Sherman's success to try and cover his own deficiencies, by naming Sherman and Meade to be major-generals in the regular

army, saying: "If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army, the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing the other" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 186).

The real intention, however, was too transparent to the government, and the appointments were not made then.

Neither Sherman nor Meade desired promotion at that time, as neither had done anything very brilliant at that date—May 10—and when Sherman received his commission as major-general just before taking Atlanta, he says he would rather they had waited until he had won promotion by the capture of that place.

The assistant secretary of war joined the army on the third day in the Wilderness; for it was one great drawback in Grant that no dependence could be placed on his dispatches, or on what he would do. He disobeyed orders at Belmont. At Shiloh he gave his losses approximately at 5000 killed and wounded, saying nothing of the prisoners taken, while the report afterward showed the loss in all to be 13,573. At Vicksburg he disobeyed orders—his orders were to join Banks after he crossed the river below Vicksburg; and here, on the sixth day of the fighting, when he knew that he had lost over 6000 prisoners, including two generals, he says: "The result to this time is much in our favor. . . . We have lost to this time eleven general officers, killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000 men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater; we have taken over 4000 prisoners, while he has taken from us but a few stragglers."

Badeau thinks it necessary to explain Grant's statement, and says: "The estimate of the national losses was based on the number of missing reported to Meade; but thousands were missing after these battles who returned to do good and even heroic service afterward" (vol. ii., p. 189).

This explanation conveys the impression that the number of missing reported to Meade was only a few stragglers, and also that thousands of the men were mere skulkers during these battles, turning up again after the fight was over "to do good and even heroic service afterward."

This is the meanest fabrication yet devised by Grant's "historian" to conceal his failures. All of these men were captured on the line of battle, five thousand were captured in the two days' fight in the

Wilderness. These were reported to Meade on the third day, for every morning there is roll-call, and on the third day there was no fighting, so that there was every chance to know the exact losses.

Besides, Grant knew on the evening of the second day that the enemy had turned his right flank and captured two brigadier-generals with most of their brigades.

Of this attack, Badeau says : " He " (Grant) " was awakened to hear that the right of the whole army was turned, that Sedgwick " (Sixth Corps) " was driven in, and the headquarters themselves were in danger of capture. . . . His officers discussed the situation for hours, and sat up to learn the fate of Sedgwick " (vol. ii., p. 126).

The reason Badeau gives for sending the assistant secretary of war to the field was : " Grant was so averse to writing long dispatches that the government sent the Hon. Charles A. Dana, at this time assistant secretary of war, to his headquarters, to report more fully than the general-in-chief was in the habit of doing. " (The next sentence is significant.) " Dana's dispatches were not submitted to Grant. "

Having failed to capture the city of Spottsylvania Court-House—it contained two houses probably, I saw one—as easily as he could drive a horse, he prepared to depart for pastures new ; but not until the enemy had again swept around his right flank and rear and discovered him in the act of preparing to change his base.

Evidently Lee had no fear of becoming " isolated ; " but then the movement was properly supported.

CHAPTER VI.

THE NORTH ANNA AND COLD HARBOR.

"As soon as the general-in-chief determined to make another advance," Badeau says, "he directed the artillery reserve, numbering over one hundred pieces, to be sent back to Washington."

This would appear rather a bold measure to the non-military reader, and Badeau makes the most of it.

He says in closing: "He was evidently stripping still closer for the next fight, and meant to be encumbered by no weapons not likely to be used."

The artillery reserve was composed almost exclusively of batteries of regulars, who were, of course, highly efficient and reliable, and it was mainly through the inspiration of the commander of one of these batteries—Lieutenant Benjamin, Battery E, Second Artillery, with which I served for some months—that Burnside destroyed over a thousand of Longstreet's men, while our loss was only eleven—the most terrible slaughter of the war.

To get reliable information on this point, I inquired of General Henry J. Hunt, U. S. A., formerly chief of artillery A. P., and he kindly wrote me:

"NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, February 17, 1883.

" . . . I answer you from memory. I have not read General Badeau's work yet. The artillery reserve was ordered to be sent back, I think, from *North Anna*, certainly not from Fredericksburg. Instead, I reduced each battery in the whole Army of the Potomac from *six to four guns*, which effected the same or nearly the same reduction of guns, and enabled us to get rid of our poorest horses and retain our men, whom we much needed.

"It was, I think, an ill-advised measure. I retained, wherever I could—and perhaps in all cases—all the caissons. We had to get back as many of the guns as we could at Petersburg."

"The Ninth Corps was not at that time a part of the Army of the Potomac. Its reserve artillery was sent away bodily, I believe, and caused

the loss of the best, or some of the best of its batteries—a loss we afterward felt severely. The artillery therein, from the very necessity of the case, *reconstructed itself* at Petersburg, but never so efficiently as before. . . .

“Truly yours,

HENRY J. HUNT.”

Thus by “taking thought,” General Hunt was able to reduce the injurious results of this “ill-advised measure” to the minimum. General Hunt I esteemed as one of the most patriotic, conscientious, able, and unassuming officers in the army.

It was at the North Anna that Grant was compelled to counter-march across that river, after securing a lodgment on the south side of it, without Lee firing a shot, contrary to Badeau’s assertion that Grant never receded a step in campaign.

Badeau says that Lee expected Grant would attempt to cross at the Pamunkey, a river that united the North and South Annas and two other streams into one, like the fingers uniting at the hand.

It was giving the general credit for good generalship—better than he possessed, it appears—to assume that he would try to cross the four streams in one, as crossing a river in face of an able enemy is always a delicate, and at times an impossible, operation.

Grant, however, was able to force his right and left wings across without much opposition. But at this point he must have experienced another severe shock.

The “isolation” and consequent fear of being absorbed in detail by his greedy though small enemy, which hung over him like a nightmare, and conspired to neutralize his great superiority in numbers, and marred all his efforts, “ill advised” as most of them were, had come at last.

Lee disposed his army so that it divided Grant’s into three pieces. Grant’s centre column had not yet crossed, and Lee placed his centre opposite to it on the south side of the river, and threw back his wings to the right and left so that his line was shaped like the letter **A**, one face confronted Grant’s right wing, the other his left wing, while the apex prevented his centre from crossing the river.

It was certainly a bad fix for the fearful Grant.

Badeau says: “Lee could thus not only concentrate on any endangered point of his own line, but mass his forces, and fall on either the National right or left while the other wing was miles and hours away.”

The general was not aware of this disposition of Lee’s army, and

was congratulating himself on having forced a passage so easily, when the further joyful news reached him that Lee could not be found. So, again thinking that Lee had fled, he telegraphed to Washington : " The enemy have fallen back from North Anna. We are in pursuit."

But he had not pursued far before his advance stumbled on the enemy, and in time, at considerable cost in men, the exact situation was discovered, and he set to work to prepare for the expected onslaught. Badeau says : " Bridges were laid and roads built to connect the different portions of the army, so that if Lee should endeavor to use his advantages troops could be moved from any quarter, and Grant's most imminent danger disappeared."

Of course, if Lee had thought of attacking, he would have done so while Grant was yet unaware of the true state of affairs.

In the mean time orders had been issued to recross the river when it became dark. Swinton says : " It was designed to make the movement secretly, and this purpose was successfully accomplished. Not a picket shot was fired, and no sound broke the midnight air."

There was no real danger, because either wing was equal to Lee's whole army ; but Grant had his fright and Lee had his laugh. Swinton says : " The game of war seldom presents a more effectual check-mate than was here given by Lee." This is quite true ; it was the conception of a master, and entirely beyond the ordinary capacity.

But if the general was outgeneralled in the field, he was not to be beaten on paper. For while waiting for darkness, that he might steal away, he wrote to the government : " Lee's army is really whipped. . . . A battle with them outside of their intrenchments cannot be had. . . . I feel that our success over Lee's army is already insured."

Badeau says : " When he wrote these words he had begun his preparations for another movement by the left flank."

Next day he described his position to Halleck, and said : " To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of men that even success would not justify."

It is a pity this fear of slaughtering his men did not occur to him both before and after this date.

For those who possess the key to Badeau's history, it is one of the most entertaining and imaginative of books ; still I would prefer that a soldier like Von Moltke, say, would not find out from it that the " greatest man of the Saxon blood " had seized the opportunity to write that his enemy " is really whipped," while preparing to steal

away from his front. Or, if Von Moltke should see it, I hope he will remain—as he is said to be—“silent in seven languages.”

Had Grant been attacked at the North Anna, he would have felt the loss of the 100 guns he had just sent away, for it is in defence against assaults that artillery counts fast. When the enemy are approaching and trying to remove the abatis and entanglements in front of an intrenched position, the canister from the guns cuts them down in rows.

I cannot refrain from quoting a few words descriptive of the general's triumphant rearward movement. He says: “Lee remained quiescent, paralyzed, at the most important moment; while Grant, placed in one of the most delicate situations possible in war, extricated himself without the loss of a man. He withdrew on both flanks in the face of an unbeaten” (but amused) “enemy, and executed a double passage of the river, under the very eyes of Lee and his army, and was not disturbed” (vol. ii., p. 237).

Had the general stood on the south bank of the river and “executed a double” somersault to the north bank, “under the very eyes of Lee and his army,” Lee would have been “paralyzed” beyond repair. Why didn't the general think of this brilliant idea? It would have been the last of Lee.

Now it was that Lee's idea of crossing three streams in one had to be resorted to, and the general wrote to Halleck: “I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies” (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 263).

It is here that Badeau says: “When all was over, Grant had no warmer admirers than the officers and men of the Eastern armies; but their admiration was the growth of a year.”

This check compelled Grant to transfer his base to the York River, and try to operate against Richmond from the east instead of the north. But at Cold Harbor Lee planted himself squarely between Grant and Richmond, and as the general had only one way of getting around this obstacle—butting at it from the front—he ordered the usual attack at four in the morning. Experience had taught him, at Spottsylvania, that the only possible chance of success lay in massing a heavy column at one point, with another right in rear ready to follow up any success, and also the necessity of reconnoitring the enemy's position, “to discover his weak points,” and try to “strike him between the joints.”

But in spite of his experience, probably grown desperate at the miscarriage of his ill-advised plans, he ordered, Swinton says : " The manner of attack ordered was of the kind already so often made in the course of this campaign—a general assault along the whole front of six miles, to be made at half past four in the morning."

For fear that his flank would be turned, or for fear that Burnside might get on the flank of the enemy, as before, and become " isolated," he ordered his corps to be kept in rear of the Fifth Corps, thus again keeping 15,000 to 20,000 men where they could do no good.

Of the result, Swinton says : " It hardly took more than ten minutes of the figment men call time to decide the battle. There was along the whole line a rush—the spectacle of impregnable works—a bloody loss—then a sullen falling back, and the action was *decided*."

" But rapidly as the result was reached it was *decisive* ; for the consciousness of every man pronounced further assault hopeless. The troops went forward as far as the example of their officers could carry them, nor was it possible to urge them beyond ; for there they knew lay only death, without even a chance of victory."

In a foot-note Swinton says : " This phrase, ' as far as the example of their officers could carry them,' I take from the report of General Hancock. It is true of the whole army, and to those who witnessed that terrible slaughter will have an almost pathetic significance."

And this was all that the commander of 140,000 men could do—stand them up to be slaughtered by a securely fortified enemy.

" The loss," Swinton says, " on the Union side, was over 13,000, while on the part of the Confederates it is doubtful if it reached that many hundreds."

In one confederate division they did not lose a man, while their front was covered with the Union dead and wounded.

The general's remedy for this was : Stand them up again. This time, however, each corps commander was to assault independently of the other, and as the most that any of them could do would be to break the enemy's line at one point, and then be driven back again—for they had no supports—it was simply the order of a madman. Swinton says : " Some hours after the failure of the first assault each corps commander was ordered to renew the attack without reference to the troops on his right or left. The order was issued through these officers to their subordinate commanders, and from them de-

scended through the wonted channels ; but no man stirred, and the immobile line pronounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic, against further slaughter."

Whatever may have been the verdict of the officers and men after "all was over," their verdict this day was : Grant is a failure. Fortunately, this "verdict" saved another ten thousand.

Swinton says : "If this rude and primitive array sufficed, one might forget all that experience had taught and genius devised of the means by which success is snatched on the field of battle."

Although Grant had apparently hidden Burnside to keep him out of mischief, it appears that Burnside had on his own account worked around on the flank of the enemy, and with the co-operation of the cavalry, who got in the confederate rear at his suggestion, they made it hot for the Confederates, and gained a position which, if properly supported, when he was ready to charge on them, would have won one of Sheridan's successes, horse and foot charging the enemy in rear of his intrenchments, while the line of battle in front wheeled in as the stampede proceeded along the enemy's line. But Grant's dispositions were made for defeat, not victory, and the men that should have won victory, if properly handled, were bleeding, and dying, and utterly discouraged.

Badeau says : "The Ninth Corps" (Burnside's) "had really made more progress than any other portion of the army ; and Burnside's dispositions for a further advance were all arranged. He had suggested to Wilson, on his right, to move from the opposite side of the Totopotomy, and attack the enemy in rear, and his own orders to advance were already given, when the command to suspend operations arrived. Wilson" (cavalry), "however, had turned the enemy's left and taken a number of prisoners before he became aware of the change of orders."

Burnside having secured this advantage while Grant thought him safe behind the Fifth Corps—for it appears he moved contrary to his orders—Badeau now coolly says : "The attention of the enemy being thus concentrated on the left, Burnside was able, as Grant anticipated, to advance on the right, and with a little more promptitude would doubtless have doubled up that wing on the rebel centre."

Had Grant said to him, as Sheridan did to Hayes, "Find the enemy's flank and turn it," at the right time, instead of sending him to the rear, then he might have "anticipated" the doubling up of that flank. And it appears that when the different corps met the

enemy on the march to Cold Harbor they defeated him ; but when they all came together under Grant, it meant disaster.

Again Badeau explains that "superiority in numbers" does not count for much. He says : "Much of the supposed advantage of numbers is a moral one" (I suppose I could give no better answer to the question, Has General Grant genius ? than to insert this statement by his historian) "where the ground held by the enemy does not permit his flanks to be turned."

And yet he admits that Wilson had turned the enemy's flank. He says : "Wilson, however, had turned the enemy's left and taken a number of prisoners" (vol. ii., p. 300).

Besides, Grant posted Burnside in rear of Warren lest the enemy might turn his flank. He says : "Burnside, on the extreme right, was not directed to attack at all, but to hold his command massed, and in readiness either to support Warren, if hard pressed, or to resist any attempt of the enemy to turn the right flank of the army" (vol. ii., p. 287).

So the intimation that superiority in numbers could not be utilized here, to outflank and envelop the enemy, will not do for military readers.

Badeau knows very well why the general always feared to take that advantage of the enemy which he feared the enemy, with less than half his numbers, would take of him. He knows it is because the general is a moral coward, that he neither had the courage to attack Lee in the proper way, nor the courage to resign a position which he could not fill, but kept up the useless slaughter to the end, until his army put a veto on further slaughter.

At another time Badeau says of him : "For, with all his willingness to take risks in certain contingencies—with all his preference for aggressive movements, Grant was no rash or inconsiderate commander. He was able to adapt his strategy to the slow processes of a siege, as well as to those imminent crises of battle when fortune hangs upon the decision of a single moment. At times audacious in design or incessant in attack, at others he was cautious, and deliberate, and restrained ; and none knew better than he," etc. (vol. iii., p. 132).

What a perfect commander ! It must have been the audacity of his designs that "paralyzed" Lee, whom he might easily have "destroyed" but that he "restrained" himself.

But if the general "executed" no "audacious" designs himself,

he gave Lee credit for bold designs. Before the battle of Cold Harbor he was joined by Smith's Tenth Corps from Butler, and while this corps was marching up in his rear he feared that Lee would attempt to get to his rear and crush or capture this corps.

The general says : " It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our flank for the purpose of cutting him off ; or, by a dash, to crush him, and get back before we are aware of it" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 273).

After the refusal to respond to the order to charge the second time, the general had to change his plans. Swinton says : " Next day siege operations were begun with a view to carry the defences of the Chickahominy by regular approaches. But this work also, at the end of a few days, ceased, and General Grant determined to change his line of operations to the south of the James River."

Of this statement Badeau sarcastically remarks : " Ignorant writers, finding the words ' regular approaches ' in Hancock's report, have rushed at once to the conclusion that Grant meant to besiege Richmond from Cold Harbor. The object of the regular approaches, as the dispatch shows, was to detain Lee outside of Richmond, not to drive him in ; and in this strategy Grant succeeded so completely that, years afterward, the rebel apologists had not discovered the ruse."

Grant was deep. Whatever his reasons were for detaining Lee " outside of Richmond " it cannot be denied that " in this strategy Grant succeeded," " completely."

Swinton says : " His" (Grant's) " conduct in this campaign ranks him with that class of generals who have been named Thor-strikers."

The situation at this time shows how much the people were " electrified " by the " fight-it-out-on-this-line " dispatch.

Swinton says : " Now, so gloomy was the military outlook after the action on the Chickahominy, and to such a degree, by consequence, had the moral spring of the public relaxed, that there was great danger of a collapse of the war. The history of this conflict, truthfully written, will show this. Had not success elsewhere come to brighten the horizon" (Sherman's), " it would have been difficult to have raised new forces to recruit the Army of the Potomac, which, shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers killed and wounded, was the Army of the Potomac no more."

In a foot-note he says : " The archives of the State Department,

when one day made public, will show how deeply the government was affected by the want of military success and to what resolutions the executive had, in consequence, come."

In the mean time Sheridan, with a much less proportion of cavalry to that of his enemy than Grant had of infantry, had vanquished the confederate cavalry and broken its spirit, and was now helping to fight the enemy's infantry.

The Swedish poet, Björnsterne Björnson, says : " Grant is not a great soul," but Badeau differs with him, for he says : " His military ability, indeed, was always blended with peculiarities that can hardly be called professional. He was when most a soldier never merely a soldier. He believed in moral as well as physical effects, and his own moral traits contributed to his success quite as much as those which were purely intellectual."

The general, however, had his good qualities. Credit must be given him for the unusual amount of labor he expended in regard to the killed and wounded who fell between the lines of the two armies. None of the Union generals, I am sure, would have spent one quarter of the time he consumed in sending numberless communications to General Lee, suggesting plans for this purpose, all of which Lee very politely answered.

At Cold Harbor the correspondence covered forty-eight hours without accomplishing his purpose *in the way he desired*, until at last, in disgust, he asked for permission to care for his wounded and bury his dead *in the usual way*, and promptly got it. But it was then too late to help the wounded, as all of them had died but two.

But my readers may not understand Greek. In plain words, then : When requested by the surgeon-general to get permission from Lee to bring in our wounded from " between the lines," instead of asking for this privilege (which is seldom refused) in the manner established by the usages of war, he proposed, and kept proposing, new plans unknown in warfare, because he had not the moral courage to do his plain duty and shape his request in the proper way to the man who had foiled him at every turn. Thus, his vanity being stronger than his humanity or his sense of duty, what could have been done in one hour occupied forty-eight, while hundreds of his wounded, who lay maimed and helpless through his incapacity, were suffering from the agonies of pain, and thirst, and hunger, under a broiling sun, until all but two succumbed to this combination of horrors.

Not only is the general a deep one, but he is also a sweet one.

My attention was called to this matter by Badeau's attempt to attach the delay on this and another occasion mentioned by him to Lee. My reader shall judge from Badeau's own testimony, in vol. ii., p. 309, of his book.

"All is fair in war," and no officer can be too careful to prevent himself from being surprised by his antagonist in any device, and I copy Beauregard's request to Grant to be allowed to bury his dead after Shiloh, as a sample of such a request. As it was made to Grant, it cannot be said that the general was ignorant of the proper way to get permission from Lee.

Beauregard to Grant.

" . . . Under these circumstances, in accordance with usages of war, I shall transmit this under flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead " (Badeau, vol. i., p. 597).

It is simple, and not unnecessarily humiliating to the applicant, but the cause of all Grant's irregular proposals was to avoid writing the three words in Beauregard's letter—"to ask permission"—or their equivalent. Badeau says: "Grant at once proposed to Lee that either be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines unarmed men bearing litters to pick up the dead or wounded without being fired upon by either party. . . . Lee, however, 'feared that such an arrangement might lead to misunderstanding and difficulty,' and proposed that 'in future, when either party desires to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent, as customary.' "

The words "either party" in Lee's reply was meant to smooth over the rugged words for Grant—it is your turn to-day, it may be mine next time.

"But Grant either misunderstood or affected to misunderstand Lee's reply, and at once wrote back: "'I will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. . . . I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.' Lee now expressed his regret that he had not made himself understood in his previous communication. 'I intended to say that I could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the

wounded between the armies in the *way you proposed*, but that when either army desires such permission it should be asked for, by flag of truce, in the usual way. Until I receive a proposition from you on the subject, to which *I can accede with propriety*, I have directed any parties you may send under white flags, as mentioned in your letter, to be turned back.'

"This was, of course, to compel Grant to 'ask permission' to remove his dead and wounded," Badeau says, "and then parade the request as proof of a rebel victory."

Unfortunately, the "proof of a rebel victory" was very apparent in the thousands of Union soldiers that lay dead and dying in front of Lee's works, where all Richmond might see them.

Badeau says: "Grant, however, was not used to such devices, and cared nothing for them. Gallant soldiers of both armies were lingering in pain under the blazing sun of June, and he replied, without delay: 'The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention between the two armies, compels me to ask for a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in—say two hours.'"

This was all that was necessary to say, and why did he not say so at the first, like a man? That was the way to save "wounded men" from suffering, for unless the general is a greater fool than I take him to be, he must have been morally certain that "such devices" as he resorted to would not receive Lee's sanction.

One of his communications to Lee contains language almost insulting. Badeau says: "Only two of his wounded were then alive, and Grant wrote, regretting that all his 'efforts'" (notice—*all his efforts*) "for alleviating the suffering of the wounded men left upon the battle-field had been rendered nugatory."

But Lee took no offence, it appears, and as soon as the application was made, as above, the request was at once acceded to. The word "all" in Grant's communication is his condemnation, when he knew that only *one* "effort" was necessary.

Badeau says: "Lee's answer, acceding to these terms, . . . was delayed in the transmission; and it was not until the 7th, forty-eight hours after Grant's first application, that the suspension of hostilities occurred. But Lee's punctilio was satisfied. Whether his military reputation gained sufficiently to compensate for the suffering he deliberately and unnecessarily prolonged, is questionable."

It will not take military men long to decide who is responsible for the "unnecessarily prolonged" suffering of the wounded.

Colonel Taylor, chief of staff to General Lee, in his book, "Four Years with General Lee," says of this matter: "General Grant made some disingenuous proposals, but at last asked for permission."

And I assume it was to contradict these words—"disingenuous proposals"—that Badeau dragged the subject into his book. "Would mine enemy would write a book"—especially by proxy, as the general has done.

But this was not the first instance of the general's "devices" to save his vanity at the expense of the "prolonged suffering" of his wounded. After the battles in the Wilderness he began his first communications with Lee by addressing "The Commander of the Confederate Forces," which he must have known would have been returned, for no man knew better than he the small details of warfare.

Badeau says: "Immediately after the battle of the Wilderness Grant sent one of his own staff to collect the wounded left behind in the region which had fallen temporarily into rebel hands. The enemy, however, refused to allow this officer to perform his task, unless application were made in writing by Grant; when this was done, the request was still refused, because the letter had been addressed to the 'Commanding Officer of the Confederate Forces' and not to Lee by name; this punctilio was immediately acquiesced in by Grant, but still quibbles were raised, until finally a body of troops, sufficient to awe the rebels, was dispatched, and the wounded were brought back within Grant's lines by force."

Now, leaving out the inhumanity of these incidents, and the revelation of the indescribable smallness of the man, it will be seen that if he occupied so much time in these matters, he had hardly time left to plan a bold or proper movement, even if he had the ability.

There might have been some excuse for Lee if he had addressed a communication to the "Commander of the Union Forces," for while he might have known who commanded that army yesterday, he could not tell—judging from precedents—who might command it to-day.

And this is a hero! And these are the lines of greatness!

CHAPTER VII.

WHY HE LOST PETERSBURG.

I HAVE not been able to give the general credit for many bright thoughts so far, but now, most opportunely, he conceived, and determined to execute, a really brilliant conception. I confess I did not expect it, nor does Badeau appear to comprehend the thought which dominated, and no doubt sustained, the general at this dark hour. Keeping all secondary considerations in the background, he proceeded to carry out this idea with all the resources at his command. It was a supreme moment, but he was equal to it.

He would extinguish Butler !

True, he lost Petersburg by trying to extinguish Butler, and true, also, that he did not extinguish Butler, but none will question the brilliancy or even the audacity of the idea !

I wish he had succeeded. So would Butler also, for I believe that general would have been willing to be "sat upon," if Petersburg had only been taken as a secondary consideration.

The fact that Badeau had no idea of the great problem that engrossed the general's mind for some days at this time, shows that the general selected the wrong man for his historian. The writer should have had that job, for I believe I am the only one who has yet discovered this momentous episode in the general's career. The general himself was too modest to call attention to it.

It was, indeed, a grand thought—Butler had failed to seize Petersburg, but the general would precipitate Butler's own troops against that place, and capture it !

Where would Butler be then ? And where would the general be, in public estimation ? The North had been "electrified" by one of his dispatches, which the general knew was a mere boast ; surely, now that something tangible had been attained—a city captured, which another had failed to accomplish—the people would jump clean out of their skins—the comparison would be drawn between himself and Butler, and he could imagine the rest !

But, like all the botches and blunderers since the days of Adam, this criminal botch and blunderer left out part of the combination to secure success. He overlooked Beauregard, or rather he overlooked the fact that Beauregard had a little brains—in the right part of his head.

The offence I charge the general with is this : He had twice the force necessary to capture Petersburg across the James, but he held back the major part of them to try and secure it by the minor (Butler's) force, until it was too late for the other to assist. In other words, he took the risk of holding back nearly two thirds of his force for the purpose indicated, until it was too late, instead of pressing every man forward to occupy the place at once. Thus the man who was continually foiled, because he would not take a proper risk for his country's good, now risked the nation's cause in favor of his own vanity, and—lost for both, as usual.

The general's great crime, of course, consisted in being at the head of the armies without sufficient brains—in the right part of the head—but that is not an offence recognized by military law, whereas the other is.

I will submit a few of the points on which I make this very serious charge for the consideration of my reader.

The general was told by Butler, a day or two before the attempt was made, that there were about 2000 Confederates at Petersburg, which was true at that time ; but Beauregard re-enforced these with all the troops he had at Bermuda Hundred when he heard that the Tenth Corps, 14,000 men, was advancing against it, making in all probably 4000 Confederates ; and with these he made such a good show, and handled his artillery so admirably, that the Union commander failed to capture the place.

But Grant had anticipated this possibility, and had ordered Hancock, with 28,000 men, to march to Harrison's Creek—which, Badeau says, is about " four miles " from Petersburg—and halt there.

This was the reason Petersburg was not captured—ordering Hancock to halt there instead of pushing him forward to help seize it without delay, for the general knew that Lee's troops were marching toward that point, and if he did not capture it before night it was lost.

The general's intention was : If Smith alone failed he would order Hancock up, and success would be assured ; he would crush Butler, and take Petersburg ; if that proved impossible he would have to be satisfied with the minor result—Petersburg.

Most of us can sympathize with a noble ambition, and can imagine how the general felt while waiting to hear of the triumphant realization of his dreams, while hour after hour passed away without his hearing the expected news of victory.

But the fate that catches up with "crooked" deeds sooner or later was already upon him. He supposed that Smith would assault and carry the works at once, but that general had just seen the effects of "blind butting" at Cold Harbor, and so spent some hours in reconnoitring and in attempts to place his artillery, which the enemy frustrated by a deadly fire. However, he eventually carried the outermost line by advancing with a "cloud of skirmishers." And it was afterward discovered that if he had advanced in solid column he would have met the fate of Longstreet at Knoxville.

It is unnecessary for Badeau to say that "the general-in-chief was greatly chagrined" at Smith's failure.

At last, after waiting too long, he sent an order to Hancock to make all haste to come to Smith's aid, but it was too late. Again he had left out part of the combination. An unforeseen but not an unusual circumstance again blasted his expectations. Instead of Hancock being within a mile or two of Petersburg, his corps had been led astray by depending on a worthless map, and when Grant's order reached him, between 5 and 6 P.M., his troops were miles away. Badeau says: "Harrison's Creek proved to be inside the rebel lines, and the point which Hancock was to reach did not exist at all" (vol. ii., p. 360).

Swinton never suspected Grant's motive in this matter, yet he thought the general's method queer. He says: "By the morning of the 15th, the same morning on which Smith moved toward Petersburg, Hancock's corps had all been ferried to the south side of the James, and it would have been a simple matter to have directed that corps on Petersburg to unite with Smith's command. Had this been done, Petersburg and the line of the Appomattox would have been in the possession of the Union forces before night."

This expresses all that could be said of this movement. "It would have been a simple matter" to order Hancock's corps "to unite with Smith's" in front of Petersburg, and all would have been well.

It seems almost incredible that the commander of the Union armies could allow such motives to influence his mind and shape his plans for several days at this fateful moment—at the end of his first series

of failures—making this the crowning failure of them all, or that he would incur the slightest risk in trying to secure what would have been the one success of his campaign.

But it would be equally incredible to believe that he would allow his wounded to broil in the sun, a burnt-offering to his vanity, if his own words and his own book—as it is considered—did not prove it.

It is, indeed, the inconceivable smallness of the transaction which has prevented any one, up to the present, from suspecting the true cause of his failure. Even Badeau does not suspect it, for if he did I could not have found it out. Nor had I any desire to find it out. I take no pleasure in dragging the skeleton out of the closet of any man's house ; the matter forced itself upon my attention, I may say, and, as patriotic and innocent men were blamed for this failure, it appears poetic justice demands the truth in the matter.

Even the astute Butler had no premonition of his impending doom when Grant told him that Hancock was ordered to halt at Harrison's Creek, for he replied : " If General Hancock advances to Harrison's Creek, . . . he will be within one mile of Smith's point of attack, and can afford aid." Nor when Grant wrote to him to have rations ready for Hancock's corps, adding : " Without this precaution the services of this corps cannot be had for *an emergency to-morrow*."

The italics are Badeau's, for, as before, I am using the words he selects, to attach the blame to the wrong party, to fix it on the right party. For keeping in mind what Swinton says, that " it would have been a simple matter to have directed that corps on Petersburg," why this preparation for "*an emergency to-morrow*," for which there was no necessity ?

The word "*to-morrow*" also shows that it was a deliberate plan, prepared in advance.

The worst construction of the general's conduct at that time merely charged him with neglect in not informing Meade or Hancock that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. But the general neglected nothing (that he could see) to secure a double victory, and what appeared to be neglect was the result of a carefully prepared plan, requiring some days for its incubation. The egg turned out to be rotten, that was all.

Certainly, on this occasion, " it did not take Grant and Rawlins to make Grant." The general must get the credit of the entire scheme, as not a soul that could thwart his intentions, either by accident or

design, was informed of even the secondary part of the plan—to capture Petersburg on the 15th—as that might have spoiled the primary object. Neither Meade nor Hancock was informed of the general's plans on this occasion, for then he could not have made such dispositions, as either of these generals would most likely have asked the very embarrassing question, Why not throw all the troops possible against and into Petersburg while there is a chance ? Then, if he persisted in his former plan, he would be incriminated. So that it was a necessary part of his plan to keep every one in ignorance who could interfere with him, and both of these men could, and would, if they saw the necessity.

Swinton says : “ It would seem as though General Grant expected that Petersburg would fall an easy prey to Butler's force, for he kept both General Meade and General Hancock wholly unaware of his design to secure the capture of that place.” And, in consequence of this, Swinton rebels against the idea of these two generals being held responsible for the failure of its capture, which he ascribes to Grant's neglect. I may add here that it is Badeau's endeavor to hold Meade, and Hancock, and Smith, and, in fact, anybody and everybody but Grant, responsible for this failure, which drew my attention to it.

Hancock's report says : “ The messages from Lieutenant-General Grant and from General Smith, which I received between 5 and 6 P.M. on the 15th, were the first and only intimation I had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. Up to that hour I had not been notified from any source that I was expected to assist General Smith in assaulting that city.”

As showing Hancock's willingness to co-operate to the best of his ability in every way, he did not wait for the rations which Butler was ordered to have ready for him, but when he found they were not ready for him he started his troops toward their supposed destination without them, so as to avoid delay.

Swinton says : “ The circumstance of Hancock's non-arrival at an earlier hour is due exclusively to the fact that he was not directed on Petersburg, and had no intimation, until between 5 and 6 P.M., that it was to be attacked. Had he been so informed he could readily have joined Smith early in the afternoon by marching directly on Petersburg.”

But Grant did not want that, for then Hancock might—would—have got there before Smith had taken it, and would have joined him in its capture. That would not be taking Petersburg with Butler's

force, after Butler had failed to do it. Swinton says: "The best hours of the day were spent in marching, by an incorrect map, in search of a designated position, which, as it was not in existence as described, could naturally not be found. With these facts, which are of official authenticity, it will not be difficult to judge who is responsible for the non-capture of Petersburg. As Lieutenant-General Grant states that he 'threw forward the Army of the Potomac, by divisions, as rapidly as could be done' (Report, p. 12), and as the manner in which he threw it forward is sufficiently manifest in the fact that neither General Meade nor General Hancock knew that Petersburg was to be attacked even, I leave the reconciliation of this discrepancy to those better equipped for the task."

One little discrepancy is that he "threw it forward by divisions" by ordering four divisions (one corps) to halt.

Here we find the general trying to creep out of his abortion, but all the facts go to show his motive for using Butler's men only.

We are a little "better equipped for the task" of explaining the true "inwardness" of the general's strategy than Swinton was, but I question whether I should have struck the general in his profoundest depths had I not possessed a good model of him. A friend of mine resembled him, even to sitting up at night when in trouble, and smoking till two or three o'clock in the morning, as the general did at City Point. So, knowing the impulses of the one under certain conditions, I soon recognized the tracks of the other.

There may be two kinds of genius—eagle genius and goose genius. Eagle genius lifts others up with it in its lofty flight, while goose genius can only flap its wings by standing on or "sitting upon" the backs of others.

My friend was perfectly reckless in this direction, and never counted the cost. He used to keep a shop, and took great delight in showing his customers how smart he was, by catching them in a lie, or in showing them their want of ability, and in other ways. Once, when he was boasting to myself and others of his prowess in this direction, I hinted that such a course might injure his business (as I knew it did); but he bridled up, and said no considerations would stop him from saying what he thought they deserved. He tried to "sit upon" myself once, but by good fortune he failed.

The general's written orders to Butler and his orders for Hancock, issued through Meade, forbid the supposition that it was mere neglect on his part. To Butler he wrote, on the 14th: "General

Hancock's corps, numbering about 28,000 men, will all be over to the south side of the James River at Windmill Point, before daylight, and will march in the morning direct for Petersburg, with directions, however, to halt on that road nearest to City Point, unless he receives further orders" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 353).

The orders to Hancock to move to Harrison's Creek were first issued, Badeau says, at ten o'clock on the 14th, on the 15th at 7.30 A.M., and again at 10.30 A.M. But before the last order reached Hancock he had started without the rations. All these orders indicated Harrison's Creek—not Petersburg.

On the 15th the general said to Butler: "No rations yet for Hancock. I started him, however, this morning on the road to Petersburg, with directions to stop at Harrison's Creek." It was repeated in substance to Butler, saying further: "I have sent back orders to hurry up this corps." This was said about three or four o'clock in the afternoon, and indicates that the general went out to Petersburg about that time, and not finding the place captured, thought the "emergency" had come.

I am indebted to Badeau's book for these orders, and that writer ridicules the idea that Meade or Hancock was in ignorance of Grant's intention to assault Petersburg that day, and refers to these orders and the frequent mention of Petersburg (I presume the whole army supposed they were going to Petersburg, and were talking about it); but it will be observed that when the orders were issued, Harrison's Creek was the place designated for Hancock to halt at, not in rear of Smith, who was really in front of Petersburg.

Badeau quotes these orders to show that Grant "threw" Hancock's four divisions into Petersburg as rapidly as possible; but Meade did not appear to think Harrison's Creek meant Petersburg, for in an order to Burnside at 6.30 P.M. on the 15th, after he was made aware of Smith's attack and Hancock's order to go to his assistance, he says: "General W. F. Smith advanced on Petersburg this morning, and has been engaged with the enemy all day. Hancock left this morning for the same place, or Harrison's Creek."

Besides, Hancock, who was blamed by the press and Secretary Stanton for the loss of Petersburg, although he only got there after dark, ahead of his men, asked for a formal investigation of the facts, and was of course prepared to swear to what he says in his report about having no knowledge of the proposed assault on Petersburg that day, until between 5 and 6 P.M., and also had his orders and witnesses to produce to substantiate his statements.

In forwarding and approving this request for an investigation, General Meade indorsed the document : " Had General Hancock or myself been apprised in time of the contemplated movement against Petersburg, and the necessity of his co-operation, I am of the opinion that he could have been pushed much earlier to the scene of operations ; but as matters occurred, and with our knowledge of them, I don't see how any censure can be attached to General Hancock and his corps" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 377).

Swinton says : " There can be no question as to who is really responsible for the failure to take Petersburg. This is no other than the lieutenant-general himself."

In a foot-note he says : " There is on file in the archives of the army a paper bearing this indorsement by General Meade : ' Had General Hancock or myself known that Petersburg was to be attacked, Petersburg would have fallen.' "

But Grant did not want this matter investigated, and would not allow a formal inquiry.

This is a beautiful example of military law. If the subordinate is imposed on or abused by a tyrannical commander, he must apply for redress through this commander, who has the power to forward or quash it as he pleases.

Badeau says : " Grant found no fault with Meade or Hancock, and so informed them, stating that no investigation was necessary. To the intimation that they had not been properly informed of his plans, *he made no reply.*"

The general was wise. Had his attorney been equally wise and " made no reply" to Swinton's statement, the worst that could have been charged against the general was negligence ; but see what the attempt to fasten this failure on innocent parties is likely to come to. " Honesty is the best policy," even in writing history.

That Harrison's Creek did not mean Petersburg to Hancock or his officers is indicated by the fact that when they arrived in the neighborhood of the supposed point they inquired of the inhabitants to be directed to Harrison's Creek—not Petersburg. Badeau says : " His orders were to march to Harrison's Creek, about four miles from Petersburg, in the direction of City Point. . . . His officers, however, succeeded in finding negro guides, and the head of column was turned to the right at a point about six miles from Petersburg. . . . As the command neared the old Court-House, a dispatch was received from Grant directing all haste to be made in proceeding to the assistance of Smith. A few moments later a note

from Smith himself was delivered, stating that he was authorized to call upon Hancock for support. These dispatches arrived just as the head of Birney's column was passing a country road leading to Petersburg, and Birney and Gibbon were turned at once in that direction."

The word "passing" here shows that Hancock was not looking for roads to lead to Petersburg, but that he was circling around that place, miles distant, between 5 and 6 p.m., looking for Harrison's Creek. Also that he could have struck on the "direct route to Petersburg" without any guides.

It will also be seen by the foregoing that Grant did not order Hancock to make "all haste to Smith's aid" nor authorize Smith to call on Hancock for aid until he himself had gone out from the James River to Petersburg, and saw that Smith had failed to capture the place, up to three o'clock in the afternoon. Had the general but one object in view he would have given Smith an order to call on Hancock before he started. Indeed, he would have sent General Meade to the front in the morning with directions to occupy the place, and get all the troops he could on the banks of the Appomattox, in rear of Petersburg, as soon as possible.

There is a queer discrepancy in point of time in Badeau's next paragraph. He says: "The head of Birney's column arrived at Bailey's Creek, one mile in rear of Hinks's division" (Smith's corps), "at five o'clock," and that Hancock rode forward from there "to confer with Smith, who pointed to him, in the dusk of the evening, the part of the line he had carried."

"The dusk of the evening" in June must have been after seven o'clock, so that it must have taken Hancock and staff over two hours to ride from "Bailey's Creek, one mile in rear of Hinks's division," to Smith's headquarters, which could not have been over half a mile farther, although Hancock was requested "to make all haste."

Badeau undertakes to show that Hancock joined Smith at five o'clock, and this is one of the ways he does it.

The same paragraph also gives an idea of the only result continually and constantly attending all of Grant's abortions during the twelve months he had command of the Eastern armies—the unnecessary suffering of his men.

"The weather was hot," he says; "the roads were covered with clouds of dust, and but little water was found on the route; but at

five o'clock the head of Birney's column had arrived at Bailey's Creek, one mile in rear of Hinks's division. Hancock here gave Birney and Gibbon directions to move forward as soon as they could ascertain at what point their assistance was needed, and himself rode on to confer with Smith, who pointed out, *in the dusk of the evening*, the part of the line he had carried. Hancock informed Smith that two divisions were close at hand and ready for any further movements; but though superior in rank, he did not offer to assume command" (vol. ii., p. 361).

"The dusk of the evening" does not appear to be a good time to "assume command" and begin the assault of an entrenched position with troops which had not yet arrived, and Badeau on the next page gives further reasons why Hancock did not "assume command." He says: "Hancock, however, coming up after a victory, and unacquainted with the situation, waived his rank, leaving Smith to reap his laurels; while Smith, in his anxiety not to risk the results which had been attained, missed one of the most brilliant opportunities of the war" (vol. ii., p. 362).

Added to this was the fact that Smith was regarded by "Grant and Meade as a brilliant soldier"—the same, I believe, who furnished Grant with the proposed North Carolina campaign—Hancock may therefore have thought him as capable as himself, although his junior in military rank.

Of course, according to Badeau, Smith—not Grant—"made the greatest mistake of the campaign," and he (Smith) soon after found out that people who were incapable of inflicting a stab on the enemies of the Union were quite capable of stabbing the friends of the Union, and he resigned his position.

Another point is that some one told Meade we had a "work" at Harrison's Creek, for he says in his order to Hancock: "Extend your right toward the mouth of Harrison's Creek, at the cross-roads indicated on the map at that point, where we have a work" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 378).

Of course Meade and Hancock would naturally infer that if we had a "work" there, we had troops there also.

Who told Meade that we had a "work" there? Butler was the only one, except Grant, who knew anything about the matter, and Butler had not seen Meade. Besides, Butler knew we had no "work" there. What was the object in telling Meade that we had a "work" at a point that was inside the enemy's lines? There

could only be one object for saying so, and there could be only one man that had this object in view. This object must have been to prevent Meade from asking any further questions concerning the operations across the James, for this led him to think the line of battle had already been marked out—"extend your right toward the mouth of Harrison's Creek."

I have given points enough to show who was responsible for the non-capture of Petersburg, and the cause thereof. Living witnesses enough can be found to fill up the blank.

If any one can imagine Washington holding back part of his army for the purpose of drawing a comparison between himself and his least experienced commander, I am willing that General Grant should be hailed as "even more than Washington."

Of course the general was entirely impersonal in the matter, and if it had been Sherman or Sheridan, instead of Butler, so much the greater triumph. A really able commander moving against Petersburg with 140,000 to 150,000 men would have occupied the place and made no fuss about driving out (as he thought) three or four regiments—partly militia. But he had accomplished really nothing in his campaign so far, and had to make "much ado about nothing."

The idea does not appear to have struck him until two days before the failure, for on the 11th, four days before, he wrote to Butler: "Expecting the arrival of Smith's corps" (from Cold Harbor, via the York and James rivers) "on Monday night; if you deem it practicable with the force you have to seize Petersburg, you may prepare to start on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless you feel a reasonable confidence of success" (Badeau, vol. ii., p. 343).

The last few words account for many of Grant's failures and much of his timidity—the fear of being connected with a failure—the fear of newspaper criticism.

When, however, he received a message from Butler on the 13th, stating, "There were this morning but about two thousand men in Petersburg, partly militia. I can by three o'clock to-morrow have three thousand well-mounted cavalry to co-operate with you against Peterburg," he felt that he had a certainty, and laid his plans accordingly. And to make it thoroughly understood that Smith was directed against Petersburg by himself, he crossed the James to issue orders for that purpose.

Badeau says: "Grant proceeded by transport to Bermuda Hun-

dred, to issue the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg. Smith was not yet in sight, but Grant directed Butler to move him at once, on his arrival, against the town, and add to his force all the troops that could be spared from the position at Bermuda Hundred" (vol. ii., p. 352).

All these troops, including Smith's corps, belonged to Butler's army. It made no difference to the general that Butler did not send, on either attempt on Petersburg, one half the number that Smith was now taking. The newspapers would not inquire into that. Butler failed; Grant succeeded with the same troops which he had transported 200 miles by land and water from his position at Cold Harbor, and if correspondents in the field failed to draw the comparison, as he anticipated, it would have been quietly intimated to them in the same way that Sherman's "protest" was made known to them after Vicksburg.

Badeau says: "The government was greatly alarmed at the movement to the south side of the James," which should have been an additional reason why Grant should have occupied this strategic position as soon as possible.

On the morning of the 14th Grant sent a dispatch to Washington: "Our forces will commence crossing the James to-day. The enemy show no signs of yet having brought troops to the south side of Richmond. I will have Petersburg secured, if possible, before they get there in much force."

This implied that by a great effort he could secure that place, although he knew he had all day to do it in, and that the capture by Smith's corps would be quite a surprise to the government.

"To this the President himself replied: 'I have just received your dispatch of 1 P.M. yesterday. I begin to see it. You will succeed. God bless you all.'"

One would think that this dispatch would incite him to do his plain and sworn duty. But the general was firm. His vanity must be tickled, and he allowed no "compunctious visitings of nature" to move him, and once again the President was doomed to question whether any one out of hell suffered more than himself, while "prominent Union journals openly advocated peace."

The general has been noted for his many epigrammatic phrases—"I take no backward step," "Let us have peace," "It has rained for five days"—and his very latest, "Let no guilty man escape," appears to possess a peculiar and unexpected significance. "Vault-

ing ambition" has, as usual, "o'erleaped itself" in his case, and the book that was written to prove him to be the "greatest man on earth" proves him to be the smallest man on earth. Badeau's "conversation" did the business. I intended at first to drop the general at Spottsylvania or the North Anna, and I merely glanced along the pages after that until the words "in conversation" again suggested that "there is something wrong here," and on reading a few words further I saw through it all. Up to that moment I had supposed that General Butler was to blame for not capturing the place; the newspaper of the day from which I got my information then stated that Butler had failed to seize it in time, when he had every opportunity, and when Grant arrived it was too late.

But now the very words which Badeau emphasized in italics as a clincher—"an emergency to-morrow"—against others, appeared to me as a clincher against the general, and all subsequent evidence confirmed my impression.

Most culprits leave some clew to their ultimate detection, and the general, having escaped detection so long, had no further fear of it, and thus left Badeau to prattle away and to censure whom he pleased, in the interest of "historical truth."

But when the general "trod on the tail of my coat" by persisting in his small ambition, he put his foot in it.

See what he lost! Badeau says that Lee could not remain one week in Richmond with Petersburg in the possession of Grant. That is, Richmond would have to be evacuated. Petersburg and Richmond in one week!

If the small man had not set his "heart" on a small triumph, he might have been able to crow over all the former commanders of the Army of the Potomac—all regular officers, I believe—instead of over an officer so "lately from private life." They had spent three years in fruitless endeavors to capture Richmond—he took it in forty days!

A few words from Badeau on the crossing of the James will give my readers an idea of what he might have said, had these two cities fallen at that time. He says: "The idea that the great river was reached at last; that after four long years of toil and combat the goal of so many campaigns was in sight" (we encamped on the banks of the James two years before); "that the evolutions displayed on land and water, the approach of the army on the northern bank, the passage of one corps by ferry-boats and of another by the wonderful

bridge" (of pontoons) "that spanned the James, the movement of Hancock from the southern shore, and the departure of Smith sailing up to join him in front of Petersburg—were all conceived by a single man for a single purpose, gave significance and moral grandeur to the scene" (vol. ii., p. 357).

How proud Butler should feel to know that all these grand combinations were conceived "by a single man" for "a single purpose!"

"The times have been,
That, when the brains were out the man would die,
And there an end; but now they rise again
With twenty mortal murders on their crowns,
And push us from our stools."

Forty thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing, were lost before Petersburg was evacuated.

When Lee's army arrived to defend the place, the assaults to repair the blunder commenced in earnest. The general, however, did not "flash and smite and thrust and—win" in these battles, but kept back at James River, while Meade used his best endeavors for two or three days and nights—for he knew the importance of the place—but he attempted an impossible task; and, as Greeley says, "It had now been established, at a cost of 10,000 men, that Petersburg could not be carried by direct assault."

Now, as Petersburg could have been taken had the full force of the troops been directed against it in time, who is responsible for the loss of these ten thousand men?

The army might just as well have been stood up without arms and shot at until that number were killed and wounded, as to be ordered to assault Petersburg after Lee's arrival. Again, these assaults were accompanied by the usual suffering inseparable from all of Grant's operations.

General Meade informs Grant: "Burnside's corps deserve great credit for their attack this morning, as they were marching all yesterday and the night before, and had no rest last night, being formed preparatory to attacking."

Badeau says: "There was disappointment on every hand . . . and a chilling disappointment fell upon the spirit of the North. The prodigious exertions of the men, however, were telling on their strength. Marching night and day in the extreme heat of June, and only arriving in front of Petersburg to fight again, day after

day and night after night—a marked falling off in their energy was perceptible ; all the corps commanders reported that the troops did not attack with the same spirit as in the Wilderness.”

How could they keep up their spirit, when they knew that their lives were only being thrown away ? Sherman says : “Soldiers are quick to catch the general drift and purpose of a campaign, and *always know when they are well commanded* or well cared for. Once impressed with this idea and that they are making progress, they bear cheerfully any amount of labor and privation.”

What Swinton says, that whatever the Army of the Potomac won “it owed not to genius, but bought with its blood,” is putting it very mild indeed.

What would have happened had the general allowed the investigation to be held, and the loss of Petersburg and these 10,000 men been traced to the real cause, is hard to say ; but, even at this late date, I would advise the general to keep away from Massachusetts. I don't believe that Governor Butler would raise a finger against him, from personal motives, but some of those 10,000 must have been from the old Bay State, whose people placed a high estimate on the lives of their soldiers, and the great contrabandist might be forced to evolve an idea from his “inner consciousness” that would cover the general's case exactly.

One reason why the general desires a third term, I understand, is because he wants to be vindicated from something, or in some way that I did not take the trouble to ascertain. Here is his chance. Set him up again. I accuse him of real, substantial crimes—inhumanity to his wounded, criminal evasion of his duty, timidity in the right, boldness in the wrong, of losing his head when he had no head to lose, and with vanity profound and unappeasable.

When it is remembered that the general sent the same men back again to attempt the capture of Fort Fisher, it will be seen that the operations of his mind, under certain contingencies, takes one direction, and that the tendency and the height of his genius is—to be a doer of stunts.

CHAPTER VIII.

AND LAST.

IF Sherman had been in command of the armies on the James, the loss of Petersburg would have made but little difference. He would then have adopted the plan he took to capture Atlanta. With Petersburg there would have been much less risk, for it would be unnecessary to protect his line for supplies. The supply fleet could have been sent toward Fortress Monroe, and supplies could have been obtained at any point on the James River, even if the movement was unsuccessful. He could thus move his whole army against Lee's railroads running south of Petersburg, or he could have made the circuit around him and come out at Bermuda Hundred, if Lee did not instantly evacuate. Thus Richmond would have fallen by the first of July, and the war might still have been ended when Atlanta fell.

But Grant was not Sherman, nor Lee, nor Sheridan, and during the nine months he sat in front of Petersburg, with over twice the number of his foe, he was never able to complete a half circle of works around that place; instead, Lee pushed him off continually, until their parallel lines threatened, in time, to reach the Atlantic Ocean. When he did begin feeble movements against the railroads, the enemy would strike him on flank, and "roll it up," Greeley says, "after the established fashion," capturing lots of prisoners every time. Thus the farce of 60 enveloping 140 was continued for nine months.

It appears the general had one cast-iron plan, which the enemy soon learned, and knew just where to strike him every time. Swinton says: "Moreover, these movements were *invariably made* in extended lines, which had the *inevitable result* to expose a flank. This system the enemy soon learned so well that his invariable plan was to attack the flank as soon as it was exposed. The aggregate of prisoners taken by the enemy in these successive swoops is astonishing."

Why, Falstaff himself might have met the general and overcome him, according to this.

Lee's generals were not afraid to get "isolated" by waiting until the general's flank was exposed, and then attacking it. And, contrary to the general's statement that they were "already whipped," and that "a fight cannot be had with them outside of their intrenchments," they came boldly out, and attacked, and drove him back with loss every time he tried to get on their railroads, which led past his flank.

"The success of the Confederate tactics," Swinton says, "was wonderful; each movement" (of Grant's), "saving that to the Weldon Railroad, ending in a check, generally accompanied by one or more thousand prisoners."

That is the history of these nine months—check, check, check.

And had not Sheridan checked Early in the valley, Lee would have kept adding to his force there until the Army of the Potomac would again have been called to defend Washington and the North.

The general has been the most expensive luxury, in blood and money, ever indulged in by the Republic, and the military critic of the future will search the histories of modern warfare in vain for a greater succession of failures, or a greater exhibition of timidity, imbecility, and incapacity, on the part of a commander, than Grant displayed during the eleven months he confronted Lee.

With a loss of four to one and the infliction of a terrible amount of suffering and labor on his own men, the only damage he inflicted on the enemy, until Sheridan rejoined him at Petersburg, was to impose extra labor on Lee's mule teams in hauling their supplies around a break he had made on the Weldon Railroad.

And yet this is just the result that might be expected from one who tried all kinds of dodges to avoid "asking permission" to take away his wounded—the man was made small, and could not help being small.

Here, again, his foeman showed his superiority and manhood by "asking permission," when it became his duty, without making "disingenuous proposals."

Badeau takes it ill because what he is pleased to call "the multitude" did not become "electrified" when Lee's mule teams were made to feel the weight of Grant's "strategy." He says: "The people of the North entirely failed to appreciate the importance of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of Burnside had left

an impression that could not easily be effaced, and all the subsequent manœuvres on right and left" (where so many prisoners were lost) "were, to the multitude, unintelligible. It was only perceived that Hancock had twice been moved to the north bank of the James, and twice withdrawn. Not only was the fact unnoticed that by these manœuvres the extension on the left had been made practicable, but the extension itself was looked upon as of no especial consequence."

("The multitude" had begun to think for themselves.)

"Until the fall of Atlanta," he says, "indeed, the gloom at the North was overshadowing. The most hopeful had become heavy, the most determined were depressed and disappointed. It was forgotten that Grant had warned the country he might have to fight 'all summer' one one line." (The line north of Richmond—not south.)

But at this point a happy idea strikes Badeau; he gets a certificate ("in conversation" of course) of Grant's great capacity from General Scott.

Badeau says: "Soldiers indeed saw the immense advantages that had been gained, the definite progress made toward the end, but soldiers alone."

Having blamed every one and everything in the army for his failures, he now excoriates "the multitude."

Of General Scott he says, in a foot-note: "During the month of July, 1864, I was sent north, and had several interviews with the old commander of the army, Lieutenant-General Scott. He expressed the greatest admiration for Grant's achievements, and complete confidence that his operations would result in entire success. I was especially charged by him to congratulate General Grant upon the manœuvres and tactics of the Wilderness Campaign," etc. (vol. iii., p. 11).

I presume General Scott's greatest admiration for the "tactics of the Wilderness Campaign" must have been the "tactics" which confronted 40,000 with 50,000 and 20,000 with 50,000.

There is one peculiarity about the men that Badeau introduces into his "conversations," and that issued the wrong orders. Except the general-in-chief—*they are all dead*.

But all this child's play ceased when, in April, 1865, Sheridan joined Grant at Petersburg. It was Grant's intention to send Sheridan on a cavalry raid against Lee's railroads, and he had an order made out for that purpose, and had informed Sherman of it some

time before, but Sheridan had different plans. Heretofore he had taken orders from Grant without questioning their utility, and had marched his men and horses from end to end of the thirty miles of intrenchments, skirmishing and intrenching for no purpose except at one time to "prostrate," Badeau says, "nearly every officer and man in his command." But at last he saw what the trouble was—brains.

He knew that if the right flank of the enemy was turned at Five Forks he would be compelled to evacuate Richmond, and that he could follow him up and capture or destroy him before he got very far.

In his testimony at the Warren trial, he said : "I was aware that our success of that day (at Five Forks) had securely established my command in a position from which the enemy would be compelled to drive me, or abandon Richmond and Petersburg."

So he proposed that Grant should give him the Sixth Corps (which was with him in the Valley), and he would turn the enemy's right flank.

Five Forks was about ten miles from the end of Grant's intrenchments, and right in the face of the enemy.

Judging from the manner in which Grant had operated heretofore, he would probably have lost 50,000 to 100,000 men before he could secure that point, if he ever could. Therefore, for him to go there with a single corps of say 25,000 men (which he never would do) would be simply adding 25,000 prisoners to the enemy to feed, which at this time might, indeed, have burst up the Confederates.

But the temptation was great. If it could be done Grant need not wait for Sherman to join him before attacking the enemy—the plan at that time—and none could then say that he was compelled to get Sherman to help him whip Lee. He also knew that Sheridan's reputation was such that no commander could be criticised for giving him a corps to undertake any operation he might attempt. The general, however, would make it perfectly plain to the world that he had nothing to do with it—if it was a failure.

So he made out a written consent that if Sheridan thought he could secure Five Forks with the Sixth Corps *entirely detached from the rest of the army* he could have it. The general was smart—in a small way.

Meade, however, could not spare the Sixth Corps from its position, but offered the Fifth Corps, which Sheridan declined, as that corps had

never fought under him, and had been too long used to nothing but defeat. To teach them how to fight, and to organize victory with them all in one day, in a perilous undertaking, was too much to attempt. And yet this was the same corps which, under Fitz-John Porter at the second Bull Run, while numbering only 10,000 men, held Longstreet with 25,000, and made him call for more from Jackson.

Such is the effect of troops knowing "when they are well commanded."

That plan, therefore, fell through, and then it appears that Sheridan was to attempt the capture of Five Forks with his cavalry, while one or two corps of the infantry would move around the corner of our intrenchments in his support. Sheridan's cavalry drove that of the enemy, and one of his brigades occupied Five Forks, while Lee's infantry was engaged in pushing ours back a mile or so; but when the enemy's infantry and cavalry concentrated against Sheridan, he found them too much for him, and had to fall back to Dinwiddie, where he held his own against their combined forces all day.

Next morning he picked up the Fifth Corps, without asking permission from any one, and advanced with it and his cavalry against Five Forks, for which he devised, what Swinton calls, "a beautiful tactical manœuvre," which I have already quoted. Colonel Taylor, chief-of-staff to General Lee, says: "Sheridan almost annihilated the confederate force at that point, . . . every man that could be spared being sent there." And at last the Army of the Potomac was indebted for what it won to genius, for we lost only seven or eight hundred, while the enemy (who was intrenched) lost nearly 7000 in prisoners, and the rest were scattered in every direction, "and Lee's right," Swinton, says, "wrenched violently from his centre—the troops, captured or rushing wildly westward, would trouble us no more."

As Sheridan anticipated, the discouraged infantry, expecting the usual result, broke once or twice, but he seized their battle flag, and, followed by his staff, dashed in front of them, and soon infused his own fire and contempt of danger into them, and they "burst upon the enemy's left like a tornado." Badeau says: "The troops, cavalry and infantry, fought as if inspired. They seemed to divine the object of their commander, as soldiers seldom can, and to be filled with his energy, and only rivals to each other in gallantry. The generals were as heroic as the men, and the men as intelligent as their officers."

Badeau's object in saying the soldiers seemed to "divine the object of their commander, *as soldiers seldom can*," is now too transparent for me to notice. Why did the general stay back at the James River for two days, immediately after the failure at Petersburg? Was he afraid his "object" would be divined? If Grant's plans were too deep for his own soldiers "to divine"—and, as I have said, Grant was deep—they did not appear too deep for the enemy "to divine;" according to Swinton: "This system the enemy soon learned so well," etc.

The enthusiasm overflowed throughout the whole army, and the Army of the Potomac was the Army of the Potomac once again. General Horace Porter, who carried the good news to Grant, became "intoxicated with victory"—he had not been accustomed to that kind of stimulant for a long time—and others, at headquarters, caught the contagion from him again. My readers can imagine the excitement that stirred strong men to this degree. The news was also communicated to the President, then at City Point. "Better news," Badeau says, "he got that night than ever before in four long years—news to warm his patriotic heart at last before it was chilled forever. 'I have just heard from Sheridan,' said Grant; 'he has carried everything before him.'"

Whether from Grant's desire to have no connection with this fight—if it proved a failure—or not, just at the critical moment, when the Fifth Corps were taking position before the attack, the left wing of the Second Corps was pulled in—whether by Grant's order or not, I cannot find out from Badeau—so that Sheridan and one corps "were entirely detached from the rest of the army," and left "to fight it out" on any line they chose.

Badeau says: "While Warren was thus elaborately and, as it seemed to his superior, too slowly taking position, Sheridan learned that the left of the Second Corps had been swung around till it fronted on the Boydton Road. This created an opportunity for the enemy to march down from the White Oak Road and attack the right or rear of Sheridan's new position" (vol. iii., p. 489).

Thus abandoned to his fate, as it were, instead of being supported, while Warren was telling him that "Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble," and the men were expecting the usual defeat, his must have been a lion heart not to falter. But, instead of that, these drawbacks and others which occurred afterward only enraged him, and he would make the enemy suffer the more for it. Badeau says,

"he was black in the face with rage." If he "carried everything before him," it appears he owed no thanks to Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant.

After the victory was won, then Grant sent him one division to help hold his position, while he himself kept the balance of 110,000 men to hold Lee with 37,000.

It is hard to get the facts in the case from Badeau, but the testimony in the Warren investigation brought out some facts as to who was the author of that movement, and what he had to contend against, both morally and physically.

In Badeau's comments on Grant at this time he incontinently tells some plain truths to those who desire to know if General Grant has genius.

If anything is a self-evident truth, it is the one that inspiration must come down from the superior to the inferior, not from the inferior up to the superior; if the journeyman depends on his apprenticeship for his ideas, where is the apprentice going to get his ideas from?

He does not let it appear that Grant changed his plans; that in his estimation, would be incompatible with genius; but Grant's order to Sheridan, when the latter was still at the White House, on the York River, days before, shows the general's intentions. He said: "Your problem will be to destroy the south-side and Danville roads, and then either return to this army or go to Sherman, as you deem most practicable" (vol. iii., p. 419).

No word here about attacking Five Forks—it was simply a cavalry raid. Yet Badeau reads as if it was Grant that proposed to "finish the job now." He says: "Grant read these instructions himself to Sheridan. As he read he saw that the latter part of the order was disagreeable to his listener. Sheridan, however, said nothing, and Grant immediately said: 'Although I have provided for you joining Sherman, I have no idea that it will be necessary. I mean to end this business, here.' Sheridan's face brightened at once, and he replied with enthusiasm: 'That's what I like to hear you say. Let us end this business here.' The two natures struck fire from each other in the contact. . . . It was often so with Grant. He was greatly influenced by what his generals felt able to do. When they were ready he became inspired; but with sluggish or over-careful subordinates the best-laid plans were liable to be disconcerted, and circumstances seldom seemed opportune."

If Sheridan had to depend for his inspiration on Grant or Warren at Five Forks, that place would never have fallen.

"Circumstances seldom seemed opportune." Genius creates opportunities, and will "remove mountains" to secure its end.

Again : "His own genius was then depressed, if not dormant, and he was like a man whose limbs were numb or lame and refused to answer to his will. With Sherman or Sheridan he moved like a skilful rider on a high-bred horse ; there was only a single impulse between their will and his own" (vol. iii., p. 452).

A cast-iron man on a cast-iron horse, they wound him up, pulled the string, and off he went as they directed.

It is somewhat amusing to see Badeau quarrelling with the confederate writers who say that Lee had only 33,000 "muskets" just before the fall of Petersburg, while Grant had over 162,000 men. He does not at this point deny this exactly, as the records may be seen at Washington, but he says they forgot to add "the crews of the gun-boats—and others." It is well that he reminds his readers of the enemy's gun-boats at Richmond with their thousands of seamen and marines, for some of them, myself included, may have forgotten all about them. This force must have added at least 500 men to swell Lee's army.

After the evacuation of Petersburg, the capture of Lee was owing entirely to the fact that Grant and his generals did exactly as Sheridan directed. Had Grant been left to his own devices, Lee could have gone where he pleased.

When it became evident to Sheridan that Lee would evacuate during the night, he did not wait to give him eight or nine hours the start, but pushed out his cavalry and the Fifth Corps at once, and by the time Grant's dispatch reached him, announcing the evacuation, and with orders to pursue, he wrote back : "I had anticipated the evacuation, and had commenced to move west. My cavalry is nine miles beyond Namozine Creek, and is pressing the enemy's trains."

Evidently, there was no waiting for orders from Grant here, nor any fear that Lee would turn upon his one corps and destroy it, for next day he was enabled to throw this corps and the cavalry right in front of Lee, cutting off his supplies from the south, and held him there while waiting for another corps, for which he had sent back, to hurry up and help him to attack Lee.

Badeau's comments on Lee show that it was only through Sheridan's promptness in intercepting Lee's supplies and his action at this

point that prevented Lee from joining Johnston. He says: "If he" (Lee) "had attacked and driven back Sheridan's inferior force" (at this point) "he might have pursued his way to Burksville Junction, and gained that point before Ord arrived. From there the road was open to Danville and Johnston's army."

After this admission, that Lee might have escaped for all that Grant could do to prevent him, Badeau's description of the general in pursuit of a "flying foe" is pleasant reading. He says: "Lee had yet no experience of the remorseless energy with which Grant pursued a routed enemy. He had not served in the West, and had, therefore, no recollection of the baffled plans, the intercepted supplies, the interrupted marches of the Vicksburg Campaign, and no conception whatever of the battles which came fast upon flight the rain of blows that accompanied demands for surrender, the infantry that outmarched cavalry, the incessant attacks and manœuvres and flanking movements with which his antagonist was wont to harass and overtake and destroy a flying foe."

If Lee had "served in the West," I fear the general would not have served in the East—as lieutenant-general.

With these two corps Sheridan proposed to attack before Lee could escape by turning to his right; but Meade, who outranked him, being on the ground, thought it better to wait for another corps, and, as foreseen by Sheridan, Lee escaped during the night.

Sheridan had, unfortunately, given up the division which was sent to re-enforce him at Five Forks when requested to do so by the corps commander. Had he retained that division in addition to the Fifth Corps, he would undoubtedly have attacked Lee without waiting for any re-enforcements. This would have been about one fourth of Grant's army.

Sheridan says in his report that he was sorry he gave up Miles's division, but does not state why. This could have been his only reason; for at this point he also gave up the Fifth Corps, and used his cavalry to detain Lee, adopting hitherto unheard-of methods for that purpose, until he could get up the nearest infantry force to help him cut off a big slice each time, until at last he was able to throw his cavalry in front of the remnant of the enemy, and hold him there until the infantry, which he was hurrying up, had surrounded the Army of Virginia at Appomattox, and Lee concluded to surrender.

Meanwhile the general-in-chief had not been idle. Indeed, he was quite busy in his own peculiar way, and while his subordinates were

trying to extinguish the enemy he was trying to extinguish some of his subordinates.

After the fall of Petersburg he sent a dispatch to Sherman, concluding, Badeau says, "with a soldier's panegyric of the forces under his command, inspired by what he had witnessed during the last few days. 'This army,' he said, 'has now won a most decisive victory, and has *followed the enemy.*'"

This is all that it ever wanted to make it as good an army as ever fought a battle.

I beg to differ with Badeau. This is not "a soldier's panegyric," but the assassin's dagger aimed at the back of the army for the purpose of covering his own abortions. It said plainly to Sherman: "All my failures were owing to having a poor army; but at last I have made it a good one, and can now win victories with it." This is what he meant Sherman to understand.

The general never ventured to stab the enemy in the back, but stabbing his own army in the back was not "hazardous."

The army requires no vindication. The same men, under Sheridan, either as cavalry or infantry, were continually successful. So were the two corps that were sent from the Army of the Potomac to the West, and were then serving under Sherman.

Of course Sherman understood what it all meant; he knew the cause of his failures well enough. And I assume he understood thoroughly what was intended by the words, "*followed the enemy.*" This was a shot at himself. He had not "followed" Hood out of Georgia in the way that the general and President Davis thought he should have done, and this was the small man's revenge. And this is exactly what his model, or rather what my model of him would have done under the circumstances. That Sherman's idea was more beneficial for the Union cause mattered not to Grant; his country's welfare weighed but lightly in the scales when compared to his vengeance. The general, however, overlooked the fact that Sherman was now following the remnant of Hood's army, so that, with Johnston and Hood and Lee all combined against him, he might have a good square fight; but probably this fact added fuel to Grant's flame.

And lest Badeau's readers might not see the point readily, he is careful to put the words in italics.

Again, while Sheridan was "deploying," Swinton says, "all the resources of an energy that seemed to grow hotter and hotter with the chase," and had written to Grant to stir him up also, saying,

"I feel confident of capturing the Army of Virginia *if we exert ourselves*. I see no escape for Lee"—the general exerted himself by preparing a parting shot for Sherman, for Sherman had really committed the unpardonable sin against Grant—he had been successful.

His plans had been indorsed, and Grant's put aside. He had destroyed all resistance in the West, the South, the South-east, and was now marching against Lee, while Grant dare not move from Petersburg. So the general would now take advantage of his position to punish him while there was a chance. His next dispatch therefore ended: "*Rebel armies are now the only strategic points to strike at.*"

This was a phrase the general appropriated from Stanton, and these words contained, in substance, the "grand movements" he marked out for Sherman and himself. His last order to Sherman before he moved from Chattanooga in May, 1864, was: "Follow Johnston's army wherever it goes, and try to prevent him from sending reinforcements to Lee. I will do my best to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Johnston."

The general forgot or disregarded his promise to Sherman when he held Hancock back, while he tried to extinguish Butler, but Sherman knew nothing about that. And his offence was that he left only part of his army to take care of Hood, while he himself took advantage of the opening left by the Confederate general to hunt for nobler game—Lee's army. Of course these words were also in italics.

This was the general's last shot but one at friend or foe during the war—he stumbled against a detachment of the enemy, and ordered an attack on them.

It was repulsed, of course, and a lot of prisoners taken as usual.

It is easy to account for the rise of this man's military reputation—after the war. His vanity led him to accept his nomination for President as a tribute to his capacity, instead of to the exigencies of politics; while those who "bent the pregnant hinges of the knee that thrift might follow fawning," kept up the delusion. But nature, like murder, "will out," and soon those who thought more of their country's welfare than of his low ambitions felt the weight of his displeasure.

He brutally insulted public men whose shoes he was unworthy to unloose, and had the astounding impudence, in the face of the whole nation, to punish a better soldier than himself, for doing his duty—for trying to save his men from being robbed by thieves.

General Custer naturally supposed that Grant—a soldier—would sympathize with and help him in this work ; but what did the robbery of soldiers amount to in comparison with his ambition to “ sit upon ” Washington ? These thieves would support him for a third term.

I cannot resist one more quotation from Badeau. It is on the occasion of the general’s last order for an “ attack all along the line,” and is so impressive as to approach the sublime.

(When assured that Sheridan had sent the enemy “ flying ” at Five Forks, he ordered an attack at once. He intended the attack to be made next morning, but forgot to mention that fact ; but when he heard the cannon thundering he corrected the mistake.

Badeau says : “ He rose, and, without saying a word, entered his tent, where a candle flickered on the table. He invited no one to join him, but wrote a despatch in sight of the officers outside and gave it to an orderly. Then coming out to the fire again, he said, as calmly as if he were remarking, ‘ it is a windy night ’—‘ I have ordered an immediate assault along the lines. ’ ”

Of course the Republic is not allowed to forget that it was “ saved ” by a “ leader.” And for once Badeau and myself agree. A “ leader ” should have, he says, “ a faculty of retaining the head under unexpected circumstances . . . such an one, if simple, honest, unambitious ” (now you talk, Badeau), “ and magnanimous ” (and here again), “ might aptly represent the best results of a republic, and worthily command its armies even in those crises when nations are never saved without a leader. . . . The North awarded him a unanimity of praise and affection such as no other American had ever received.”

The words “ no other American ” cannot, and it is intended should not, be misunderstood, and it is this desire to flap his wings at the expense of somebody else that has brought about his downfall, and discovered his genius to be of the barnyard species—not the eagle.

Has General Grant genius ?

When Mr. Archibald Forbes, the English war correspondent, visited this country, an incident in regard to the general was related to him. He was told that pending the Spanish trouble, about a vessel that sailed to Cuba from this country as a sort of privateer, President Grant had planned to land an army at Corunna and march to the conquest of Spain. General Sheridan would be given command with General Meade as his chief-of-staff—an excellent combination. Meade was sent for to Philadelphia, and on being pressed to accept

the position declined, but on a second interview accepted the position. Mr. Forbes said, "Just like him" (Grant).

But in what a different light people see the same action from different standpoints. It is the danger of placing too much power in the hands of any one man in the Republic, and the consequences that it may lead to, that I desire to call the attention of citizens to what might happen at any moment.

As Solomon said, "all is vanity," and here we find the President of the Republic panting to plunge the country into a war on the slightest pretext, to gratify his own vanity—to show how smart he was after taking lessons from Sherman—and to retain the grasp of power. He knew well enough that the Spanish Government would make ample reparation if proved to be in the wrong; but instead of taking every honorable means to avoid war, he was arranging the details of an invasion, prepared doubtless to take advantage of any mistake in the negotiations to precipitate immediate action.

But, certain as he was of victory in such a contingency, it is almost equally certain that failure would have been the result of a snap judgment.

"Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just."

The voice of the world would have been against us, and our own citizens could not support such a war heartily, while those who dared to express their disapprobation would have found out what a real tyrant a man whose head is turned by ambition could be, and prisons would have bulged with so-called malcontents.

These considerations, together with the institution of the "bosses," and the fact that while we are accumulating great wealth we are, Mr. Herbert Spencer says, losing our liberties—the old story—have led me to inquire why history repeats itself. Byron says :

" 'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past,
First Freedom and then Glory—when that fails,
Wealth, vice, corruption—barbarism at last.
And History, with all her volumes vast,
Hath but *one* page."

In a word, vanity or ambition and selfishness have done the business in the past, and will likewise do it in the future, unless they are divorced from governmental affairs.

If this can be done—and it can—then the Republic becomes immortal.

I propose to show how this can be done, and then have a government by the people, that neither knave nor fool in any position can injure.

Mr. Talmage says he awaits the coming of a leader to start a new party. But there is the trouble.

"Changing 'bosses,'" Mr. Herbert Spencer says, "amounts to nothing," and that is all that a "new party" would mean in a short time.

I propose to do better. I propose to abolish parties altogether, and make the professional politician an impossibility. To have a government by the people direct, in which public opinion, as expressed by the majority, will be instantly enforced, in which it will cost neither candidate nor people one cent to elect a public officer, and no amount of "means" can capture an office or purchase legislation.

There is a programme for a "leader" to accomplish, and lest by my own analysis of a "leader" my reader may be a little doubtful, I will hand you nature's certificate to interpret as you choose, in regard to my ability to do the work. It may secure a more serious attention to what I have to say. It will show you how a really great man is recognized by his peers and other agencies long before he "comes out," instead of requiring a "historian" to boost him up. But I wish it to be distinctly understood beforehand that I am willing to take the second place after Washington, or even the third place, should the fates decide it so, and I hope over-zealous friends will bear this in mind. I imagine that the name of Washington is regarded in the light of a sentiment by most Americans, and many others, and that they feel like giving any one who attempts a comparison with it "one" right on the end of the nose. And I have had enough of them. About the longest thing that I can remember was a bloody nose every day for a long time. I have an indistinct idea that the boy was bigger than myself, and that I regarded him as a tyrant, and in that case I never stopped to count the cost.

What I say in the next chapter I never intended should be known even to my friends, but I give it because it will be somewhat fresh reading, and further, that it leads up to the important matter of my work.

CHAPTER IX.

"AN ORIGINAL DOG"—A BEAUTIFUL WOMAN.

SCIENTIFIC men and others have been much interested in a few cases where certain persons, when at church or other places, sometimes attract the entire attention of the speaker, who addresses his discourse to him or her, unconsciously ignoring the rest of his hearers. To see a clergyman who reads his discourse direct his eyes alternately on his manuscript and over the heads of his congregation to the farthest corner of the gallery perhaps, and keep this performance up for half an hour, is somewhat edifying to the sexton at least.

And when prima donnas, and lady "stars," tenors, and "leading men," musicians, and others, become puzzled, pleased, or "mashed," as the case may be, and even his royal highness of the barnyard, the rooster, exhibits his acknowledgment of the presence of such an one in his own way, my reader may be pleased to know a little of my experience in this direction. I give the names of the men to prove, if necessary, what I say.

Mr. Beecher was the first one that I remember who picked me out among the crowd some seventeen years ago. Feeling the magnetism of a pair of eyes directed on me, I glanced up from the book I was reading and found him regarding me with a clear and penetrating eye. As our eyes met we "read" each other instantly. In a few minutes, while the choir were singing, I found his eye on me again. This time the expression appeared to be one of curiosity—"I wonder who he is" sort of look.

But as he then aroused the curiosity of a gentleman in front, who turned around to see what interested him so much, he stopped.

My impression of him was : a man of great power, with the quick perceptions of a woman. After visiting Plymouth Church once or twice Mr. Beecher appeared to know just where I was without looking, and by that means he got a good joke on me once. With the members of his church it is his practice, he says, to find out their weak (or strong) points, and then "preach all around them." In

practice, however, he finds that when he aims a shot at Jones, that gentleman sees in the picture of moral or religious turpitude so masterly drawn, a perfect likeness of Brother Brown, and as a Christian man he rejoices to see Brother Brown stirred up to a proper sense of his shortcomings.

I was a casual attendant only, but he saw where the pruning-knife might be profitably applied to my case, and he displayed such fine strategy that I was completely taken by surprise, and had no chance whatever to deflect the shot toward Brown or Jones. On entering, I generally glanced down from the gallery, and he generally glanced up in return, but on this evening he pretended to be terribly busy reading a book.

I sat opposite the end of the platform on his right, and could see that, in spite of his determination, his eyes began to flutter and would most likely have come up in another second, but I thought he had some particular reason for not looking up, and I did not press the matter.

His particular reason was a guilty conscience. He intended to hold me up as an awful example to his hearers.

In the course of his sermon he devoted a few words to sinners of my particular stripe, and just at the right moment he turned around and looked up at me with defiance in his eye, so that every one must have known for whom the shot was intended.

After that, when I went to hear him, I was careful to get a seat in front of him, so that he could not take me on the flank, and the next time he became personal in his remarks no one knew it but myself.

As a man Mr. Beecher stood very high in my estimation, and when he got into trouble and said not guilty, that settled the matter with me forever. After it was all over, an incident occurred that suggested a joke on the old gentleman, and as it is not every day that one can get a corner on the great American joker, I give it :

The first time I heard him was in the old church, and he was trying to infuse a little backbone into that class of young men who are practically failures. They go whining around, saying, "The world owes me a living," and all that.

"I know what's the matter with them," said he, "they aren't baked."

He wore a dress coat that morning, and he fulfilled my ideal of what Daniel Webster might have been, and one could hardly conceive of any combination of circumstances that would discourage or disconcert him for a moment.

After the trial, however, I saw, in reading an account of a Friday evening's "talk," that he had apparently broken down for just a moment. The ladies were weeping, the paper said, and the men felt badly. Had I been there myself, I fear I should have joined the ladies; but on reading the account at a safe distance from the scene, the other scene of some fifteen years before soon flashed through my mind, and I thought, "I know what's the matter with Mr. Beecher." But if he wasn't "baked," I understand he got a pretty good roasting.

In church I always took a back seat to avoid attracting the pastor's attention; but in over half of those that I used to attend occasionally I failed in that. If I escaped the pastor's notice, then the prima donna of the choir would most likely see me, and it is not an unpleasant sensation to have a pair of handsome eyes (generally blue) directed toward one occasionally.

One clergyman tried to convert me; he said "he did not deny the high intelligence," etc. Dr. Chapin said, "Have you never seen a man who, with a quiet exterior, yet possessed great power," etc. Mr. Alger, who preceded Dr. Collyer, said: "Our destinies equal our attractions."

There was no misunderstanding, either with the congregations, the clergyman, or myself, for whom these remarks were intended.

I never sought the acquaintance of any of these gentlemen; although I had an idea that they would like to know something about me. Dr. Chapin, in giving an invitation to every one to call on him one New Year's, directed a special look toward myself, but I did not go. Who was I? Nobody of any account. What had I done? Nothing very unusual. What did I expect to do? Nothing very unusual. These were my reasons. My business then was getting up new and somewhat original ideas in commercial art; but so far I have been unable to get out my two or three best thoughts.

I had been accustomed to be observed in this way in the provincial city where I resided for some time, but I was not prepared to have an operatic star sing "The Last Rose of Summer," in the music hall of the place, apparently for my especial benefit.

The conditions were peculiar. The end of the gallery where I sat ran past the end of the stage, so that those who sat there only saw the sides and backs of the artists at the footlights.

When the curtain rose the diva sat at a table directly facing me (in

the opera of *Martha*), and while the contralto sang, the soprano was observing me, instead of beaming on the young gentlemen in front of the house. Could I have known that I would divert the attention of any of the artists from their proper work I would have sat in the front of the house ; but that was my first experience with musical artists. In this case it was the baritone and the soprano only who were affected.

Both of them turned around their heads several times during the performance to look at me, and when the lady began to sing "The Last Rose of Summer," she faced around, turning her side to the majority of the audience, and sang it to me. But I suppose she was entirely unconscious of what she was doing, and probably would not have believed it if any one had told her she stood so in five minutes after. It was fortunate that the baritone behaved somewhat like the lady, as that may have conveyed the impression to the audience that I was an acquaintance, or even a great composer. Otherwise, the gossips might have been severe on the lady for acting under a psychological impulse over which she had no control.

Dr. Brown-Sequard, in reading a paper on this phenomena, said : "All that is known of this condition so far is that the person was always in a terribly nervous state." My own experience is that the more nervous I have been the wider was the circle that might be influenced by me. Ordinarily, it is only those who exhaust considerable nervous energy in the creative art themselves, such as clergymen or lecturers, and one or two of the principal artists in opera or theatre, that notice me in an audience. But when I have been very nervous the lesser lights on the stage then notice me, and I could easily spoil a performance by sitting at a certain point in a theatre.

When a lady's eye is attracted toward me, of course I endeavor to make her believe that it was the warmth of my glances that attracted hers ; but I got badly caught in that once, when it was insincere, by a lady at the Academy of Music, New York. *Lohengrin* was on the boards, and the soprano was singing explanations to the crowned personage on a throne at one end of the stage, while the contralto sat a few yards behind her, facing in the same direction, and as she was not engaged just then, she occupied her time, in part, by looking up to the upper gallery where I sat. At first I used to meet her glance, but as the soprano was singing just then, and as I had no idea that the other could tell to within a yard or two just who I was looking at, I kept my attention fixed on the soprano.

But soon an idea struck the other ; she would find out who I was looking at, and glancing up she swept her eyes down the rays of light from my eyes, and found they rested on the other lady. I felt very flat ; I knew that I was a traitor and a false one, like all the men.

I had always given women credit for being quick-sighted, and this severe lesson confirmed it ; so when at another time and place and troupe the soprano caught me looking with admiring eyes on the contralto, who was singing and acting with a real celestial fire, I knew I could not deceive her. Some of the male artists were much puzzled in regard to the matter. I have seen Campanini and Galassi stand side by side in the middle of the stage at the Academy, and look up to where I sat, sometimes in the last row of the top gallery, both quite absorbed with the problem, and neither apparently aware of the other's occupation.

I startled a lady "star" one night at the Grand Opera House, in New York. The lights were turned down to represent a sleeping apartment at midnight. It was quite dark, and I did not imagine any one among the audience could be seen from the stage. I was seated about the middle of the second balcony. She was in the act of coming on the stage from the side, and had taken about two steps when she stopped and looked up at me completely dumbfounded.

There was no acting then. It was real life. I feared she would get confused and forget her lines, but she was a lady of very strong will power, and recovered her self-possession, and soon went on with her part without attracting much attention to this part of her performance.

Whatever the men may have thought, it was evident that some of the unmarried ladies thought the "prince had come." "Why should they see me more than any other man?" Although, as far as personal appearance is concerned, most of them, I presume, have refused much better-looking men than myself, as I am not considered good-looking. But I never sought their acquaintance, and am still an old bachelor for reasons that I will refer to later.

And here I would ask if any one ever heard of the ladies falling in love with the general ?

Most people would think it odd to see the bold P. S. Gilmore, when approaching the footlights, stop in the middle of the stage, as if ordered to halt by some one he had just seen in the audience, and then move on again. And I suppose he was a little surprised himself

when, at Madison Square Garden, he found he had just executed a double bow—in the elegant manner he used to bow—to a man he had never seen before. I was surprised myself, and at first thought it might be intended for some one who sat behind me, but there was no one behind me. Nor is there any use in trying to hide from him at Manhattan Beach ; he always sees me at the concerts. So do a few of the soloists also.

The first time I noticed a rooster crow or flap his wings, as an apparent salute, was over twelve years ago.

I was seated on a veranda at Fairfield, Conn., all alone, and an old rooster, who hopped on to the veranda near me, ran over to one corner in what I thought an unnecessarily excited manner, as I was not interfering with him. There he stopped, and turning up his eye looked at me with the same apparent intelligence that a man or woman might exhibit, and immediately flapped his wings and crowed. I mentioned the incident to a friend in New Haven, and he laughingly replied, "Then you are bound to be high cockalorem."

Here is the general's chance. There is a chicken-fancier's within a few doors of where I write. Let him go in there for ten minutes, and if a rooster crows, either by accident or design, during that time, I will give him five cents to buy a good cigar, provided he agrees to give me five cents to buy a pound of grapes, say—as I don't use the weed—if three or four roosters crow during one minute while I am there.

Not all roosters, any more than all men, are susceptible to this influence, but the little game fellows generally are. Nor is it necessary that they should see me, in my case, before I hear from them. I have only mentioned the fact to two or three persons, and had a narrow escape from being "sat upon" by one of them—Grant's model. He kept a number of chickens at his place in New Haven, and as he and I were going into his barn one day, we passed the rooster at the door, and I remarked to him in the barn that roosters generally crowed when I passed them. There he had me, for this time the rooster did not crow. "Why, Moses," said he, "that rooster comes to the door of the house every morning and crows for ten or fifteen"—minutes, he would have said, but just then the rooster came to my aid, and rung out clear and loud. "There he goes," said he (Mr. J. D. Eldridge, New Haven, Conn.), and changed the subject. Since then, until now, I have allowed the roosters to do most of the crowing.

In the case of dwarfs, "fat ladies," etc., who have noticed me

among a crowd, I think it is owing to their becoming saturated with magnetism from the millions of eyes that are directed on them ; even that mass of flesh and bones, Jumbo, the elephant, appeared to be affected in this way. I saw him at Madison Square Garden one morning before the performance commenced. His head was turned away from me as I stood admiring his huge proportions for a moment, but I soon noticed an eye, away up aloft, begin to move—a handsome and intelligent brown eye—and after looking down at me a moment, with a kindly and interested expression, he turned around and moved his trunk toward me. His keeper pressed some gingernuts against it as it swayed around, but he threw them on the floor—he did not want cakes just then—he wanted to offer me the hand of good-fellowship, and is the last of the distinguished personages whom I will name at present.

I will now tell my reader why I am an old bachelor. When about nineteen years of age I boarded, together with three or four other apprentices, with an old German, in a rookery corner of Nineteenth Street and Broadway, where the carpet store now stands. One evening, after the young men had gone out to see their "flames," and while I stood alone in front of the fire, the question occurred to me, "I wonder what my wife will look like?" Instantly I saw myself standing outside the cabin of a North River ferry-boat, down-town, and looking at a young lady who was just stepping on board. She was a blonde, with red cheeks and what I will call the nose piquant—accent on the last syllable. The ordinary English name for such noses I don't admire, nor is the French name much of an improvement.

I was not at all pleased. She was not my ideal, but she looked as if she possessed the instincts of a lady, and as I never desired a beautiful wife, and if it was fate, I was satisfied, feeling something like the American voter after the election, when the wrong candidate has won.

This passed out of my mind in a few minutes, and I forgot all about it for over twenty years. Meantime, relatives and friends had been making matches for me, which, in a worldly sense, were good ones ; but for one reason or another I failed to "catch on" to their ideas, till at last it struck me that when one marries for money he admits his incapacity to take care of a wife and family like his fellows, and whatever one may admit to himself in this regard in the "forties," he does not like to admit it in the "twenties." Soon

after coming to this conclusion (which settled the matter) I was going over to Jersey City one Sunday afternoon, and as it was winter and snow on the ground, I stopped in the waiting-room to dry my boots at the stove before taking the boat. Two other persons had stopped there, and they stood on the opposite side of the stove—a young lady of about eighteen and her companion, a little boy. The lady's eyes were directed toward the door leading out to the boat, and she was bent nearly to a right angle in her interest in what she had seen going out of the door.

I assumed that she was a worshipper of children, and had been watching a child which had just gone out.

No thought of my vision occurred to me, but I had an idea, from the instant I saw her, that I would exert an influence over her, and I prepared to take a searching look at her when she should turn around. Her back was partly turned toward me, and as she stood for some moments in this attitude, perfectly motionless, and with a perfect grace and repose of manner, I thought, "What a fine model she would make!"

"Was it the red cheeks and the pug nose?" No. The first thing I noticed was that the cheek was a little thin, and it awoke my compassion for her, and I suppose it would be absolutely impossible for her to blush even—any exhibition of feeling must be seen in the eyes. As to the nose, there is no more beautifully chiselled Grecian nose in Christendom.

She was a blonde, but not so tall as the one I had seen in my vision. She is "the height of the perfect woman," and if I am capable of judging, she is the most beautiful woman living to-day. I believe she is living, but have no assurance of the fact. She is a New Jersey lily, I think, and, like most American productions, surpasses anything of the English kind.

When she turned around she looked past me out of the window, and as she offered no resistance I began to examine her features with a concentrated look, as if she were a statue. Beginning at the brow, I saw it was neither too high nor too low. The eyes of blue were neither too large nor too small, the expression intelligent and gentle. The nose was the straight, perfect Grecian. In fact, I had never met any one with such perfect features before. All that was wanting to complete the perfect Grecian lines was a little more—a very little more—fulness in the cheeks, and I knew that in ten years from then she would be a lovely woman. She appeared to

be on the turn between girlhood and womanhood, but had all of a woman's heart.

During my long, and it may be cruel, survey she did not resist or show any embarrassment, but stood perfectly motionless, looking past me out of the window, as at first. This rather puzzled me. "Is it stolidity?" No; those eyes are too intelligent for that. So I determined to see what was in those eyes. They now appeared to me like wells of clear water, in which I could read—"one love."

"Then, if I should be the first to make an impression, no one could cut me out." "A genuine democrat"—that is, she could not understand social distinctions. All were alike entitled to her help in trouble and to her pleasure in their happiness, and whether her husband were a hod carrier or a king would make no difference in her devotion to him.

This was consoling to a proud man ("as proud as a Spaniard," the phrenologist said), who did not know what ups and downs he might have in life.

I further saw that there was an entire absence of those little drawbacks which possess most mortals; but suddenly recollecting "that none are perfect," I stopped my analysis, lest I should see some defect.

I had seen more than enough of admirable qualities to offset an hundredfold any shortcomings, and if she swore and chewed tobacco it would have made no difference to me. She was the most perfect woman I had ever seen, and for the first time in my life I could worship without "mental reservation"—for it is the qualities of the mind and heart that command and hold love; the face is only admired as the indication of these qualities.

Thus far I had stood with my hands partly in my trousers pockets, and at this point I mechanically thrust them down to the bottom, and felt—about ten dollars. No use! Still she stood in the same perfectly motionless but perfectly graceful attitude; her hand, of beautiful proportion, neither too large nor too small, was hanging by her side in a perfectly easy and graceful manner. (A short time before this I asked the friends of a lady, whose very small hands they were boasting of, if she had a temper. They had to admit the fact. Everything in proportion makes the even temper and the level head.)

In the present case I thought the hand was an ambitious hand—ambitious to work for those she loved—but here I would head her off.

If the gods thought fit to intrust this work of nature's best art to my care, I would see to it that she did not overwork herself.

I had by this time exhausted every decent excuse to glance at her, although her manner appeared to say that I had a perfect right to look at her. But there was the boy. Of course I knew that he was not her son, but by looking down at him I could look up at her again. On trying to look at the boy, however, I found I could not see him, although I almost touched him. A thick bluish haze gathered before my eyes which I could not penetrate; evidently I had "eyes only for her."

Without appearing to look, I knew that she saw all that was going on from first to last, and doubtless interpreted the motions correctly. Even when I thrust my hands into my pockets, I presume she knew just what I would have said had circumstances been favorable. "Actions speak louder than words."

So far, her own part had been to keep her countenance, under a very severe ordeal; but to the direct question, Is this your son? she felt unequal, and while I was trying to penetrate the fog she turned round slightly, so as to present her profile, and as I raised my eyes to hers a great white light fluttered from her eyes, and both of us felt that the campaign was over. It had been "short, sharp, and decisive."

Soon she began to grow restless and to act mechanically, first standing on one foot and then on the other, the mind being absent. I knew the symptoms. After a while she took the boy by the hand, said "Come" mechanically, and they walked past me to the window, she to "think."

The boat having come in soon after, I glanced around to where she stood thinking, and went aboard. But that was not the last of it, though whether anything shall come of it time will tell. It did not occur to me then, nor until very lately, that this part of my vision had been almost literally fulfilled. Not on the boat, but in the ferry-house, and instead of being resigned to my fate, I need hardly say she fulfilled my ideal beyond my dream, and she was the only one I have ever met, either before or since, whom it appeared to be quite natural should be my wife. I feel sure I could have lived happily with others whom I have met, but when I came to think of any of them as wife, there appeared to be something wrong about it somehow.

Was I quite sure of the state of her feelings? Yes: I need not go into details. I have only met her three or four times, to know for

certain it was she. The last time I saw her was about four years from the time I had first met her. I had been to New Haven for about two years, and had come to New York and Jersey City for one day on business. Before I left, the possibility of meeting her during that day occurred to me. There was but one chance in millions, but the chance won that time. While going up Courtlandt Street, I noticed a lady turning into that street from Broadway. She was leading a child with one hand, and with the other carried a valise. Both hands being thus engaged, she had protected her face from the sun by a blue veil—it was early in September. I determined to cast a searching glance at this lady, just before she could pass me, although at the time the desire appeared to be nothing more than to see whether she was pretty or not. As she approached, I kept my eyes on the ground as if in a brown study, but I was really calculating to a nicety when to flash my eyes across her face.

My verdict was, "One of Jersey's beauties." "But, what!—those features! can any two be exactly alike? Now she will pass me, and I won't know whether 'tis she or not." All this flashed through my mind while taking one step. But after she had passed I knew it was she. Her features were too deeply imprinted on my memory for me to forget, but it was only by their absolute perfection that I could distinguish her at one glance from the numbers of American women who approach so closely to the Grecian lines.

She looked serene and calm, but just at the moment that I recognized her, she could not restrain the light from rising to her eyes. Evidently she had been to the sea-shore, and ocean and air and sky had combined in a happy conspiracy to make her beautiful, and she was then, without doubt, the most beautiful woman living, and she appeared to have grown younger instead of older, for now at twenty-two she looked sixteen.

I stopped to consider what to do, but then I was beginning some new ideas, and the thought was forced upon me that I must stick to them. So I concluded that I might be only a dreamer, and would never amount to anything, and she might do better, but as I turned to look after her, the words, "There goes the woman that is to be your wife, she will be your reward when your work is done," passed through my mind.

I did not pay much attention to the words at that time. I could understand the first part—the feeling that certain events will work themselves out somehow is not unusual—but the second part, "she

will be your reward when your work is done," I did not see through very clearly. I had no special work in hand that I could imagine would interest the fates very deeply. At the moment I met her I was going to have a drawing made of a new fountain group, which I knew to be original, and was called by a good judge a "poem in zinc," but with the exception of a few ideas in this direction, which I hoped to work out, I had no particular "work" on hand. But I now believe this was but the beginning of an education in designing, which, continued through years, has begotten a courage that did not hesitate a moment when I began to regard the scheme of government as a design which was capable of improvement; which, as I said before, consists in throwing out the mortal parts—selfishness and ambition.


And it is gratifying to myself to know that the scheme as worked out from the necessities of the case is identical with the business system—that it is not new, but is as "old as the hills." The system by which a firm, on a large or small scale, conducts its business, flatters no man's vanity—his money is recounted when he pays his bill, his goods are reweighed or checked when he fills an order, and the members of the firm themselves—not their representatives—originate the rules which govern their establishment.

This has been the fatal defect in all governments—the people have never had direct supervision of their own affairs, but have trusted to "rulers" to make their laws for them, until sooner or later they have had: "Wealth, vice, corruption—barbarism at last."


It is probable that what some are pleased to call "the common people" were never so well prepared as at the present time to take charge of their own affairs, and that by taking the reins of government in their own hands our system may be perpetuated.

Here is where the "work" comes in, for in getting rid of the humbug in the present plan, no leader except myself can look for other reward than the gratitude of his fellow-citizens, and the knowledge that he has done his duty to his country and his children.

And I am sure no arguments that I could make would have half the weight in favor of the plan that the short sketch in this chapter would have.









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